Sleep Paralysis

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Sleep paralysisI was afflicted from sleep paralysis as young child and into early adulthood. Without a doubt, these were the most terrifying moments of my life.

Despite being raised Roman Catholic, I never believed in the “devil” or demons. However, I can attest to the fact that there was unequivocally a “presence” during these episodes. The “visitations” occurred 9 times over the course of 13 years.  It may have been startled from sleep, but I was in a fully awake state during each incident.

Sleep paralysisAlthough the entity was present every time the sleep paralysis befell me, I only saw this creature once. The most significant occurrence happened when I was 9 years old. Robed in darkness, the faceless hooded being was lurking beside my bed. There was a sound emitting from him, not like breathing, it’s not a sound I can describe, it was more like a frequency, nor can I explain how I knew “it” was a he/alpha.

Unable to move or speak, I dared not fall into sleep, eyes wide open until dawn.  As the sun rose he melted into the ground, or under my bed I thought, but when his image dissolved, I was released from the grip of paralysis. Exhausted, as if I had a stroke, I thought this “fearsome entity” was out to possess my soul or was trying to crush or smother my life force.

This strange experience in the middle of the night, as you just come out of sleep, can be downright terrifying.

I know now there is NO sinister menacing intruder watching me, but as a child, it felt very real.

Classification

Sleep paralysis is a phenomenon in which a person, either when falling asleep or awakening, temporarily experiences an inability to move. It is a transitional state between wakefulness and sleep characterized by complete muscle atonia (muscle weakness). It is often associated with terrifying visions, such as an intruder in the room, to which one is unable to react due to paralysis, from which the term “nightmare” is derived. One theory is that it results from disrupted REM sleep, which is normally characterized by complete muscle atonia to prevent the sleeper from acting out his or her dreams. Sleep paralysis has been linked to disorders such as narcolepsy, migraines, anxiety disorders, and obstructive sleep apnea; however, it can also occur in isolation. When linked to another disorder, sleep paralysis commonly occurs in association with the neurological sleep disorder narcolepsy.

sleep-paralysis

The two major classifications of sleep paralysis are Isolated sleep paralysis (ISP) and the significantly rarer Recurrent Isolated Sleep Paralysis (RISP). ISP episodes are infrequent, and may occur only once in an individual’s lifetime, while recurrent isolated sleep paralysis is a chronic condition, and can recur throughout a person’s lifetime. RISP episodes can last for up to an hour or longer, and have a much higher occurrence of perceived out of body experiences, while ISP episodes are generally short (usually no longer than one minute) and are typically associated with the intruder and incubus visitations. With RISP the individual can also suffer back-to-back episodes of sleep paralysis in the same night, which is unlikely in individuals who suffer from ISP.

Signs and symptoms

Physiologically, sleep paralysis is closely related to REM atonia, the paralysis that occurs as a natural part of REM (rapid eye movement) sleep. Sleep paralysis occurs either when falling asleep, or when awakening. When it occurs upon falling asleep, the person remains aware while the body shuts down for REM sleep, a condition called hypnagogic or predormital sleep paralysis. When it occurs upon awakening, the person becomes aware before the REM cycle is complete, and it is called hypnopompic or postdormital. The paralysis can last from several seconds to several minutes, with some rare cases being hours, “by which the individual may experience panic symptoms” (described below). As the correlation with REM sleep suggests, the paralysis is not complete: use of EOG traces shows that eye movement is still possible during such episodes; however, the individual experiencing sleep paralysis is unable to speak.

Sleep paralysis alien abduction experienceHypnagogia and Hypnopompic visions are symptoms commonly experienced during episodes of sleep paralysis. Some scientists have proposed this condition as an explanation for reports of alien abductions and ghostly encounters. Some suggest that reports of alien abductions are related to sleep paralysis rather than to temporal lobe lability. There are three main types of these visions that can be linked to pathologic Neurophysiology. These include the belief that there is an intruder in the room, the incubus, and vestibular motor sensations.

Many people who experience sleep paralysis are struck with a deep sense of terror when they sense a menacing presence in the room while paralyzed—hereafter referred to as the intruder. A neurological interpretation of this phenomenon is that it results from a hyper-vigilant state created in the midbrain. More specifically, the emergency response is activated in the brain when individuals wake up paralyzed and feel vulnerable to attack.     This helplessness can intensify the effects of the threat response well above the level typical of normal dreams, which could explain why such visions during sleep paralysis are so vivid. Normally the threat-activated vigilance system is a protective mechanism to differentiate between dangerous situations and to determine whether the fear response is appropriate. Some hypothesize that the threat vigilance system is evolutionarily biased to interpret ambiguous stimuli as dangerous, because “erring on the side of caution” increases survival chances. This hypothesis could account for why the threatening presence is perceived as being evil.The Amygdala is heavily involved in the threat activation response mechanism, which is implicated in both intruder and incubus SP visions. The specific pathway through which the threat-activated vigilance system acts is not well understood. One possibility is that the thalamus receives sensory information and sends it on the amygdala, which regulates emotional experience. Another is that the amygdaloid complex, anterior cingulate, and the structures in the pontine tegmentum interact to create the vision. It is also highly possible that SP hallucinations could result from a combination of these. The anterior cingulate has an extensive array of cortical connections to other cortical areas, which enables it to integrate the various sensations and emotions into the unified sensorium we experience. The amygdaloid complex helps us interpret emotional experience and act appropriately. This is conducive to directing the individual’s attention to the most pertinent stimuli in a potentially dangerous situation so that the individual can take self-protective measures. Proper amygdaloid complex function requires input from the thalamus, which creates a thalamoamygdala pathway capable of bypassing the intense scrutiny of incoming stimuli to enable quick responses in a potentially life-threatening situation. Typically, situations assessed as non-threatening are disregarded. In sleep paralysis, however, those pathways can become over-excited and move into a state of hyper-vigilance in which the mind perceives every external stimulus as a threat. The hyper-vigilance response can lead to the creation of endogenous stimuli that contribute to the perceived threat.

Sleep-paralysis-causesA similar process may explain the experience of the incubus presence, with slight variations, in which the evil presence is perceived by the subject to be attempting to suffocate them, either by pressing heavily on the chest or by strangulation. A neurological explanation hold that this results from a combination of the threat vigilance activation system and the muscle paralysis associated with sleep paralysis that removes voluntary control of breathing. Several features of REM breathing patterns exacerbate the feeling of suffocation. These include shallow rapid breathing, hypercapnia, and slight blockage of the airway, which is a symptom prevalent in sleep apnea patients. According to this account, the subject attempts to breath deeply and finds herself unable to do so, creating a sensation of resistance, which the threat-activated vigilance system interprets as an unearthly being sitting on her chest, threatening suffocation. The sensation of entrapment causes a feedback loop when the fear of suffocation increases as a result of continued helplessness, causing the subject to struggle to end the SP episode.

The intruder and incubus experiences highly correlate with one another, and moderately correlate with the third characteristic experience, vestibular-motor disorientation, also known as out-of-body experiences, which differ from the other two in not involving the threat activation vigilance system. Under normal conditions, medial and vestibular nuclei, cortical, thalamic, and cerebellar centers coordinate things such as head and eye movement, and orientation in space.[9] A neurological hypothesis is that in sleep paralysis, these mechanisms—which usually coordinate body movement and provide information on body position—become activated and, because there is no actual movement, induce a floating sensation. The vestibular nuclei in particular has been identified as being closely related to dreaming during the REM stage of sleep. According to this hypothesis, vestibular-motor disorientation, unlike the intruder and incubus experiences, arise from completely endogenous sources of stimuli.

Pathophysiology

The Pathophysiology of sleep paralysis has not been concretely identified, although there are several theories about its etiology. The first of these stems from the understanding that sleep paralysis is a parasomnia resulting from dysfunctional overlap of the REM and waking stages of sleep. Polysomnographic studies found that individuals who experience sleep paralysis have shorter REM sleep latencies than normal along with shortened NREM and REM sleep cycles, and fragmentation of REM sleep. This study supports the observation that disturbance of regular sleeping patterns can instigate an episode of sleep paralysis, because fragmentation of REM sleep commonly occurs when sleep patterns are disrupted and has now been seen in combination with sleep paralysis.

Neurotransmitter systemAnother major theory is that the neural functions that regulate sleep are out of balance in such a way that causes different sleep states to overlap.  In this case, Cholinergic sleep on neural populations are hyper activated and the serotonergic sleep off neural populations are under-activated. As a result the cells capable of sending the signals that would allow for complete arousal from the sleep state, the serotonergic neural populations, have difficulty in overcoming the signals sent by the cells that keep the brain in the sleep state.  During normal REM sleep, the threshold for a stimulus to cause arousal is greatly elevated. However, in individuals with SP, there is almost no blocking of exogenous stimuli, which means it is much easier for a stimulus to arouse the individual. There may also be a problem with the regulation of melatonin, which under normal circumstances regulates the serotonergic neural populations. Melatonin is typically at its lowest point during REM sleep.[Inhibition of melatonin at an inappropriate time would make it impossible for the sleep off neural populations to depolarize when presented with a stimulus that would normally lead to complete arousal. This could explain why the REM and waking stages of sleep overlap during sleep paralysis, and definitely explains the muscle paralysis experienced on awakening.  If the effects of sleep on neural populations cannot be counteracted, characteristics of REM sleep are retained upon awakening. Common consequences of sleep paralysis includes headaches, muscle pains or weakness and/or paranoia.

Research has found a genetic component in sleep paralysis.  The characteristic fragmentation of REM sleep, hypnopompic, and hypnagogic hallucinations have a heritable component in other parasomnias, which lends credence to the idea that sleep paralysis is also genetic. Twin studies have shown that if one twin of a monozygotic pair experiences sleep paralysis that other twin is very likely to experience it as well.  The identification of a genetic component means that there is some sort of disruption of function at the physiological level. Further studies must be conducted to determine whether there is a mistake in the signaling pathway for arousal as suggested by the first theory presented, or whether the regulation of melatonin or the neural populations themselves have been disrupted.

Sleep paralysis could also be a part of a larger diagnosis because of the dissociative state seen during sleep paralysis. Like mentioned earlier patients, especially with narcolepsy, seem to have trouble distinguishing between states of wakefulness and sleep. They are unable to tell if what they are experiencing is a dream or if it is reality. Many patients can recall talking to a doctor if they are in the hospital or family and friends but they are uncertain if this memory was from a state of wakefulness or was experienced in REM sleep. Their recall is very similar to patients who suffer from delirium, which is why some experts conclude there is a dissociative state in sleep paralysis.

Another possible cause of sleep paralysis is depression. There is a correlation between depression and sleep disturbances, sleep paralysis being one of them. In people that are depressed there is about an 11% frequency of people that have sleep paralysis. The reasoning behind this is the depression causes disturbances in the REM sleep cycle.

 

 

Resources:

Sleep paralysis

What Causes Muscle Atonia in REM?

Sleep Paralysis Symptoms, Treatment, and Causes

Ever had sleep paralysis? That’s some scary shit!

A victim of sleep-paralysis recreates his visions

Sleep Physiology – Sleep Disorders and Sleep Deprivation .

Sleep paralysis – Spiritual Science Research Foundation

How to Stop Sleep Paralysis and Turn It Into Lucid Dreams

Non-Violent Activists Can Land on the Drone King’s Kill List

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Extrajudicial KillingSince 2008, the year of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s, the U.S. Department of Defense has funded a multimillion dollar university research program to probe the complex dynamics of mass social and political movements, anticipate global trends, and ultimately augment the intelligence community’s preparations for civil unrest and insurgencies both abroad and at home.

Part of that has involved developing advanced new data mining and analysis tools for the U.S. military intelligence community to pinpoint imminent and potential threats from individuals and groups.

Among its many areas of focus are ongoing projects at Arizona State University (ASU) designed to enhance and automate the algorithms used by intelligence agencies like the NSA to analyze “open source” information from social media in order to track the potential threat-level to U.S. interests. Formal organizations and broad social networks as well as individuals could be identified and closely monitored with such tools to an unprecedented degree of precision.

Loosely defined concepts of political “radicalism,” violence and nonviolence, as well as questionable research methodologies, open the way for widespread suspicion of even peaceful activist groups and their members, and the equation of them with potential terrorists. Civil society organizations in the U.K., including both Muslim religious groups and non-religious anti-war networks, have been prioritized for study to test and improve the effectiveness of these data-mining tools.

Tracking and Killing SurveillanceIncreasingly, though, the automation of threat-detection and terrorism-classification has been accompanied by the automation of killing, in the form of the generation of “kill lists” of terrorism suspects to be targeted via extrajudicial assassination by drone strikes. As President Obama, encouraged by powerful lobbies in the defense industries, has paved the way for the systematic integration of drones into domestic law-enforcement and homeland security operations, the prospect of extrajudicial assassinations occurring on U.S. soil are no longer merely hypothetical.

Now, new but little-known Pentagon directives authorize the use of armed drones against American citizens in the homeland in the context of domestic emergencies.

Flawed DoD Algorithms Determine Extrajudicial Assassinations

Algorithms of Death

“The algorithms being developed at ASU remind me of the algorithms used as the basis for signature strikes with drones,” said Thomas Drake, a former senior National Security Agency executive who leaked information about the NSA’s data-mining project Trailblazer to the press in 2006.

Drake agreed that the algorithms linked toLookingGlass,” a new Pentagon-sponsored Visual Intelligence Platform, could in fact be applied to fine-tuning the generation of the CIA’s notorious “kill lists.”

“Having the U.S. government and Department of Defense fund this kind of research at the university level will bias the results by default. This is a fall-out of big data research of this type, using algorithms to detect patterns when the patterns themselves are an effect – and mixing up correlation with causality. Under this flawed approach, many false positives are possible and these results can create an ends of profiling justifying the means of data-mining.”

It is now increasingly recognized that U.S. drone strikes against foreign terrorism targets have systematically killed large numbers of civilians, with a 2012 joint Stanford and New York University report suggesting that as few as 2% of casualties are “high-level” targets – an analysis cohering with counterinsurgency expert David Kilcullen’s 2009 estimate showing a “kill ratio” of 50 civilians to one militant, or, in other words, 98% civilian casualties.

Critical Targeting Challenge“My colleagues in Special Forces tell me that the men on the front line are furious with the lack of accuracy and integrity at the national level, and no longer trust the targeting data,” said former veteran CIA case officer Robert Steele, who previously served as a Marine Corps infantry officer.

“They have seen for themselves how wrong the system is when they look their man in the eyes. Technical surveillance is the most expensive, least useful, and least accurate form of surveillance. Technology is not a substitute for thinking. We must become deeply and broadly expert at the human factor.”

Drones Come Home

U.S. administration officials including Obama himself have repeatedly refused to confirm whether the alleged legal power to conduct extrajudicial assassinations via drone strikes extends to the U.S. homeland. Last year, prior to becoming CIA director, John Brennan told the Senate Intelligence Committee:…we do not view our authority to use military force against al-Qaeda and associated forces as being limited to ‘hot’ battlefields like Afghanistan.” He referred to Attorney General Eric Holder’s statement that “neither Congress nor our federal courts has limited the geographic scope of our ability to use force to the current conflict in Afghanistan.”

In February 2012, Obama signed in a law directing the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to throw American airspace wide open to drones by as early as September 2015. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) already deploys Predator drones to spot smugglers and illegal immigrants crossing into U.S. territory, and two dozen U.S. police departments have successfully applied for FAA permits for drones. As National Geographic observes, “all 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the U.S. are potential customers.” By 2020, it is estimated that some 30,000 drones would be active across the U.S. homeland.

Obama Using DirectiveDocuments obtained under Freedom of Information by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) show that police plan to use drones essentially for surveillance. In Seattle and Miami, drones are already being used during criminal investigations and in “hot pursuit” of suspects, and could be used during natural disasters along with “specific situations with the direct authorization of the Assistant Chief of the Homeland Security Bureau.” Hundreds of “domestic drone missions” have been flown by CBP on behalf of other state and local agencies.

Last year, government documents revealed that Department of Homeland Security had customized its Predator B drones, built originally for foreign military operations, for domestic surveillance tasks and to “respond to emergency missions across the country,” including “identifying civilians carrying guns and tracking their cell phones.”

These drones are now being used on U.S. soil by the FBI, Secret Service, Texas Rangers and some local police forces. The DHS had also proposed to arm its domestic fleet of border patrol drones with “non-lethal weapons designed to immobilize TOIs [targets of interest]” – an option also being pursued by local police agencies that want to arm drones with rubber bullets, tear gas and other riot control weapons.

Nobel ObamaAccording to an unclassified U.S. Air Force document, the deployment of military drones in U.S. airspace will be controlled by the Pentagon and will be able to monitor unidentified groups, as well as “specifically identified” individuals with the Secretary of Defense’s approval. Military drones “are allowed to fly drones in public areas and record information on domestic situations,” noted Jennifer Lynch of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Executive Decisions

In February 2013, an extraordinary Pentagon directive authorized the deployment of U.S. military resources and personnel to respond to domestic emergencies, quell civil unrest and support civilian law enforcement in a domestic terrorism incident. The new directive builds on an earlier 2010/2012 DoD directive specifically authorizing the use of military surveillance drones on U.S. soil under Pentagon authority.

Although that directive prohibited the use of “armed” drones for “DSCA [Defense Support of Civil authorities] operations,the new 2013 directive for Domestic Support to Civil Law-Enforcement Agencies goes further. It broadly asserts that “the Secretary of Defense may authorize the use of DoD personnel in support of civilian law enforcement officials during a domestic terrorism incident.”

Unlike the older directive, it stipulates that U.S. military commanders, including those at USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and USSOCOM, would receive blanket authority over “operations, including the employment of armed Federal military forces at the scene of any domestic terrorist incident.” No limit is specified on what kind of “armed military forces” the Pentagon can conceivably deploy.

U.S. Customs and Border ProtectionThe “hypothetical” but nevertheless real extension of powers here was confirmed when Republican Senator Rand Paul asked Attorney General Holder to confirm the Obama administration’s position on conducting armed drone strikes on U.S. soil.

Holder wrote back that “the president could conceivably have no choice but to authorize the military to use such force if necessary to protect the homeland in the circumstances like a catastrophic attack.”

While denying any specific “intention” to do so, Holder conceded “it is possible, I suppose, to imagine an extraordinary circumstance, in which it would be necessary and appropriate under the constitution and applicable laws of the United States for the president to authorize the military to use lethal force within the territory of the United States.”

Although Holder’s comments were widely publicized last year, their pseudo-legal parallel in the form of the Pentagon’s 2013 directive was not. The latter demonstrates that Holder’s consideration of the U.S. military’s legal authority to execute drone strikes on U.S. soil is far from “hypothetical.” On the contrary, the U.S. military was determined to ensure that this extraordinary authority was formally adopted.

I asked the U.S. Department of Defense whether it could confirm that the Minerva-funded data-mining research would not be used to support the U.S. intelligence community’s analytical tools to identify terrorism suspects, in particular to identify targets for Extrajudicial killing. I did not receive a direct answer to this question.

Extrajudicial killing1“Research in these areas will improve strategic and operational responses to insurgencies,” said Dr. Erin Fizgerald, chief of the Minerva program. “Perhaps more importantly, these efforts will help analysts faced with a particular political environment that seems ripe for mass mobilization – or a particular movement that appears to be turning violent or destabilizing a government – know where to look to understand a particular movement and its implications for society.”

terrorist-no-1

Global Instability

Prof. Mark Woodward, an anthropologist who leads the ASU projects funded by the DoD’s Minerva Research Initiative, is also affiliated to the CIA-funded Political Instability Task Force (PITF), originally formed in 1994 by appointment of the U.S. government. Although the PITF boasts of developing a predictive model with a “two-year lead time and over 80% accuracy” based purely on modelling “political institutions, and not economic conditions, demography, or geography,” in practice U.S. intelligence was unable to anticipate the unprecedented wave of instability that has swept across the Middle East and North Africa since 2011.

The Pentagon Minerva program addresses this gap in attempting to account for a complex range of interconnected factors beyond political institutions, including the impacts of environmental, energy and economic crises.

As I reported last year, the NSA’s surveillance programs are linked to extensive Pentagon planning for civil unrest in the context of escalating risks from climate, oil, food and economic shocks. Official documents over the last decade confirm that the intelligence community anticipates a heightened threat of instability, including “domestic insurgencies,” due to social and political collapse triggered by such shocks.

As episodes like the recent conflagration in Ferguson demonstrate, the Pentagon’s fears of a future of imminent domestic civil unrest are already being borne out.

 

 

Resources:

MEDIA ROOTS – Reporting From Outside Party Lines

Exposed: Pentagon Funds New Data-Mining Tools to Track

LookingGlass: A visual intelligence platform for tracking

US Customs grounds drone fleet after $12 million

‘Defense support of civil authorities‘ has been authorized

Drones in the Homeland: A Potential Privacy Obstruction

Seemorerocks: Tracking and killing activists

The mixed record of foreign fighters in domestic insurgencies

Tweaking the Constitution to Make Extrajudicial Killing Easier

Political Instability Task Force – Center for Global Policy

Meet The “Minerva Research Initiative” – The Pentagon’s

ISIS Revealed as ISRAELI SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

Originally posted on Chemtrails: The Exotic Weapon:

zionist-plan-copy1

This 1990 publication is the first comprehensive and balanced account of the most controversial and well-known espionage organization in the world, taking readers through the complex web of politics and personal ambition that led to such disasters as the brutal violence on the West Bank. 8 pages of photographs.

Complete C-Span Interview

Book Every Spy a Prince Dan RavivThe amount of detail in this book certainly lends some credence to the book’s subtitle, and the journalist authors have also uncovered some fascinating new information: Israel has a number of top secret agencies, including one devoted to protecting their nuclear program and another for rescuing Jews from unfriendly countries; nuclear weapons using submarine-based launch platforms are nearly a reality; and Israel has been spying on the United States for years. The authors work diligently in this book to convince the world of the high morality of the Israeli cause. Israeli intelligence has been a popular subject for…

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America’s Obsession With Racial Purity

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race mixingIn November 2000, after a statewide vote in a special election, Alabama became the very last state to overturn a law that was an ugly reminder of America’s past, a ban on interracial marriage. The one-time home of George Wallace and Martin Luther King Jr. had held onto the provision for 33 years after the Supreme Court declared Anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional.       Yet as the election revealed40 percent of Alabamans voted to keep the ban — many people still see the necessity for a law that prohibits blacks and whites from mixing blood. I find that shocking!

Werner Sollors, a professor of Afro-American studies at Harvard, was born in Germany and came to the United States in 1978. He has been studying and writing about the history of American interracial relationships since 1986. Sollors is the editor of his book “Interracialism : Black-White Intermarriage in American History, Literature, and Law,” a fascinating survey of legal decisions, literary criticism and essays by writers and scholars including Langston Hughes, W.E.B. Du Bois and Randall Kennedy. Here Sollors discusses mixed-race origins — and multiracial future — of the nation.

What took Alabama so long to overturn its anti-miscegenation law?

In the years after the Civil War, most of the Southern states made miscegenation bans part of their constitutions. And part of the constitutional provision was that no legislation should ever change them. These were not just ordinary laws that you could modify with a simple majority; they called for very complicated processes and very large majorities to be overturned.

In 1967, the Supreme Court invalidated these anti-miscegenation provisions with the Loving v. Virginia case, and the Southern states began to adjust. But not right away. In the first 10 or 15 years, there wasn’t a lot of activism or popular support for having the laws changed — no politician wanted to be caught trying to remove those statutes. I think Mississippi did it in 1987 or 1988 — 20 years after the Loving vs. Virginia case.

Alabama also had a law — dating back to the 1833 Pace v. Alabama case — that mandated different punishment for a black-white couple who “fornicated” or committed adultery than for a same-race couple.

Pace v. AlabamaIsn’t that amazing? It reads like Orwell. The federal Supreme Court sanctioned the states’ right to mete out different punishment for the same offense depending on whether the people involved were of different races or not.

 Virginia Racial Integrity Act of 1924.

They actually required people who got married to hand in authenticated racial genealogies. To get a marriage license you had to show that you and your partner were not of different races.

But all states weren’t like Virginia. South Carolina took into account someone’s reputation and place in society when judging whether that person was black.

EugenicsYes, South Carolina defined whiteness in a broader way than North Carolina or Virginia or Mississippi did. The assumption is that they wanted to have as many white people as possible in their community.

With state autonomy, if a general principle is agreed upon, states can take quite different routes to achieving that principle. If the principle is to have racial segregation in a hierarchical way, one state might think that it’s a good idea to have as large a white population as possible. Another state might think the best thing is to have as sharp a dividing line as possible. Neither of them makes sense, but they coexist in an interesting way and create a lot of drama in the United States. In the 19th century, you could move from one state to another and be reclassified racially.

Fear of miscegenation was the driving force behind all racial classifications and, eventually, segregation.

Fear of miscegenationIt’s really interesting how much effort had to be undertaken by lawmakers in so many states in order to prohibit something that clearly was going on. A whole apparatus of legislation arose to prohibit it, and in a way that runs so much against the grain of the democratic ethos. The free choice of the person you want to marry seems to be a pretty basic human right.

From that angle, it does indeed seem that the core of the fear of racial integration is miscegenation, and that everything else surrounding it is protecting that core. In the 1950s, even in the argument about school and desegregation, there was always the bottom-line question: Do you want your daughter to marry a Negro? President Truman famously asked that of a reporter.

It’s interesting that it’s always “daughter.”

That has something to do with the way “the Negro” was cast in the popular imagination. A good example is Gunnar Myrdal’s classic study of American blacks, “An American Dilemma,” which really changed the climate against segregation in 1944. It’s a massive book, 1,500 pages, in which the Negro is always imagined as a man. Women are white women. When people said “the Negro,” the first association was always a man, and the problem of the Negro was the problem of Negro men. Which is something the last three decades of scholarship about black women has somewhat corrected and challenged.

It really struck me how American the anti-miscegenation drive is, and that it’s specifically black-white relations that are such a problem here. Is there any other country that compares?

An American DilemmaOn this abstract racial principle of “black” and “white,” there really is an exceptional situation in the U.S. In virtually every other country, people who in the U.S. would be considered “people of color” have lived together with white people without such prohibitions.

Even in South Africa, the legal prohibition on interracial marriage was short-lived. At the beginning of the last century, when the first prohibitions on interracial sex were enacted, they only affected black men going to white prostitutes — that was the beginning of apartheid. Only after World War II was interracial marriage prohibited in South Africa, and that lasted 40 years.

Whereas prohibition of interracial marriage in the United States is pretty much the whole history of the country until 1967. That’s a very dramatic difference.

What about different regions of the U.S.? Is it still true that, as Alain Locke wrote in 1916, “The North loves the Negro and dislikes Negroes, while the South hates the Negro and loves Negroes” is a generalization with a hint of truth?

MiscengenationLocke was looking at a relatively early stage of the migration of Southern blacks to the North, but even now you could find a bit of lip service paid to racial mixing from pro-integrationist Northerners who have little interracial contact, and you could find hostile white Southerners who have a lot of close contact with blacks. That is a paradox.

In history class, we learn about the Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act, but not about the case that ended the ban on interracial marriage, Loving vs. Virginia. It’s a landmark case, but it isn’t usually included as a part of the history of the civil rights movement.

It really isn’t part of the common consciousness and it isn’t celebrated. [The case involved an interracial couple, Mildred and Richard Loving, who were married in Washington, D.C., and then moved to Virginia, where their marriage was prohibited; the Lovings were awakened in their bed one night by a policeman and taken to jail. Mildred Loving, who was black, was widowed in 1975 when Richard, who was white, died in a car accident.] Once in a while a magazine will mention it. Emerge magazine, for example, had a celebratory piece in 1997, for the 30th anniversary of the decision. But it’s really very low-key by comparison with the other landmarks.

When the Loving decision came out, it was during the Six-Day War in Israel and there were the urban riots in the United States, so it was an incredibly troubled national and international moment. Way in the back of the newspaper, among other decisions, Loving was mentioned. It didn’t have a contemporary resonance. People didn’t say, “Wow, it’s really over.”

LovingvVirginiaQuoteIt should still resonate — it’s the same issue that’s now come up again with gay marriage.

Did blacks support overturning the ban?

In “An American Dilemma,” Gunnar Myrdal pointed out that for blacks, interracial marriage was the lowest rung of what he called the “rank order of discrimination.” The first things they wanted were equal legal treatment and voting rights and employment rights. The freedom to marry whites was always listed, but it was the last item that came to mind in terms of what one suffered during segregation. Whereas for white, liberal civil rights people, it was a pretty high-ranking item on the agenda.

Black resistance to interracial marriage comes up strongly in literature of the 1960s. The standard plot is that the black man gets divorced from a white woman. Then there are all the stories, which before were written from the white side, that started appearing from the black side also: worry about having children with someone outside of the race, about what the children’s identity would be and so on.

What does literature add to the legal history?

When you look at Latin American myths of origin, they always involve mixed beginnings; for example, there’s a marriage of a Portuguese and an Indian or something of that sort. The Brazilian founding myth involves three races. Mexico has three cultures.

By contrast, it seems odd — especially in the age of multiculturalism in America — to always focus on antagonistic stories that are based on one origin and then on conflict only. But there is also American literature out there that does very much what these Latin American founding myths do. There has been quite a bit of recent interest in the literature of “passing” and the literature of mixed-race alliances. And in a way, the gossip about presidents has a function similar to that literature.

jeffersonhemingsSally Hemings and Thomas Jefferson

One has to have mythic stories. If Jefferson’s family includes Sally Hemings’ family, then America, much farther back, is a much more united country than the fiction of separate races permits us to consider. For that reason, the JeffersonHemings story has always been interesting to writers who were progressives on the racial front and were trying to address the problem of the color line. The Jefferson-Hemings story is particularly telling too, because this is the author of the Declaration of Independence, the whole root of the enterprise — “All men are created equal.”

Interracialism: the problem of the 21st century could be colorblindness, as opposed to what W. E. B. Du Bois said 100 years ago: “The problem of the 20th century is the problem of the color line.”

There are two camps. On the one hand, colorblindness is a problem as long as social equality is not achieved. It might be a wonderful ideal to aim for, but one can’t presume that we’re now completely race neutral and we’ll achieve social justice.

On the other hand, the “race blindness” camp is strong in saying, “Why should we perpetuate the very same categories that were used for such unbelievably sinister purposes? Wouldn’t some other measures of addressing the injustice of the past be more appropriate?” Whenever somebody fills in the affirmative action form, they probably have that reaction — “My God, why should I classify myself racially? Shouldn’t we steer policies more toward a form of social equalization that will make these categories unnecessary?”

What’s been going on with racial categories in the census is also interesting.

The census had two rules. One is the 1997 rule that permitted everyone to mark more than one box in the 2000 census. Then came the 2000 evaluation procedure, which allowed the census to classify anyone who marked more than one box as part of the “people of color” category — if there was a white and color mix indicated.

Essentially, it’s one thing to say that a person can fall into multiple racial categories, but what happens to all the people in the old categories? It can have some disastrous consequences now because in some states, apparently many white Americans found it fashionable to indicate that they were Native American. In some counties where Native Americans were a minority they may now end up as a majority. There are lots of headaches with counting and civil rights and voting rights and districting that are going to come in the next two years as a result of this census decision.

interracial marriageHow will interracial relationships affect America demographically in the future?

The U.S. Census presumes that there is no interracial procreation going on. The predictions it makes about the future population of the United States are based on the assumption that after tonight at midnight, no further interracial relationship takes place. It is an absurd assumption. If we include the possibility of interracial procreation, the future population of the United States will look completely different from what the census predictions tell us now. “The Browning of America by 2050″ prediction, which says that whites will no longer be in the majority by 2050, assumes that procreation will happen only within the five affirmative action categories.

Why don’t they take interracial marriage into account?

I really can’t understand why this variable isn’t put into play. They predict all kinds of things — like whether more people will move to cities or fewer will move to cities. But they don’t predict that after today there will be any children born to parents who fall into different race categories.

But if you acknowledge a mixed-race population, there’s going to be an even larger future mixed-race population, even if you presume just a continuation of the last 10 years of interracial progeny.

The Browning of AmericaSome people have the sense that more intermarriage will promote racial harmony.

Where we are now is just on the point of overcoming the legacy of a very long and exceptional set of prohibitions against interracial marriage. We’re merely correcting a serious and long-lasting social block. There is beginning to be more reflection on the possibility of multiracial identity. I’m not a Utopian and I don’t think there’s anything necessarily superterrific that will come from that. I myself don’t think that racial harmony is guaranteed by interracial marriage. But I think that racial disharmony was guaranteed by prohibiting it.

Recources:

Anti-miscegenation laws in the United States

Loving v. Virginia | LII / Legal Information Institute

Interracial marriage

Mixing it up – Salon.com

Historical Overview Lasting Effects

Bill of Rights Institute: Landmark Supreme Court Cases

Full text of “American dilemma: the Negro problem and

Mississippi Republican – Public Policy Polling

Patchwork heritage: our beautiful rainbow country

NATO Ignores Climate Change At Its Peril

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Leaders watch a ceremony honoring NATO military personnel for their service the NATO Summit meeting in ChicagoRetired US navy admiral James Stavridis, former supreme allied commander Europe, dubbed the NATO Summit in Wales “the most important one since the fall of the Berlin Wall because of the clear level of multi-crises.”

Russia’s Revanchist military designs in Ukraine, instability in Libya, and the implosion of the Syrian and Iraqi states, have all focused NATO’s attention on its backyard.

But despite NATO’s renewed focus on state-based threats, it’s not the same world the alliance dealt with during the cold war.

Since 1991, the world population has increased by two billion, the internet and global marketplace connect nations across democratic and authoritarian borders, and transnational threats, including cyber-security, state failure, and the proliferation of nuclear materials, litter the international security environment.

Overlaid on this landscape is climate change, a “threat multiplier” which according to the Pentagon’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, places significant strains on water, food and energy security.

Is NATO ready for a multi-crisis world, exacerbated by a changing climate?

climate-change-instability-multiplier-blue-water-prize-reportThe threat multiplier

While for some it may seem strange for NATO to fret over climate change as Russian forces mass on Europe’s doorstep, today’s alliance must have the capacity to prepare for, and respond to, multiple threats – or as we say in America “walk and chew gum at the same time.”

Like threats emanating from states, threats from climate change can be unpredictable and destabilising. More extreme and frequent floods and droughts will stress the forces of NATO member states, who are called upon as first responders both inside and outside the alliance’s borders.

Stresses on food production and prices threaten fragile regions in NATO’s backyard, as well as burden member state budgets in a time of austerity.

Rapid sea ice melt is dramatically shifting the geopolitics of the Arctic region, creating new challenges for member states that border the Arctic, including the Russia, China, US, Canada and Norway.

Water insecurity in regions of strategic concern to NATO, such as North Africa and the Middle East, is contributing to the devastation of crops and livestock and widespread displacement of peoples.

These cascading disasters associated with climate change could diminish the capacity of a NATO whose forces and budgets are strained. If left unchecked, these dynamics could fray the bonds that hold the alliance together – just when those bonds are needed most.

NATO’s track record on climate change

In 2008, as Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s term drew to a close, he said: “Climate change could confront us with a whole range of unpleasant developments — developments which no single nation state has the power to contain.”

In 2009, secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen integrated climate concerns into NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept. It states: “Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO, and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.”

Since then, NATO has done little to address those challenges, all while climatic risks have increased.

Climate Change and National SecuritFoundations laid

Despite legitimate competing priorities, NATO has a responsibility to address the climate threat head on.

The good news is that NATO doesn’t have to start from scratch. The US military – leader of NATO’s Military Command Structure – has been proactive in addressing the climate threat, as highlighted in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, the DoD Arctic Strategy, and robust statements by defense secretary Hagel.

NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen laid out a robust list of objectives for the alliance and its member states in 2009, which remain relevant today.

The alliance has held workshops on the issue, such as one in 2010 which led then supreme allied commander Admiral James G. Stavridis to warn that climate change could spur conflict in the Arctic if steps were not taken to avoid that “icy slope.”

Lastly, the incoming secretary general Jens Stoltenberg has an impressive track record handling both traditional security matters and climate change.

This lays the groundwork for NATO to make bold decisions on climate change, without taking its eye off other pressing concerns. Here’s the low-hanging fruit:

  • Raise the profile of climate change at NATO summits, on the NATO agenda, and at international security forums;
  • Encourage member states to integrate climate risks into intelligence assessments, and national security and defense strategies (modeled on the US Quadrennial Defense Review);
  • Call on member states to integrate climate risks into exercises and training for forces, in preparation for increased humanitarian crises that could result;
  • Support developing  the capacity of partner nation forces to manage increases in the frequency, severity and variability of natural and humanitarian disasters;
  • Enhance the operational resilience of NATO forces by promoting strategic investments in energy efficiency and renewable energy;
  • Build on Bulgarian suggestions to develop a common NATO strategy for addressing the impact of climate change on military operations.

Such actions will save NATO member states money and lives in the future. Being adequately prepared for climate-related risks will bolster NATO’s resilience, ensure the adequacy of forces when responding to more traditional threats, avoid the higher costs of responding to such threats post facto and with minimal preparation, and enhance the ability of NATO to manage low probability and high impact threats in the future.

Climate of opportunity…for now

As distinct from more unpredictable security threats, climate change projections have actually given us considerable advanced warning of the range of probable outcomes to expect.

But as the scientific research confirms, climate change is not a future threat. It’s here, and it is changing the very nature of the global security landscape.

Institutions like NATO therefore have a shrinking window of opportunity in which to develop a strong, durable and climate-resilient force. Success in this objective could go a long way towards shaping regional and global responses to emerging threats [like Agenda 21 and Smart Growth].

agenda21In short, the 21st century demands a multi-tasking NATO, capable of “fending off threats” from many directions. And climate change, the consummate threat multiplier, will not be ignored or funded.

 

Resources:

National Security and the Threat of Climate Change

Comments on NATO

Climate Change and National Security in the 2014

Sage Advice on Sustainable DevelopmentGlobal Sherpa

 

Iran’s Emergence as a Cyber Power

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Emerging Security ThreatIran is a country of 80 million people, educated and dynamic. It sits astride a crucial part of the world. It cannot be sanctioned and pressed down forever. It is the last great civilization to sit outside the global order. – Fareed Zakaria

 

As international scrutiny remains focused on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Nuclear Program, a capability is developing in the shadows inside Iran that could pose an even greater threat to the United States. The 2010 National Security Strategy discusses Iran in the context of its nuclear program, support of terrorism, its influence in regional activities, and its internal problems. There was no mention of Iran’s cyber capability or of that ability to pose a threat to U.S. interests. This is understandable, considering Iran has not been a major concern in the cyber realm. Furthermore, Russia and China’s cyber activities have justifiably garnered a majority of attention and been widely reported in the media over the past decade. Iran’s cyber capabilities have been considered third-tier at best. That is rapidly changing. This report discusses the growing cyber capability of Iran and why it poses a new threat to U.S. national interests.
 
 

Iran in a Cyber Context

 
      Just as computing power grows exponentially each year, so can an adversary’s cyber capabilities. When one considers the origins of world-class cyber threats to the United States, two countries immediately come to mind—Russia and China. Yet with its growing cyber capabilities and intent to use them, Iran is rapidly striving to earn a position among the ranks of this nefariously elite group. For decades, the U.S. Government has publicly acknowledged concern over Iran’s efforts to develop a Nuclear Programto counter U.S. military capabilities. Recently, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review stated that, “Over the past 5 years, a top Administration priority in the Middle East has been preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.”2 This focus on Iran’s nuclear ambitions has distracted many from Iran’s other developing capability. In the last few years, Iran’s cyber proficiency has garnered the attention of a select few government officials and private industry leaders. In late-2011, an executive chairman of Google stated, “The Iranians are unusually talented in cyber war for some reason we don’t fully understand.”3 Stopping a cyber adversary from disrupting activity or stealing intellectual property has been the primary concern of government and private sector organizations, but in the military and intelligence communities, there are other concerns about Iran.
 
 
      Few countries (or nonstate actors) can come close to matching or opposing U.S. military capabilities without taking an asymmetric warfare approach. As U.S.-led sanctions and international isolation impact Iran, the regime continues to seek ways to counter this threat and send a message. “The past year [2012] has seen the Iranian regime evolve significantly in its exploitation of cyberspace as a tool of internal repression…Iran has also demonstrated a growing ability to hold Western targets at risk in cyberspace, amplifying a new dimension in asymmetric conflict.”4 In the global community, few countries are on par with the cyber capabilities of the United States, Russia, and China. The ability to attack another country or target an adversary’s leaders, population, or infrastructure via the cyber domain, causing significant harm, disability, or damage to key facilities such as electric power grids or financial institutions has been the province of an elite group of countries. Iran, considered a third tier cyber power compared to the United States, is rapidly becoming a world-class cyber threat. During a recent subcommittee hearing, U.S. Representative Peter Hoekstra (R-Michigan) stated that, “Iran has boosted its cyber capabilities in a surprisingly short amount of time and possesses the ability to launch successful cyber attacks on American financial markets and its infrastructure.”5
 Iran

Iran’s Cyber Evolution

 
      Any mention of the Islamic Republic of Iran immediately invokes thoughts of veiled nuclear programs and support for terrorism, as well as ways (primarily military) to counter these threats. However, understanding Iran’s perspective is vital to knowing what is behind its cyber development. First and foremost in importance to the Islamic Republic is its regime survival, followed by its right to a nuclear program and other national interests. Prior to 2009, much of Iran’s cyber efforts were focused internally on countering government dissidence. The influential Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) proposed the development of an Iranian Cyber Army in 2005 to combat internal threats. It sought out professional hackers through voluntary means or by using blackmail and threats to boost its ranks.
 
 
      Although the 2007 Russian cyber attacks against the government websites of Estonia and Georgia may have been the first such shots in cyberspace, the Stuxnet attack that targeted Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was the catalyst that changed the entire dynamic of Iranian cyber development. Publicly revealed in July 2010, it is considered the most advanced cyber weapon of its kind to date. Stuxnet insidiously compromised centrifuge operations at the Natanz nuclear power plant critical to Iran’s uranium enrichment efforts, causing delays to Iran’s nuclear program. Ironically, Stuxnet also served as the watershed event that spurred the Islamic Republic to make Iran’s cyber capability a priority. From an Iranian perspective, Stuxnet was like the famous bifurcated sword called Dhu al-Fiqar or Zulfiqar in Persian that, among Shia Islam, is believed to have been given by the Islamic prophet Muhammad on his death bed to his son-in-law Ali as his successor. Stuxnet confirmed that the Islamic Republic’s interests were under attack, but it also served as the forcing function needed to formalize and expand its cyber capability.6
 
 
      In early March 2012, Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khameni publicly announced to state media the creation by decree of a new Supreme Council of Cyberspace charged “to oversee the defense of the Islamic Republic’s computer networks and develop new ways of infiltrating or attacking the computer networks of its enemies.”7 It included heads of intelligence, militia, security, media chiefs, and the IRGC. It has its own budget and offices along with the power to enact laws. Additionally, the IRGC stated that a secure internal network for high-level command and control called “Basir” (Persian for perceptive) was created to counter outside threats to online activities.8 However, it is clear from its actions against opposition influences and dissident groups that the regime continues internal censorship and monitoring as well. Furthermore, Reporters Without Borders, in its 2012 annual report of countries that restrict internet access, filter content, and imprison bloggers, “ranked Iran the number one enemy of the Internet…ahead of 11 other countries—including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria, China, and Belarus.”9
 
 
      Today, Iran as a cyber power is the elephant in the room that everyone is finally beginning to notice. The Iranian government was originally believed to have budgeted approximately $76 million annually to its fledgling cyber force. However, in late-2011, Iran invested at least $1 billion dollars in cyber technology, infrastructure, and expertise.10 In March 2012, the IRGC claimed it had recruited around 120,000 personnel over the past 3 years to combat “a soft cyber war against Iran.”11 In early-2013, an IRGC general publically claimed Iran had the “fourth biggest cyber power among the world’s cyber armies.”12 Regardless of the numbers, the fact is that Iran’s cyber capability continues to mature. The IRGC has its own Cyber Defense Command which recruits and trains cyber warriors to spy on dissidents on the internet and spread Iranian government propaganda.13 The IRGC also now owns and controls Iran’s largest communication company and manages the skilled cyber technicians and specialists of Iran’s Cyber Army trained to hack into opposition websites and conduct other types of offensive cyber operations. On the law enforcement side, the FETA police (in Persian it literally means Police of the Space of Creating and Exchanging Information) handle typical internet crimes as well as more opaque enforcement activities such as political and security crimes. There are other Iranian organizations and companies recruited and/or affiliated with Iran’s cyber capabilities, either knowingly or by loose association.
 
 
      On February 12, 2013, during a discussion about Iran’s cyber development at the Center for National Security at Fordham Law, former Iranian Ambassador and visiting current research scholar at Princeton University Seyed Hossein Mousavian stated, “The U.S., or Israel, or the Europeans, or all of them together, started war…Iran decided to establish a cyber army, and today, after 4 or 5 years, Iran has one of the most powerful cyber armies in the world…it’s exaggerating the present capabilities but it’s working toward the future.”14 While Iran’s overall cyber capabilities may be inflated there is little doubt it is serious about becoming a dominant future cyber power. That future may be closer than initially anticipated. General William Shelton, head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, said “Iran’s developing ability to launch cyber attacks will make it a force to be reckoned with. Iran poses a risk because of the potential capabilities that they will develop over the years and the potential threat that will represent to the U.S.”15
 Cyber Basij

Iran’s Cyber Capability as a Threat

 
      While Iran has not yet graduated to full membership as a world-class cyber power on par with the United States, China, and Russia, “it is the intensity, variety, and destructiveness of Iran-linked cyber intrusions over the past 5 years” that has accelerated its ranking as a cyber threat.16 The evolution of Iranian cyber capability did not just occur overnight or in a vacuum. It was cultivated over the years in a crucible of real-world activity and consolidated in lessons learned from dealing with internal attacks against the government by dissidents, external attacks against its nuclear infrastructure, and through efforts to create and educate its own technical force. What Iran currently lacks in technological know-how, it more than makes up for in ambition. To reinforce this point and show Iran’s intent, the commander of Iran’s information technology and communication department of the General Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces stated that “one of the options on the table of the U.S. and its allies is a cyber war against Iran…but we are fully prepared to fight cyber warfare.”17
 
 
      The sophistication of attacks like Stuxnet proved successful in delaying Iran’s nuclear program development, but it also served as an opening salvo in the escalation of cyber warfare. “Iran represents a qualitatively different cyber actor… they’re not stealing our intellectual property en masse like China, or using cyberspace as a black market like the Russians do…what Iran does use cyber for, including elevating its retaliatory capabilities abroad, makes it a serious threat.”18 Iran understands it cannot match the United States and its allies directly and therefore must strengthen its asymmetric toolset to counterbalance this gap. So as not to rely exclusively on foreign technology, in late December 2013, the IRGC publicly revealed Indigenously Developed cyber defense products including secure: cell phones; operating system; navigation system; telecommunications optical transmission system; anti-malware; cyber threats recognition and identification system; security operations center; a high-speed and high-capacity firewall and a software firewall. Although the technology is likely not as advanced as U.S. equipment, this proves that the Islamic Republic is tenaciously working to address its concerns and close the gap.
 Iran's cyber capability
      Iran is actively seeking increased offensive cyber capabilities that could also increase its asymmetric position. It has shown its ability to use cyber attacks to infiltrate and take down targets. In 2011, it infiltrated a Dutch company and stole digital certificates for secure communications that it later used internally to hack Iranian citizens’ communications and email. In 2012, Iran was suspected of launching malware that wreaked havoc on 30,000 computers at the Saudi oil company Aramco. This attack was followed later in the year by another against Qatari energy company, RasGas. In late-2012, a significant Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack was executed against websites of major U.S. banks. Iran was suspected, but what was even more disconcerting to the United States, was the magnitude of traffic flow which was greater than anything previously seen from a DDOS attack up to that point. This indicated a remarkable degree of sophistication.19 In late-2013, Iran’s infiltration of the U.S. Navy’s internet network garnered much attention because it indicated Iran’s capability had advanced. It not only showed Iran could get into a U.S. Department of Defense system, but it highlighted the ability to stay in it for several months. An example of this improved knowledge was initially suggested back in May 2012 when Morteza Rezaei, an Iranian cyber engineer with NEDA Industrial Group in Tehran, published his analysis of how to defend against Stuxnet.20 What was more disturbing was what he wrote it in Control Global, to show just how far Iran’s cyber knowledge had come.
 
 
      Iran is no doubt working hard to elevate its standing as a world-class cyber power. It is taking full advantage of U.S. foreign policy issues to foster relationships with U.S. adversaries such as China and Russia that will help advance Iran’s cyber capabilities. General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in an interview in January 2013 that, “there are reports that destructive cyber tools have been used against Iran…whoever’s using those can’t assume that they’re the only smart people in the world.”21 Maybe a more imminent U.S. concern regarding Iran should be the danger the Islamic Republic poses if it becomes a world-class cyber power. All indications show this is likely to happen sooner than later.

 

***

ENDNOTES

        1. Fareed Zakaria, “To Deal with Iran’s Nuclear Future, Go Back to 2008,” The Washington Post, October 26, 2011.
 
        2. 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014, p 21.
 
        3. Eric Schmidt, during CNN interview with Erin Burnett that aired on December 15, 2011.
 
        4. Iian Berman, “The Iranian Cyber Threat, Revisited,” Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies, Washington, DC, March 20, 2013.
 
        5. Peter Hoekstra, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Joint Subcommittee Hearing: Iran’s Support for Terrorism Worldwide, Washington, DC: March 4, 2014.
 
        6. Tony Capaccio, “Iran’s Cyber Threat Potential Great, U.S. General Says,” Bloomberg, January 17, 2013.
 
        7. Shane Harris, “Forget China: Iran’s Hackers Are America’s Newest Cyber Threat,” Foreign Policy, February 18, 2014.
 
        8. Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran’s Censors Tighten Grip,” The Wall Street Journal, March 16, 2012.
 
        9. Ibid.
 
        10. Ashley Wheeler, “Iranian Cyber Army, The Offensive Arm of Iran’s Cyber Force,” September 2013, available from http://www.phoenixts.com/blog/iranian-cyber-army.
 
        11. Fassihi, p. 2.
 
        12. “Iran Enjoys 4th Biggest Cyber Army in the World,” FARS (Tehran), February 2, 2013.
 
        13. “After the Green Movement: Internet Controls in Iran 2009-2012,” Open Net Initiative, February 2013, available from https://opennet/sites/opennet.net/files/iranreport.pdf.
 
        14. Center on National Security at Fordham Law, discussion with Seyed Hossein Mousavian and Robert Windrem, February 12, 2013, available from http://www.centeronnationalsecurity.org.
 
        15. Capaccio, p.1.
 
        16. Mark Clayton, “Cyber-war: In Deed and Desire, Iran Emerging as a Major Power,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 16, 2014.
 
        17. “Commander Reiterates Iran’s Preparedness to Confront Enemies in Cyber Warfare,” Tasnim News Agency (Tehran), February 18, 2014.
 
        18. Clayton, p. 3.
 
        19. Harris, p. 1.
 
        20. Clayton, p. 4.

 

Resources:

The Iranian Cyber Army | Center for Strategic and

Cyber AnalogiesNaval Postgraduate School

U.S. Naval War College | Weekly Maritime News Survey

Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRCG)

Developments in Iranian Cyber Warfare, 2013-2014

Structure of Iran’s Cyber Warfare – NL IGF

Iran Equips IRGC With ‘Qiyam-1′ Ballistic Missiles

An Exhibition of Indigenously Developed

Can Aluminum Cut Through Steel?

lisaleaks:

Can Aluminum Cut Through Steel?

This is taken from the website http://911crashtest.org/ and was written 2 years ago by the site’s founder Steve De’ak. R.A.W.W. is re-posting this information with his permission for the upcoming 13th anniversary of the attacks at the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 to attempt to raise awareness on the “real” truth of 9/11. If you read through this information and watch these videos and are not convinced of the plausibility of Steve’s theory then maybe it is time for some soul searching. This information has no propaganda, no lies, no half-truths, no hidden agenda, and no mainstream media spin. What it has are the proven Law’s of Physics as discovered by Sir Isaac Newton, common sense, and a bit of critical thinking. Put aside everything you “believe” about 9/11 and open your mind to the truth.

There are events that happen that change your life forever. 9/11 was one of those events. And it not only changed your life forever, but the lives of literally everyone on this planet. There have been 2 illegal wars waged, 100,000’s (if not millions) of innocent people murdered, and untold emotional and physical damage done; all justified by this most heinous event. There have also been many draconian laws, bills, and executive orders passed because of 9/11 such as: USA Patriot Act, Department of Homeland Security, NDAA, as well as many others that have usurped the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights. All the while, consolidating power of the president effectively making him a war-time dictator. And all of this because of 9/11!

I would be willing to bet that everyone (that was old enough to understand what was happening) can remember exactly where they were, what they were doing, and who they where with when they found out about the attacks on 9/11. If an event was this important and changed so many lives, don’t you think we should know the truth about what really happened and bring the people who were responsible for the loss of all these innocent lives to justice?

Keep an open mind, use your ration not your ego or emotions, and see what you think after looking at this information…

Originally posted on The R.A.W.W. Scoop:

plane into office building
This is what it really looks like when a plane hits a building
 
EDITOR’S NOTE: This is taken from the website 911crashtest.org and was written 2 years ago by the site’s founder Steve De’ak.  R.A.W.W. is re-posting this information with his permission for the upcoming 13th anniversary of the attacks at the World Trade Center on September 11th, 2001 to attempt to raise awareness on the “real” truth of 9/11.  If you read through this information and watch these videos and are not convinced of the plausibility of Steve’s theory then maybe it is time for some soul searching.  This information has no propaganda, no lies, no half-truths, no hidden agenda, and no mainstream media spin.  What it has are the proven Law’s of Physics as discovered by Sir Isaac Newton, common sense, and a bit of critical thinking.  Put aside everything you “believe” about 9/11 and open your…

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US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1992-2014

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US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1992-2014 PDF Library (Size: 743.19 MB)

US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1992
01. Nuclear Pakistan and Nuclear India – Stable Deterrent or Proliferation Challenge? (1992)
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US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1993
01. Turkey’s Strategic Position at the Crossroads of World Affairs (1993)
02. The Future of Insurgency (1993)
03. The Military-News Media Relationship – Thinking Forward (1993)
04. The Army and Multinational Peace Operations – Problems and Solutions (1993)
05. The Future of the United Nations – Implications for Peace Operations (1993)
06. Paradigm Lost? – Transitions and the Search for a New World Order (1993)
07. Afghanistan and Beyond – Reflections on the Future of Warfare (1993)
08. The Nature of the Post-Cold War World (1993)
09. Strategy, Forces and Budgets – Dominant Influences in Executive Decision Making, Post-Cold War, 1989-91 (1993)
10. Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement – The U.S. Role in the New International Order (1993)
11. General George C. Marshall – Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting the Army, 1939-41 (1993)
12. Eisenhower as Strategist – The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace (1993)
13. Land Warfare in the 21st Century (1993)
14. Domestic Missions for the Armed Forces (1993)
15. Alternative World Scenarios for a New Order of Nations (1993)
 *
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1994
01. The Awakening – The Zapatista Revolt and Its Implications for Civil-Military Relations and the Future of Mexico (1994)
02. Pandora’s Box Reopened – Ethnic Conflict in Europe and Its Implications (1994)
03. Total Force – Federal Reserves and State National Guards (1994)
04. Security Cooperation with China – Analysis and a Proposal (1994)
05. Hamas and Hizbollah – The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories (1994)
06. Haiti Strategy – Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit (1994)
07. Haiti Strategy – Control, Legitimacy, Sovereignty, Rule of Law, Handoffs, and Exit (1994)
08. Germany, France and NATO (1994)
09. Russian Policy and the Korean Crisis (1994)
10. French Policy Toward NATO – Enhanced Selectivity, Vice Rapprochement (1994)
11. Energy and Security in Transcaucasia (1994)
12. Disaster and Intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa – Learning from Rwanda (1994)
13. Partnership for Peace – Discerning Fact from Fiction (1994)
14. U.S. Africa Policy – Some Possible Course Adjustment (1994)
15. Proliferation and Nonproliferation in Ukraine – Implications for European and U.S. Security (1994)
16. Russia’s New Doctrine – Two Views (1994)
17. Does Russian Democracy Have a Future? (1994)
18. Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs (1994)
19. Responding to Terrorism across the Technological Spectrum (1994)
20. Two Historians in Technology and War (1994)
21. The New Russia in the New Asia (1994)
22. The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (1994)
23. Trends in German Defense Policy – The Defense Policy Guidelines and the Centralization of Operational Control (1994)
24. Whither the RMA – Two Perspectives on Tomorrow’s Army (1994)
25. The Revolution in Military Affairs – A Framework for Defense Planning (1994)
26. War in the Information Age (1994)
27. Nuclear Threats from Small States (1994)
28. America in the Third World – Strategic Alternatives and Military Implications (1994)
30. Japan’s Self-Defense Forces – What Dangers to Northeast Asia? (1994)
31. The Owl of Minerva Flies at Twilight – Doctrinal Change and Continuity and the Revolution in Military Affairs (1994)
32. National Interest – From Abstraction to Strategy (1994)
33. Shari’a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt – The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak (1994)
34. World View – The 1994 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (1994)
35. Environmental Security – A DoD Partnership for Peace (1994)
36. Reconciling the irreconcilable – The Troubled Outlook for U.S. Policy toward Haiti (1994)
37. Ethnic Conflict – Implications for the Army of the Future (1994)
38. The Mexican Military Approaches the 21st Century – Coping with a New World Order (1994)
39. Can Europe Survive Maastricht? (1994)
40. Meeting the Challenges of Regional Security (1994)
41. Where Does Cuba Stand? (1994)
 *
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1995
01. Strategic Implications for the United states and Latin America of the 1995 Ecuador-Peru War (1995)
02. Deciphering the Balkan Enigma – Using History to Inform Policy (1995)
03. Yugoslavia’s Wars – The Problem from Hell (1995)
04. Strategic Art – The New Discipline for 21st Century Leaders (1995)
05. Strategic Plans, Joint Doctrine and Antipodean Insights (1995)
06. A Theory of Fundamentalism – An Inquiry into the Origin and Development of the Movement (1995)
07. U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning – The Missing Nexus (1995)
08. Mexico and the Future (1995)
09. U.S. Policy in the Balkans – A Hobson’s Choice (1995)
10. Russian Defense Legislation and Russian Democracy (1995)
11. The Principles of War in the 21st Century – Strategic Considerations (1995)
12. The Fog of Peace – The Military Dimensions of the Concert of Europe (1995)
13. Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs – From Theory to Policy (1995)
14. Time’s Cycle and National Military Strategy – The Case for Continuity in a Time of Change (1995)
15. The Technological Fix – Weapons and the Cost of War (1995)
16. The Revolution in Military Affairs – Prospects and Cautions (1995)
17. Canada, Getting It Right This Time the 1994 Defence White Paper (1995)
18. The European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy – Central issues … Key Players (1995)
19. Reform and the Revolution in Russian Defense Economics (1995)
20. Terrorism – National Security Policy and the Home Front (1995)
21. Mexico in Crisis (1995)
22. NATO Strategy in the 1990s – Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind? (1995)
23. Making Do with Less, or Coping with Upton’s Ghost (1995)
24. Strategic Implications of the U.S.-DPRK Framework Agreement (1995)
25. Ready For What and Modernized Against Whom? – A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization (1995)
26. American Civil-Military Relations – New Issues, Enduring Problems (1995)
27. The Army in the Information Age (1995)
28. The National Security Strategy – Documenting Strategic Vision Second Edition (1995)
30. Energy, Economics, and Security in Central Asia – Russia and Its Rivals (1995)
31. Counterforce and Theater Missile Defense – Can the Army Use an ASW Approach to the SCUD Hunt? (1995)
32. World View – The 1995 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (1995)
33. Assad and the Peace Process – The Pivotal Role of Lebanon (1995)
34. The CFE Treaty – A Cold War Anachronism? (1995)
35. Counterinsurgency – Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability (1995)
36. Russia’s Invasion of Chechnya – A Preliminary Assessment (1995)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1996
01. The ASEAN Regional Forum – Asian Security without an American Umbrella (1996)
02. Asian Security to the Year 2000 (1996)
03. Force, Statecraft and German Unity – The Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices (1996)
04. Managing Strains in the Coalition – What to Do About Saddam? (1996)
05. Ethnic Conflict and European Security – Lessons from the Past and Implications for the Future (1996)
06. Civil-Military Relations and the Not-Quite Wars of the Present and Future (1996)
07. The Strategist and the Web Revisited – An Updated Guide to Internet Resources (1996)
08. What’s with the Relationship between America’s Army and China’s PLA? (1996)
09. Managing a Changing Relationship – China’s Japan Policy in the 1990s (1996)
10. Finnish Security and European Security Policy (1996)
11. Unification of the United States Armed Forces – Implementing the 1986 Department of Defense Reorganization Act (1996)
12. China’s Quest for Security in the Post-Cold War World (1996)
13. China’s Transition into the 21st Century – U.S. and PRC Perspectives (1996)
14. India’s Security Environment – Towards the Year 2000 (1996)
15. Central Asia – A New Great Game? (1996)
16. U.S. Participation in IFOR – A Marathon, not a Sprint (1996)
17. Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire (1996)
18. China and the Revolution in Military Affairs (1996)
19. Russian Security Policy in the Asia-Pacific Region – Two Views (1996)
20. The Invitation to Struggle – Executive and Legislative Competition over the U.S. Military Presence on the Korean Peninsula (1996)
21. Yemen and Stability in the Persian Gulf – Confronting the Threat from Within (1996)
22. The Troubled Path to the Pentagon’s Rules on Media Access to the Battlefield – Grenada to Today (1996)
23. Whither Haiti? (1996)
24. Shaping China’s Future in World Affairs – The U.S. Role (1996)
25. Prague, NATO, and European Security (1996)
26. The Future of American Landpower – Strategic Challenges for the 21st Century Army (1996)
27. Conference Report – International Workshop on the U.S.-ROK Alliance (1996)
28. International Politics in Northeast Asia – The China-Japan-United States Strategic Triangle (1996)
30. World View – The 1996 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (1996)
31. Federal Budget Policy and Defense Strategy (1996)
32. The Strategist and the Web – Guide to Internet Resources (1996)
33. Armies and Democracy in the New Africa – Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa (1996)
34. China’s Strategic View – The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (1996)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1997
01. Shadow Politics – The Russian State in the 21st Century (1997)
02. The United States and the Transformation of African Security – The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond (1997)
03. Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations (1997)
04. The CINCs’ Strategies – The Combatant Command Process (1997)
05. Multinational Land Formations and NATO – Reforming Practices and Structures (1997)
06. “Enhancing” the Australian-U.S. Defense Relationship – A Guide to U.S. Policy (1997)
07. NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States – What Can the Great Powers Do? (1997)
08. The United States and Russia into the 21st Century (1997)
09. Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty – Two MRCs as a Force Sizing Framework (1997)
10. The Challenge of Haiti’s Future – Report on the Conference Sponsored by U.S. Army War College, Georgetown University, and the Inter-American Dialogue (1997)
11. Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China (1997)
12. Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (1997)
13. Syria and the Peace – A Good Chance Missed (1997)
14. U.S. National Security – Beyond the Cold War (1997)
15. Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations (1997)
16. Between a Rock and a Hard Place – The United States, Mexico, and the Agony of National Security (1997)
17. Command in NATO After the Cold War – Alliance, National, and Multinational Consideration (1997)
18. The Crisis in the Russian Economy (1997)
19. From Madrid to Brussels – Perspectives on NATO Enlargement (1997)
20. The Russian Military in the 21st Century (1997)
21. Assessing the Costs of Failure (1997)
22. The Evolution in Military Affairs – Shaping the Future U.S. Armed Forces (1997)
23. Military Medical Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa – THE DoD (1997)
24. National Defense into the 21st Century – Defining the Issues (1997)
25. Challenges and Options in the Caucasus and Central Asia (1997)
26. Why Russian Policy is Failing in Asia (1997)
27. The Future Roles of U.S. Military Power and Their Implications (1997)
28. The Dynamics of Russian Weapon Sales to China (1997)
30. Strategic Horizons – The Military Implications of Alternative Futures (1997)
31. Tacit Acceptance and Watchful Eyes – Beijing’s Views about the U.S.-ROK Alliance (1997)
32. World View – The 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (1997)
33. The Chemical Weapons Convention – Strategic Implications for the United States (1997)
34. Haiti Update (1997)
35. The Peace process, Phase One – Past Accomplishments, Future Concerns (1997)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1998
01. America’s Army – Preparing for Tomorrow’s Security Challenges (1998)
02. Security Implications of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East (1998)
03. The Economic Crisis and ASEAN States’ Security (1998)
04. China’s Military Potential (1998)
05. Opening Pandora’s Box – Ethnicity and Central Asian Militaries (1998)
06. NATO After Enlargement – New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces (1998)
07. Breaking Away from the Bear (1998)
08. Defining U.S. Atlantic Command’s Role in the Power Projection Strategy (1998)
09. Challenging the United States Symmetrically and Asymmetrically – Can America be Defeated? (1998)
10. Halt Phase Strategy – New Wine in Old Skins … with Powerpoint (1998)
11. The Political-Military Rivalry for Operational Control in U.S. Military Actions – A Soldier’s Perspective (1998)
12. Nonlethality and American Land Power – Strategic Context and Operational Concepts (1998)
13. On Diversity (1998)
14. Reforming NATO’s Military Structures – The Long-Term Study and Its Implications for Land Forces (1998)
15. The Case for Army XXI (1998)
16. The Creeping Irrelevance of U.S. Force Planning (1998)
17. Redefining Land Power for the 21st Century (1998)
18. Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the Sahel – The Tuareg Insurgency in Mali (1998)
19. AY 97 Compendium Army After Next Project (1998)
20. The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas – Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century (1998)
21. New Century, Old Thinking – The Dangers of the Perceptual Gap in U.S.-China Relations (1998)
22. European Security and NATO Enlargement – A View from Central Europe (1998)
23. Russia’s Armed Forces on the Brink of Reform (1998)
24. Five-Dimensional (Cyber) Warfighting – Can the Army After Next be Defeated Through Complex Concepts and Technologies? (1998)
25. The Age of Revolutions (1998)
26. Evolutionary Technology in the Current Revolution in Military Affairs – The Army Tactical Command and Control System (1998)
27. Searching for Stable Peace in the Persian Gulf (1998)
28. World View – The 1998 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute (1998)
30. Force Planning Considerations for Army XXI (1998)
31. Joint U.S. Army-Navy War Planning on the Eve of the First World War (1998)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1999
01. The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century (1999)
02. Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century (1999)
03. The Fog of Peace – Finding the End-State of Hostilities (1999)
04. Land Power and Dual Containment – Rethinking America’s Policy in the Gulf (1999)
05. Security and Civil-Military Relations in the New World Disorder – The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas (1999)
06. China’s Strategic Modernization – Implications for the United States (1999)
07. America’s Army in Transition – Preparing for War in the Precision Age (1999)
08. The Growing Imperative to Adopt “Flexibility” as an American Principle of War (1999)
09. Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium (1999)
10. Population Diversity and the U.S. Army (1999)
11. Future Warfare (1999)
12. Transnational Threats from the Middle East – Crying Wolf or Crying Havoc? (1999)
13. The Future U.S. Military Presence in Asia – Landpower and the Geostrategy of American Commitment (1999)
14. Pacific Security Today – Overcoming the Hurdles (1999)
15. Landpower and Ambiguous Warfare – The Challenge of Colombia in the 21st Century (1999)
16. Colombia’s Three Wars – U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads (1999)
17. East Asia in Crisis – The Security Implications of the Collapse of Economic Institutions (1999)
18. Technology and the 21st Century Battlefield – Recomplicating Moral Life for the Statesman and the Soldier (1999)
19. Warriors in Peace Operations (1999)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2000
01. The Asia-Pacific in the U.S. National Security Calculus for a New Millennium (2000)
02. Alternative National Military Strategies for the United States (2000)
03. Transnational Threats – Blending Law Enforcement and Military Strategies (2000)
04. Organizing for National Security (2000)
05. Generations Apart – Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps (2000)
06. Theater Missile Defense in Japan – Implications for the U.S.-China-Japan Strategic Relationship (2000)
07. “…to insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense…” (2000)
08. American Strategy – Issues and Alternatives for the Quadrennial Defense Review (2000)
09. Peacekeeping and the Just War Tradition (2000)
10. People’s Liberation Army After Next (2000)
11. The Information Revolution and National Security (2000)
12. Chinese Arms Exports – Policy, Players and Process (2000)
13. Chinese Army Building in the Era of Jiang Zemin (2000)
14. Threats to Russian Security – The View from Moscow (2000)
15. U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia and Central Asia (2000)
16. Multinational Land Forces and the NATO Force Structure Review (2000)
17. The PLA and the Kosovo Conflict (2000)
18. The Future of the American Military Presence in Europe (2000)
19. Shaping the World through Engagement – Assessing the Department of Defense’s Theater Engagement Planning Process (2000)
20. The United States and Latin America – Shaping an Elusive Future (2000)
21. Armed Conflict in the 21st Century – The Information Revolution and Post-Modern Warfare (2000)
22. Future Leadership, Old Issues, New Methods (2000)
23. Prevailing in a Well-Armed World – Devising Competitive Strategies Against Weapons Proliferation (2000)
24. The United States and Colombia – Untying the Gordian Knot (2000)
25. European Security – Washington’s Shaping Strategy in Action (2000)
26. Refining American Strategy in Africa (2000)
27. Asia-Pacific Security – China’s Conditional Multilateralism and Great Power Entente (2000)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2001
01. Transforming Defense an Era of Peace and Prosperity (2001)
02. The Transatlantic Security Agenda – A Conference Report and Analysis (2001)
03. Colombia’s Paramilitaries – Criminals or Political Force? (2001)
04. ESDP and Missile Defense – European Perspectives for More Balanced Transatlantic Partnership (2001)
05. Chinese Information Warfare – A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat? (2001)
06. Rapid Decisive Operations – An Assumptions-Based Critique (2001)
07. The Costs of Conflict – The Impact on China of a Future War (2001)
08. AC/RC Integration – Today’s Success and Transformation’s Challenge (2001)
09. Soldiers in Cities – Military Operations on Urban Terrain (2001)
10. Toward a Strategy of Positive Ends (2001)
11. Preparing for Asymmetry – As Seen Through the Lens of Joint Vision 2020 (2001)
12. Budget Policy and Fiscal Risk – Implications for Defense (2001)
13. Funding Defense – Challenges of Buying Military Capability in Sub-Saharan Africa (2001)
14. Internal Wars – Rethinking Problem and Response (2001)
15. The Hart-Rudman Commission and the Homeland Defense (2001)
16. The Drug Scourge as a Hemispheric Problem (2001)
17. W(h)ither Corps? (2001)
18. Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan, and the New Great Game (2001)
19. Army Transformation – A View from the U.S. Army War College (2001)
20. Educating International Security Practitioners – Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment (2001)
21. U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere – Why Colombia, Why Now, and What Is To Be Done? (2001)
22. Plan Colombia – Some Differing Perspectives (2001)
23. Future Warfare Anthology, Revised Edition (2001)
24. The Regional Security Crisis in the Andes – Patterns of State Response (2001)
25. Plan Colombia – The View from the Presidential Palace (2001)
26. U.S. Support of PLAN COLOMBIA – Rethinking the Ends and Means (2001)
27. The Search for Accountability and Transparency in PLAN COLOMBIA – Reforming Judicial Institutions–Again (2001)
28. European Perceptions of Plan Colombia – A Virtual Contribution to a Virtual War and Peace Plan? (2001)
30. Plan Colombia – The Strategic and Operational Imperatives (2001)
31. U.S. Army and the Asia-Pacific (2001)
32. Revising the Two MTW Force Shaping Paradigm (2001)
33. Political Control over the Use of Force – A Clausewitzian Perspective (2001)
34. Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia – A New Strategy for Peace (2001)
35. The Army and Homeland Security – A Strategic Perspective (2001)
36. Planning for a Peaceful Korea (2001)
37. U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy (2001)
38. The American Army in the Balkans – Strategic Alternatives and Implications (2001)
39. Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy – Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts (2001)
40. Landpower and Crises – Army Roles and Missions in Smaller-Scale Contingencies During the 1990s (2001)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2002
01. Plan Colombia – Reality of the Colombian Crisis and Implications for Hemispheric Security (2002)
02. South Asia in 2020 – Future Strategic Balances and Alliances (2002)
03. Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare – Implications for Army and Defense Policy (2002)
04. European Adaptation to Expeditionary Warfare – Implications for the U.S. Army (2002)
05. Saddam’s Strategy – No To Nuclear Weapons; Yes To Biologicals (2002)
06. Colombia’s Conflicts – The Spillover Effects of a Wider War (2002)
07. Dragon on Terrorism – Assessing China’s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses Post-September 11 (2002)
08. Growing U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia (2002)
09. China’s Growing Military Power – Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities (2002)
10. Transformation Concepts for National Security in the 21st Century (2002)
11. Avoiding Vietnam – The U.S. Army’s Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia (2002)
12. Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity – Changing Our Warfighting Doctrine–Again! (2002)
13. The Bases of French Peace Operations Doctrine – Problematical Scope of France’s Military Engagements within the U.N. or NATO Framework (2002)
14. A 21st Century Security Architecture for the Americas – Multilateral Cooperation, Liberal Peace, and Soft Power (2002)
15. The Future of Transcaspian Security (2002)
16. Pax NATO – The Opportunities of Enlargement (2002)
17. Hizballah – Terrorism, National Liberation, or Menace? (2002)
18. Tweaking NATO – The Case for Integrated Multinational Divisions (2002)
19. Nonstate Actors in Colombia – Threat and Response (2002)
20. China and Strategic Culture (2002)
21. Facing the Hydra – Maintaining Strategic Balance while Pursuing a Global War against Terrorism (2002)
22. Beyond Nunn-Lugar – Curbing the Next Wave of Weapons Proliferation Threats from Russia (2002)
23. Defining and Achieving Decisive Victory (2002)
24. Stifled Innovation? Developing Tomorrow’s Leaders Today (2002)
25. The Inescapable Global Security Arena (2002)
26. The Past as Prologue – A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 1958-66 (2002)
27. U.S. Military Presence in the Persian Gulf – Challenges and Prospects (2002)
28. The New Craft of Intelligence – Achieving Asymmetric Advantage in the Face of Nontraditional Threats (2002)
30. The Rise of China in Asia – Security Implications (2002)
31. Defeating Terrorism – Strategic Issue Analyses (2002)
32. Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency (2002)
33. The Intervention Debate – Towards a Posture of Principled Judgment (2002)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2003
01. Security Transformation (2003)
02. Insurgency in Nepal (2003)
03. The Future of the Australian-U.S. Security Relationship (2003)
04. Bounding the Global War on Terrorism (2003)
05. The Trajectory of Security Transformation (2003)
06. Expanding the Use of State Defense Forces in Homeland Defense Missions (2003)
07. Impact of Strategic Culture on U.S. Policies for East Asia (2003)
08. Crisis Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait (2003)
09. After the 16th Party Congress – The Civil and the Military (2003)
10. National Security Challenges for the 21st Century (2003)
11. Building Regional Security Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere – Issues and Recommendations (2003)
12. Army Professional Expertise and Jurisdictions (2003)
13. From “Defending Forward” to a “Global Defense-In-Depth” – Globalization and Homeland Security (2003)
14. What should be Believed about Progress in Iraq? (2003)
15. Rethinking Asymmetric Threats (2003)
16. Strategic Leadership Competencies (2003)
17. Keep the Reserves in the Fight (2003)
18. The U.S. and Canadian Army Strategies – Failures in Understanding (2003)
19. Improving Accountability for Effective Command Climate – A Strategic Imperative (2003)
20. The Posse Comitatus Act – A Harmless Relic from the Post-Construction Era or a Legal Impediment to Transformation? (2003)
21. War in the Balkans, 1991-2002 (2003)
22. Maintaining Effective Deterrence (2003)
23. The Need for a United Nations’ Security Role in Iraq (2003)
24. The Lessons of History – The Chinese people’s Liberation Army at 75 (2003)
25. Perspectives from Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia – Hemispheric Security (2003)
26. Assessing the Impact of U.S.-Israeli Relations on the Arab World (2003)
27. Socio-Economic Roots of Radicalism? – Towards Explaining the Appeal of Islamic Radicals (2003)
28. Why They Fight – Combat Motivation in the Iraq War (2003)
30. Nationalism, Sectarianism, and the Future of the U.S. Presence in Post-Saddam Iraq (2003)
31. The “New” American Way of War (2003)
32. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Leadership Using the Joint Strategic Planning System in the 1990s – Recommendations for Strategic Leaders (2003)
33. Recalibrating the U.S.-Republic of Korea Alliance (2003)
34. The United States and Colombia – The Journey from Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity (2003)
35. Prospects for Peace in South Asia (2003)
36. Security Transformation – Report of the Belfer Center Conference on Military Transformation (2003)
37. Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq – The Middle East, North Africa, and Turkey (2003)
38. Mapping Colombia – The Correlation between Land Data and Strategy (2003)
39. Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq – South Asia (2003)
40. Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq – Southeast Asia (2003)
41. Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq – Australia and New Zealand (2003)
42. Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq – Europe (2003)
43. Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq – Post-Soviet States (2003)
44. Future War/Future Battlespace – The Strategic Role of American Landpower (2003)
45. Globalization and the Nature of War (2003)
46. Strategic Effects of Conflict with Iraq – Latin America (2003)
47. Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya – Military Strategic Culture and the Paradoxes of Asymmetric Conflict (2003)
48. Reconstructing Iraq – Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (2003)
49. Waging Ancient War – Limits on Preemptive Force (2003)
50. Why Saddam will not Choose Exile (2003)
51. Reconstructing Iraq – Challenges and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario (2003)
52. Defeating Saddam Hussein’s Strategy (2003)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2004
01. Winning the War by Winning the Peace – Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century (2004)
02. Deception 101–Primer on Deception (2004)
03. U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the Value of Interoperability (2004)
04. The Paradox of Civil War (2004)
05. Chinese Crisis Management (2004)
06. Getting MAD – Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice (2004)
07. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century – Reconceputalizing Threat and Response (2004)
08. Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future – Lessons for the Insurgencies in Our Midst (2004)
09. Islamic Rulings on Warfare (2004)
10. Unlearning Counterinsurgency (2004)
11. Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations – The Case of Kosovo (2004)
12. Current and Future Challenges for Asian Nonproliferation Export Controls – A Regional Response (2004)
13. Confronting an Irregular and Catastrophic Future (2004)
14. Civil-Military Change in China – Elites, Institutes, and Ideas After the 16th Party Congress (2004)
15. A Nation at War in an Era of Strategic Change (2004)
16. Uncomfortable Questions Regarding the inevitable Succession of Power in Cuba (2004)
17. Fighting in the Gray Zone – A Strategy to Close the Preemption Gap (2004)
18. Is it all about Winning? (2004)
19. Homeland Security and Civil Liberties (2004)
20. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 1st Edition (2004)
21. Britain’s Role in U.S. Missile Defense (2004)
22. Developing Adaptive Leaders – The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2004)
23. Strategic Ends in the Middle East (2004)
24. Building Capability from the Technical Revolution that Has Happened (2004)
25. Northeast Asia–Cultural Influences on the U.S. National Security Strategy (2004)
26. Female Suicide Bombers (2004)
27. Nuclear Asia (2004)
28. Hemispheric Strategic Objectives for the Next Decade (2004)
30. The Exigencies of Global, Integrated Warfare – The Evolving Role of the CJCS and his Dedicated Staff (2004)
31. Iraq and Vietnam – Differences, Similarities, and Insights (2004)
32. Learning from the Stones – A Go Approach to Mastering China’s Strategic Concept, Shi (2004)
33. Strategic Consequences of the Iraq War – U.S. Security Interests in Central Asia Reassessed (2004)
34. Fighting Insurgents–No Shortcuts to Success (2004)
35. U.S. Security Strategies – Trade Policy Implications for Latin America (2004)
36. THIS IS NOT YOUR FATHER’S, OR MOTHER’S ARMY! (2004)
37. Security in the Americas – Neither Evolution nor Devolution–Impasse (2004)
38. China and North Korea – From Comrades-In-Arms to Allies at Arm’s Length (2004)
39. Toward an American Way of War (2004)
40. Debating Ends, not Just Means, in the War on Terror (2004)
41. Reconfiguring the American Military Presence in Europe (2004)
42. Countering Global Terrorism – Developing the Antiterrorist Capabilities of the Central Asian Militaries (2004)
43. The United States and Iraq’s Shi’ite Clergy – Partners or Adversaries? (2004)
44. Toward a New U.S. Strategy in Asia (2004)
45. Strategic Deception in Modern Democracies – Ethical, Legal, and Policy Challenges (2004)
46. Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (2004)
47. Paths Diverging? The Next Decade in the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance (2004)
48. An American Way of War or a Way of Battle? (2004)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2005
01. Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat (2005)
02. Victories are Not Enough (2005)
03. Transformation for What? (2005)
04. Revisions in Need of Revising – What Went Wrong in the Iraq War (2005)
05. Why the Teachers? (2005)
06. Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran (2005)
07. Going to War With the Allies You Have – Allies, Counterinsurgency, and the War on Terrorism (2005)
08. Coup D’Oeil – Strategic Intuition in Army Planning (2005)
09. Fourth-Generation War and Other Myths (2005)
10. The Danger of Seeking Permanent U.S. Military Bases in Iraq (2005)
11. The PLA Shapes the Future Security Environment (2005)
12. Chinese National Security – Decisionmaking Under Stress (2005)
13. Natural Allies? Regional Security in Asia and Prospects for Indo-American Strategic Cooperation (2005)
14. Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq (2005)
15. Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare (2005)
16. The High Cost of Primacy (2005)
17. Contending Perspectives – Southeast Asia and American Views on a Rising China (2005)
18. Contractors on Deployed Military Operations – United Kingdom Policy and Doctrine (2005)
19. Balik Terrorism – The Return of the Abu Sayyaf (2005)
20. Honoring, Not Pitying, Our Troops (2005)
21. Appeasement Reconsidered – Investigating the Mythology of the 1930s (2005)
22. Implications of DoD Directive 3000 (2005)
23. Agile Leaders, Agile Institutions – Educating Adaptive and Innovative Leaders for Today and Tomorrow (2005)
24. Tribal Alliances – Ways, Means, and ends to Successful Strategy (2005)
25. Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively – The Case for Greater Stabilization capacity in the Modular Force (2005)
26. The Test of Terrain – The Impact of Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces (2005)
27. U.S. Defense Strategy After Saddam (2005)
28. Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic Security” (2005)
30. North Korea’s Strategic Intentions (2005)
31. Who Stays and Who Goes – Army Enlisted Reserve and National Guard Retention (2005)
32. Law vs. War – Competing Approaches to Fighting Terrorism (2005)
33. After Two Wars – Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia (2005)
34. 2005 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) (2005)
35. Democratization Vs. Liberalization in the Arab World – Dilemmas and Challenges for U.S. Foreign Policy (2005)
36. Gangs, “Coups D’ Streets,” and the New War in Central America (2005)
37. Budget Policy, Deficits, and Defense – A Fiscal Framework for Defense Planning (2005)
38. The Strategic Implications of the Rise of Populism in Europe and South America (2005)
39. U.S. National Security Implications of Chinese Involvement in Latin America (2005)
40. Pseudo Operations and Counterinsurgency – Lessons from Other Countries (2005)
41. Welcome Iran and North Korea to the Nuclear Club – You’re Targeted (2005)
42. Terrorist Beheadings – Cultural and Strategic Implications (2005)
43. The U.S.-UK Special Relationship – Past, Present and Future (2005)
44. South Asia and the Nuclear Future – Rethinking the Causes and Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation (2005)
45. U.S.-India Security Ties (2005)
46. Beyond The U.S. War on Terrorism – Comparing Domestic Legal Remedies to an International Dilemma (2005)
47. Strategic Opportunities – Charting New Approaches to Defense and Security Challenges in the Western Hemisphere (2005)
48. The International Community and Haiti – A Proposal for Cooperative Sovereignty (2005)
49. The Rise and Fall of Empires (2005)
50. Afghanistan – Reconstituting a Collapsed State (2005)
51. The Transatlantic Defense Industrial Base – Restructuring Scenarios and Their Implications (2005)
52. Transformation and Strategic Surprise (2005)
53. American Grand Strategy After 9/11 – An Assessment (2005)
54. The New RC – Will it Please Anyone? (2005)
55. The Power of Division and Unity (2005)
56. Dismantling North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Programs (2005)
57. Street Gangs – The New Urban Insurgency (2005)
58. Saudi Arabia – Islamic Threat, Political Reform, and the Global War on Terror (2005)
59. Seizing the Day – Resolution in and around the Black Sea (2005)
60. The Return of the Latin American Left (2005)
61. Strategic Implications of Intercommunal Warfare in Iraq (2005)
62. The U.S.-India Relationship – Strategic Partnership or Complementary Interests? (2005)
63. The Problem with Fourth-Generation War (2005)
64. Is there a Positive Side to Al Jazeera? (2005)
65. Stabilization and Post-Conflict Operations – The Role of the Military (2005)
66. Insurgency in Iraq – An Historical Perspective (2005)
67. The Impact of Missile Threats on the Reliability of U.S. Overseas Bases – A Framework for Analysis (2005)
68. It’s Asia (Again) (2005)
69. Logistics Transformation–Restarting a Stalled Process (2005)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2006
01. Castro’s Cuba – Quo Vadis? (2006)
02. Learning from Iraq – Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (2006)
03. Regional Fears of Western Primacy and the Future of U.S. Middle Eastern Basing Policy (2006)
04. Russian Defense Reform – Current Trends (2006)
05. Russia, Iran, and the Nuclear Question – The Putin Record (2006)
06. Iraqi Security Forces and Lessons from Korea (2006)
07. Iran, Iraq, and the United States – The New Triangle’s Impact on Sectarianism and the Nuclear Threat (2006)
08. Defense Transformation – To What, For What? (2006)
09. The NATO-Russia Partnership – A Marriage of Convenience or a Troubled Relationship? (2006)
10. Ukraine After the Orange Revolution – Can It Complete Military Transformation and Join the U.S.-Led War on Terrorism? (2006)
11. Transformation’s Uncontested Truths (2006)
12. Alliances and American National Security (2006)
13. China-ASEAN Relations – Perspectives, Prospects, and Implications for U.S. Interests (2006)
14. Confronting the Unconventional – Innovation and Transformation in Military Affairs (2006)
15. Shaping China’s Security Environment – The Role of the People’s Liberation Army (2006)
16. Defense, Development, and Diplomacy (3D) – Canadian and U.S. Military Perspectives (2006)
17. North Korean Civil-Military Trends – Military-First Politics to a Point (2006)
18. Fashion Tips for the Field Grade (2006)
19. Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism (2006)
20. “What If?” — A Most Impertinent Question Indeed (2006)
21. The Future of Transatlantic Security Relations (2006)
22. How to Make Army Force Generation Work for the Army’s Reserve Components (2006)
23. Doctrine that Works (2006)
24. String of Pearls – Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral (2006)
25. 2006 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) (2006)
26. Canadian Defense Policy–A Breath of Fresh Air (2006)
27. Taming the Next Set of Strategic Weapons Threats (2006)
28. Friction in U.S. Foreign Policy – Cultural Difficulties with the World (2006)
30. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy, 2nd Edition (2006)
31. Value Projection and American Foreign Policy (2006)
32. Addicted to Oil – Strategic Implications of American Oil Policy (2006)
33. Strategic Planning by the Chairmen, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1990 TO 2005 (2006)
34. Is Eurasia’s Security Order at Risk? (2006)
35. U.S. Military Operations in Iraq – Planning, Combat and Occupation (2006)
36. Preventive War and Its Alternatives – The Lessons of History (2006)
37. Counterterrorism in African Failed States – Challenges and Potential Solutions (2006)
38. The Proliferation Security Initiative as a New Paradigm for Peace and Security (2006)
39. Iron Troikas – The New Threat from the East (2006)
40. The Challenge of Governance and Security (2006)
41. Planning For and Applying Military Force – An Examination of Terms (2006)
42. Kim Jong Il and North Korea – The Leader and the System (2006)
43. CU @ The FOB – How the Forward Operating Base is Changing the Life of Combat Soldiers (2006)
44. Multilateral Constraints on the Use of Force – A Reassessment (2006)
45. Training Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency – A Tale of Two Insurgencies (2006)
46. Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy – Can the American Way of War Adapt? (2006)
47. Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare – The Sovereignty of Context (2006)
48. Strategic Theory for the 21st Century – The Little Book on Big Strategy (2006)
49. Information Operations – Putting the “I” Back Into DIME (2006)
50. U.S.-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century (2006)
51. A Hundred Osamas – Islamist Threats and the Future of Counterinsurgency (2006)
52. The Mexican Armed Forces in Transition (2006)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2007
01. Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability (2007)
02. Sustaining the Peace After Civil War (2007)
03. Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan (2007)
04. Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence – A Game-Theorist’s Perspective (2007)
05. Russian Security Strategy under Putin – U.S. and Russian Perspectives (2007)
06. Is it Time to Mandate Volunteerism? (2007)
07. The Global War on Terrorism – A Religious War? (2007)
08. East Asian Security – Two Views (2007)
09. AFRICOM’s Dilemma – The “Global War on Terrorism” “Capacity Building,” Humanitarianism, and the Future of U.S. Security Policy in Africa (2007)
10. Regional Threats and Security Strategy – The Troubling Case of Today’s Middle East (2007)
11. Security Cooperation – A Key to the Challenges of the 21st Century (2007)
12. The Evolution of U.S.-Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context (2007)
13. The “People” in the PLA – Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s 80-Year-Old Military (2007)
14. On the Uses of Cultural Knowledge (2007)
15. Transformation Under Fire – A Historical Case Study with Modern Parallels (2007)
16. Working and Playing Well with Others – A Strategy-Policy Mismatch in Export Controls (2007)
17. The Eastern Dimension of America’s New European Allies (2007)
18. The United States and ASEAN-China Relations – All Quiet on the Southeast Asian Front (2007)
19. “Making Riflemen from Mud – Restoring the Army’s Culture of Irregular Warfare (2007)
20. The Military Strategy of Global Jihad (2007)
21. Opium and Afghanistan – Reassessing U.S. Counternarcotics Strategy (2007)
22. The Army and Defense Resource Allocation – The Bronze Medal Ain’t Good Enough in a Three-Man Race (2007)
23. Strategy, National Interests, and Means to an End (2007)
24. Turning on the DIME – Diplomacy’s Role in National Security (2007)
25. The Summit – Mirage or Milestone? (2007)
26. A Concept at the Crossroads – Rethinking the Center of Gravity (2007)
27. American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment (2007)
28. Egypt – Security, Political, and Islamist Challenges (2007)
30. Turkmenistan and Central Asia after Niyazov (2007)
31. The Emerging Pattern of Geopolitics (2007)
32. ASEAN and Its Security Offspring – Facing New Challenges (2007)
33. The Reserve Policies of Nations – A Comparative Analysis (2007)
34. Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship after Saddam (2007)
35. China’s Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal from Argentina’s Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National Security (2007)
36. Grunts and Jarheads – Rethinking the Army-Marine Division of Labor (2007)
37. Right Sizing the People’s Liberation Army – Exploring the Contours of China’s Military (2007)
38. Latin America’s New Security Reality – Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez (2007)
39. Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment – Lessons from Iraq (2007)
40. An Introduction to Theater Strategy and Regional Security (2007)
41. Shaping Commitment – Resolving Canada’s Strategy Gap in Afghanistan and Beyond (2007)
42. Security Requirements for Post-Transition Cuba (2007)
43. Can Tony Blair Make a Difference in the Middle East? (2007)
44. The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines – A Reconsideration (2007)
45. 2007 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) (2007)
46. Knowing when to Salute (2007)
47. Political Trends in the New Eastern Europe – Ukraine and Belarus (2007)
48. Ukraine’s Military Between East and West (2007)
49. Treating Allies as Allies in the Arab World (2007)
50. Rethinking Insurgency (2007)
51. Roots of Terror (2007)
52. Strategic Competition and Resistance in the 21st Century – Irregular, Catastrophic, Traditional, and Hybrid Challenges in Context (2007)
53. China’s Nuclear Forces – Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control and Campaign Planning (2007)
54. Russian-American Security Cooperation after St. Petersburg (2007)
55. Manning the Force (2007)
56. Global Climate Change – National Security Implications (2007)
57. North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War World (2007)
58. North Korea’s Military Threat – Pyongyang’s Conventional Forces, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Ballistic Missiles (2007)
59. Biodefense Research Supporting the DoD – A New Strategic Vision (2007)
60. From Munich to Munich (2007)
61. Chinese Perceptions of Traditional and Nontraditional Security Threats (2007)
62. The Politics of Identity – History, Nationalism, and the Prospect for Peace in Post-Cold War East Asia (2007)
63. Political Warfare in Sub-Saharan Africa – U.S. Capabilities and Chinese Operations in Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, and South Africa (2007)
64. U.S. Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them (2007)
65. Georgia After the Rose Revolution – Geopolitical Predicament and Implications for U.S. Policy (2007)
66. Globalization and Its Implications for the Defense Industrial Base (2007)
67. Colombia and the United States–The Partnership – But What Is the Endgame? (2007)
68. The Missing Debate (2007)
69. Russia, the United States, and the Caucasus (2007)
70. Gauging U.S.-Indian Strategic Cooperation (2007)
71. Exploring the “Right Size” for China’s Military – PLA Missions, Functions, and Organizations (2007)
72. The Other Special Relationship – The United States and Australia at the Start of the 21st Century (2007)
73. The Iraq War – Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future (2007)
74. Understanding Indian Insurgencies – Implications for Counterinsurgency Operations in the Third World (2007)
75. Russia and the European Union – The Sources and Limits of “Special Relationships” (2007)
76. The New Totalitarians – Social Identities and Radical islamist Political Grand Strategy (2007)
77. In Defense of Rational Risk Assessment (2007)
78. A Nation at War (2007)
79. Rosoboroneksport – Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry (2007)
80. Russian Nonproliferation Policy and the Korean Peninsula (2007)
81. Iraq, Women’s Empowerment and Public Policy (2007)
82. Challenging Transformation’s Clichés (2007)
83. Negotiating with Iran and Syria over Iraq (2007)
84. Naval Transformation, Ground Forces, and the Expeditionary Impulse – The Sea-Basing Debate (2007)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2008 Complete
01. Hamas and Israel – Conflicting Strategies of Group-Based Politics (2008)
02. War without Borders – The Colombia-Ecuador Crisis of 2008 (2008)
03. Russia Challenges the Obama Administration (2008)
04. Unity of Command in Afghanistan – A Forsaken Principle of War (2008)
05. Known Unknowns – Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development (2008)
06. Living Perilously in a Bubble (2008)
07. Slowing Military Change (2008)
08. PLA Missions Beyond Taiwan (2008)
09. Leadership and National Security Reform – The Next President’s Agenda (2008)
10. Dueling Natures (2008)
11. Stability Operations and State Building – Continuities and Contingencies (2008)
12. The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare – Implications for Army and Defense Policy (2008)
13. The “People” in the PLA – Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military (2008)
14. The View from There (2008)
15. U.S. Counterterrorism in Sub-Saharan Africa – Understanding Costs, Cultures, and Conflicts (2008)
16. The American Military Advisor – Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the Islamic World (2008)
17. China-Russia Security Relations – Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion? (2008)
18. Real Change or Retrenchment? (2008)
19. Key Strategic Issues List, July 2008 (2008)
20. Civil-Military Relations in a Post-9/11 World (2008)
21. Expand the U.S. Military? Not So Fast (2008)
22. State of the U.S. Military Reserve Components (2008)
23. Wars of Ideas and the War of Ideas (2008)
24. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. I – Theory of War and Strategy, 3rd Edition (2008)
25. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. II – National Security Policy and Strategy, 3rd Edition (2008)
26. From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age – The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy (2008)
27. Chavez – The Beginning of the End (2008)
28. Borders – Technology and Security–Strategic Responses to New Challenges (2008)
30. U.S. Foreign Policy and Regime Instability (2008)
31. The Second Berlin Wall (2008)
32. Global Climate Change National Security Implications (2008)
33. Prospects from Korean Unification (2008)
34. Precision in the Global War on Terror – Inciting Muslims through the War of Ideas (2008)
35. Baloch Nationalism and the Geopolitics of Energy Resources – The Changing Context of Separatism in Pakistan (2008)
36. The Evolution of U.S. Turkish Relations in a Transatlantic Context (2008)
37. The Strategy Deficit (2008)
38. Projecting Pyongyang – The Future of North Korea’s Kim Jong Il Regime (2008)
39. Building for the Future – China’s Progress in Space Technology during the Tenth 5-Year Plan and the U.S. Response (2008)
40. The Political Context Behind Successful Revolutionary Movements, Three Case Studies – Vietnam (1955-63), Algeria (1945-62), and Nicaragua (1967-79) (2008)
41. Security Sector Reform in Liberia – Mixed Results from Humble Beginnings (2008)
42. Opportunities for Engaging Minorities (2008)
43. Drug Intoxicated Irregular Fighters – Complications, Dangers, and Responses (2008)
44. Towards a New Russia Policy (2008)
45. After Fidel, The Deluge? (2008)
46. Falling Behind – International Scrutiny of the Peaceful Atom (2008)
47. The North Korean Ballistic Missile Program (2008)
48. Dissent and Strategic Leadership of the Military Professions (2008)
49. Developing Strategic Leaders for the 21st Century (2008)
50. Deterrence, Missile Defense, and Collateral Damage in the Iranian-Israeli Strategic Relationship (2008)
51. Transforming to Effects-Based Operations – Lessons from the United Kingdom Experience (2008)
52. Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police Forces (2008)
53. Women in Combat Compendium (2008)
54. Pakistan’s Nuclear Future – Worries Beyond War (2008)
55. A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty – Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil (2008)
56. COIN of the Realm – U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy (2008)
57. The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare – Aligning and Integrating Military and Civilian Roles in Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (2008)
58. Intrepidity…And Character Development within the Army Profession (2008)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2009
01. Medvedev’s Plan – Giving Russia a Voice but not a Veto in a New European Security System (2009)
02. An All Hazards Training Center for a Catastrophic Emergency (2009)
03. Resetting the Reset Button – Realism About Russia (2009)
04. Democratic Governance and the Rule of Law – Lessons from Colombia (2009)
05. Leadership and National Security Reform Conference (2009)
06. YouTube War – Fighting in a World of Cameras in Every Cell Phone and Photoshop on Every Computer (2009)
07. India’s Strategic Defense Transformation – Expanding Global Relationships (2009)
08. A Case Study in Security Sector Reform – Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (Oct 2002-Sep 2003) (2009)
09. Army Football and Full Spectrum Operations (2009)
10. Schools for Strategy – Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict (2009)
11. Talent – Implications for a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy (2009)
12. The Army’s Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict (2009)
13. Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations – A Role for the Military (2009)
14. War’s Second Grammar (2009)
15. A Comprehensive Approach to Improving U.S. Security Force Assistance Efforts (2009)
16. A “New” Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment – The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies (2009)
17. Dealing with Political Ferment in Latin America – The Populist Revival, the Emergence of the Center, and Implications for U.S. Policy (2009)
18. Iraq – Strategic Reconciliation, Targeting, and Key Leader Engagement (2009)
19. Russian Elite Image of Iran – From the Late Soviet Era to the Present (2009)
20. Alien – How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (2009)
21. Escalation and Intrawar Deterrence During Limited Wars in the Middle East (2009)
22. National Security Strategy Reform – Rebalancing the President’s Agenda (2009)
23. Baghdad ER–Revisited (2009)
24. Mind-Sets and Missiles – a First Hand Account of the Cuban Missile Crisis (2009)
25. Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents – Organized Crime in Iraq (2009)
26. Toward a Risk Management Defense Strategy (2009)
27. The Role of Cuban Paramilitary Organizations (People’s Militias) in the Post-Castro Era (2009)
28. Taking Up the Security Challenge of Climate Change (2009)
30. Pakistan – The Most Dangerous Place in the World (2009)
31. 2009 Key Strategic Issues List (2009)
32. New Partnerships for a New Era – Enhancing the South African Army’s Stabilization Role in Africa (2009)
33. On Peace – Peace as a Means of Statecraft (2009)
34. Strategic Implications of Emerging Technologies (2009)
35. Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations – A Role for the Military? (2009)
36. China’s Strategic Culture – A Perspective for the United States (2009)
37. Arrowhead Ripper – Adaptive Leadership in Full Spectrum Operations (2009)
38. Challenges and Opportunities for the Obama Administration in Central Asia (2009)
39. China’s Maritime Quest (2009)
40. American Grand Strategy after War (2009)
41. State and Nonstate Associated Gangs – Credible “Midwives of New Social Orders” (2009)
42. Cultural Dimensions of Strategy and Policy (2009)
43. Mexico’s Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy (2009)
44. Preventing Iraq from Slipping Back into Sectarian Chaos (2009)
45. Beyond the Strait – PLA Missions other than Taiwan (2009)
46. New NATO Members – Security Consumers or Producers? (2009)
47. A History of Socio-Cultural Intelligence and Research Under the Occupation of Japan (2009)
48. The New Balance – Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower (2009)
49. Drug Trafficking, Violence, and the State in Mexico (2009)
50. Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success – A Proposed Human Capital Model Focused upon Talent (2009)
51. Provincial Reconstruction Teams – How Do We Know They Work? (2009)
52. Russia and Arms Control – Are There Opportunities for the Obama Administration? (2009)
53. Prospects for U.S.-Russian Security Cooperation (2009)
54. Russia, China, and the United States in Central Asia – Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis (2009)
55. Training for the “Political” War (2009)
56. Kazakhstan’s Defense Policy – An Assessment of the Trends (2009)
57. Japan’s Decision for War in 1941 – Some Enduring Lessons (2009)
58. Kiss the Embargo Goodbye (2009)
59. Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance – A New Structural Paradigm (2009)
60. Nuclear Heuristics – Selected Writings of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter (2009)
61. The Serpent in Our Garden – Al-Qa’ida and the Long War (2009)
62. After Iraq – The Search for a Sustainable National Security Strategy (2009)
63. The Army’s Ethic Suffers under its Retired Generals (2009)
64. Regional Spillover Effects of the Iraq War (2009)
65. Affairs of State – The Interagency and National Security (2009)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2010
All SSI Publications by Year/Date 2010.pdf
All SSI Publications by Year/Date 2010.png
01. Nuclear Power’s Global Expansion – Weighing Its Costs and Risks (2010)
02. A Risk-Based Approach to Strategic Balance (2010)
03. Lessons Learned from U.S. Government Law Enforcement in International Operations (2010)
04. La Familia Drug Cartel – Implications for U.S.-Mexican Security (2010)
05. Russia’s Prospects in Asia (2010)
06. Strangely Silent – The Missing Strategic Debate in the 2010 Mid-Term Elections (2010)
07. Deciding to Buy – Civil-Military Relations and Major Weapons Programs (2010)
08. America’s Most Committed Muslim Ally (2010)
09. Preventing Yemen from Becoming Fallujah (2010)
10. Some of the Best Weapons for Counterinsurgents Do Not Shoot (2010)
11. Operation EUFOR TCHAD/RCA and the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (2010)
12. Final Response to “America’s Flawed Afghanistan Strategy” (2010)
13. The Coming of Chinese Hawks (2010)
14. Harnessing Post-Conflict “Transitions” – A Conceptual Primer (2010)
15. Preparing for One War and Getting Another? (2010)
16. A New Chapter in Trans-American Engagement (2010)
17. An Army Transformed – The U.S. Army’s Post-Vietnam Recovery and the Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations (2010)
18. Somalia – Line in the Sand–Identification of MYM Vulnerabilities (2010)
19. Lessons Learned – 13 Months as the Senior Military Advisor to the Minister of Interior (2010)
20. Is the Organizational Culture of the U.S. Army Congruent with the Professional Development of Its Senior Level Officer Corps? (2010)
21. Candidly, One Friend to Another (2010)
22. Dilemmas of Brazilian Grand Strategy (2010)
23. David Galula – His Life and Intellectual Context (2010)
24. Preparing for a Mid-Term Assessment of Leadership and National Security Reform in the Obama Administration (2010)
25. U.S. Military Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations – The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. Capacity Gap (2010)
26. Chinese Energy Security – The Myth of the PLAN’s Frontline Status (2010)
27. Defense Energy Resilience – Lessons from Ecology (2010)
28. America’s Flawed Afghanistan Strategy (2010)
30. Organizing to Compete in the Political Terrain (2010)
31. Project on National Security Reform – Vision Working Group Report and Scenarios (2010)
32. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol I – Theory of War and Strategy, 4th Edition (2010)
33. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol II – National Security Policy and Strategy, 4th Edition (2010)
34. Got Vision? Unity of Vision in Policy and Strategy – What It Is and Why We Need It (2010)
35. The Russian Military Today and Tomorrow – Essays in Memory of Mary Fitzgerald (2010)
36. 2010 Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) (2010)
37. Who Won The Cold War? (2010)
38. China’s Role in the Stabilization of Afghanistan (2010)
39. Enter the Era of Persistent Competition for Talent (2010)
40. Arms Sales to Taiwan – Enjoy the Business While It Lasts (2010)
41. The PLA at Home and Abroad – Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China’s Military (2010)
42. Endgame for the West in Afghanistan? Explaining the Decline in Support for the War in Afghanistan in the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, France and Germany (2010)
43. Wanted – A Strategy for the Black Sea (2010)
44. Human Intelligence – All Humans, All Minds, All the Time (2010)
45. Rethinking Leadership and “Whole of Government” National Security Reform – Problems, Progress, and Prospects (2010)
46. Implications of a Changing NATO (2010)
47. Sufism in Northern Nigeria – A Force for Counter-Radicalization? (2010)
48. Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala – A Case Study in the Erosion of the State (2010)
49. Untangling a New Gordian Knot – Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, and Alexander’s Sword (2010)
50. Decisionmaking In Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – The Strategic Shift of 2007 (2010)
51. Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success – Employing Talent (2010)
52. Reviewing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) (2010)
53. Shades of CORDS in the Kush – The False Hope of “Unity of Effort” in American Counterinsurgency (2010)
54. Short of General War – Perspectives on the Use of Military Power in the 21st Century (2010)
55. The Construction of Liberal Democracy – The Role of Civil-Military Institutions in State and Nation-Building in West Germany and South Africa (2010)
56. The State-Owned Enterprise as a Vehicle for Stability (2010)
57. Criminal Sovereignty – Understanding North Korea’s Illicit International Activities (2010)
58. Thinking about Nuclear Power in Post-Saddam Iraq (2010)
59. Counternarcotics Operations in Afghanistan – The COIN of the Realm (2010)
60. Put Warning Bells on World Finance (2010)
61. The Goose and the Gander (2010)
62. Teaching Strategy – Challenge and Response (2010)
63. Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success – Developing Talent (2010)
64. Synchronizing U.S. Government Efforts toward Collaborative Health Care Policymaking in Iraq (2010)
65. Decisionmaking in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – Removing Saddam Hussein by Force (2010)
66. Lashkar-I-Taiba – The Fallacy of Subservient Proxies and the Future of Islamist Terrorism in India (2010)
67. Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict – Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan (2010)
68. Foreign Policy Continuity – War Finds Us (2010)
69. Accessing Talent – The Foundation of a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy (2010)
70. Do Oil Exports Fuel Defense Spending? (2010)
71. Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability in Mexico, Colombia, and the Caribbean – Implications for U.S. National Security (2010)
72. A Death Knell for “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (2010)
73. The Army Officers’ Professional Ethic–Past, Present, and Future (2010)
74. The Effects of Multiple Deployments on Army Adolescents (2010)
75. Security and Stability in Africa – A Development Approach (2010)
76. Pakistan’s Nuclear Future – Reining in the Risk (2010)
77. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (2010)
78. Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success – Retaining Talent (2010)
79. Something Brewing in Venezuela (2010)
80. Security Sector Reform – A Case Study Approach to Transition and Capacity Building (2010)
81. Security and Stability in Africa – A Development Approach (2010)
82. Response to “America’s Flawed Afghanistan Strategy” (2010)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2011
01. Organizational Change in the Russian Airborne Forces – The Lessons of the Georgian Conflict (2011)
02. Colloquium Brief – Cyber Infrastructure Protection (2011)
03. The United States and China in Power Transition (2011)
04. Real Leadership and the U.S. Army – Overcoming a Failure of Imagination to Conduct Adaptive Work (2011)
05. Op-Ed – The West and the Durability and Problems of Monarchies in the Arab Spring (2011)
06. The Saudi-Iranian Rivalry and the Future of Middle East Security (2011)
07. The Strategic Logic of the Contemporary Security Dilemma (2011)
08. Forecasting Zero – U.S. Nuclear History and the Low Probability of Disarmament (2011)
09. Russian Nuclear Weapons – Past, Present, and Future (2011)
10. Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars (2011)
11. Op-Ed – Where Have All the Army Generals Gone? (2011)
12. Arms Control and Proliferation Challenges to the Reset Policy (2011)
13. Op-Ed – China’s Aircraft Carrier – The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly (2011)
14. Economic Transition in Afghanistan – How to Soften a Hard Landing (2011)
15. The Afghanistan Question and the Reset in U.S.-Russian Relations (2011)
16. Natural Gas as an Instrument of Russian State Power (2011)
17. Mexico’s “Narco-Refugees” – The Looming Challenge for U.S. National Security (2011)
18. Presidential Succession Scenarios in Egypt and Their Impact on U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Relations (2011)
19. Puncturing the Counterinsurgency Myth – Britain and Irregular Warfare in the Past, Present, and Future (2011)
20. 2011-2012 U.S. Army War College Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) (2011)
21. Threat Posed by Mounting Vigilantism in Mexico (2011)
22. Anticipating Contemporary War – How Well Did We Do? (2011)
23. Profession of Arms — Starfish Metaphor (2011)
24. Adapting, Transforming, and Modernizing Under Fire – The Mexican Military 2006-11 (2011)
25. National Security Reform 2010 – A Midterm Assessment (2011)
26. Colloquium Brief – Kingston Conference on International Security (KCIS-2011) – The Changing Arctic – Sovereignty, Resources, and Security (2011)
27. China-Latin America Military Engagement – Good Will, Good Business, and Strategic Position (2011)
28. At Crossroads – Iceland’s Defense and Security Relations, 1940-2011 (2011)
30. Op-Ed – The Criminals South of the Border – Lessons from Mexico (2011)
31. The Arab Spring and the Future of U.S. Interests and Cooperative Security in the Arab World (2011)
32. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union’s Common Security and Defense Policy – Intersecting Trajectories (2011)
33. Understanding the North Korea Problem – Why It Has Become the “Land of Lousy Options” (2011)
34. Colloquium Brief – The Energy and Security Nexus – A Strategic Dilemma (2011)
35. The Changing Face of Afghanistan, 2001-08 (2011)
36. Russia in the Arctic (2011)
37. The New Aztecs – Ritual and Restraint in Contemporary Western Military Operations (2011)
38. Colloquium Brief – Conflict Management – A Tool for U.S. National Security Strategy (2011)
39. Op-Ed – A National Strategic Narrative and Grand Strategy for the 21st Century (2011)
40. The European Campaign – Its Origins and Conduct (2011)
41. The Arab Upheavals and the Future of the U.S. Military Policies and Presence in the Middle East and the Gulf (2011)
42. Op-Ed – U.S. Intelligence at a Crossroads (2011)
43. Colloquium Brief – Post-Heroic Warfare? (2011)
44. Resolving Insurgencies (2011)
45. Military Modernization and the Russian Ground Forces (2011)
46. The Russian Military and the Georgia War – Lessons and Implications (2011)
47. Defining Command, Leadership, and Management Success Factors within Stability Operations (2011)
48. Rebuilding Armed Forces – Learning from Iraq and Lebanon (2011)
49. Op-Ed – Conventional Arms Control and European Security (2011)
50. Cyber Infrastructure Protection (2011)
51. The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism – Examples and Implications for Liberal Democracies (2011)
52. Colloquium Brief – American Society and Its Profession of Arms (2011)
53. Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003-09 – A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response (2011)
54. Central Asian Security Trends – Views from Europe and Russia (2011)
55. Army Strong–Really? (2011)
56. Other People’s Wars – PLA Lessons from Foreign Conflicts (2011)
57. Hard Power and Soft Power – The Utility of Military Force as an Instrument of Policy in the 21st Century (2011)
58. A Colloquium on U.S. National Security Policy, Military Strategy – Understanding the Environment for Contemporary Warfare (2011)
59. Resolving Ethical Challenges in an Era of Persistent Conflict (2011)
60. Junior Leader Professional Development — Who Has the Time? (2011)
61. Security and Governance – Foundations for International Stability (2011)
62. An Evaluation of Counterinsurgency as a Strategy for Fighting the Long War (2011)
63. Russian Military Politics and Russia’s 2010 Defense Doctrine (2011)
64. Profession of Arms Study Trust Review (2011)
65. Should ROTC Return to the Ivy League? (2011)
66. India in Africa – Implications of an Emerging Power for AFRICOM and U.S. Strategy (2011)
67. Brazil’s Security Strategy and Defense Doctrine (2011)
68. Civilian Skills for African Military Officers to Resolve the Infrastructure, Economic Development, and Stability Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa (2011)
69. Reforming Military Command Arrangements – The Case of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (2011)
70. A Continuation of Politics by Other Means – The “Politics” of a Peacekeeping Mission in Cambodia (1992-1993) (2011)
71. The Role of Religion in National Security Policy Since 9/11 (2011)
72. How Smart Economic Strategy Could Strengthen the Afghan Counterinsurgency (2011)
73. Is Tunisia Tipping? (2011)
74. Op-Ed – What If They Threw a War and… (2011)
75. 2010 SSI Annual Strategy Conference Report “Defining War for the 21st Century” (2011)
76. The Conflicts in Yemen and U.S. National Security (2011)
77. Civil-Military Relations in Medvedev’s Russia (2011)
78. Coherence and Contrasts (2011)
79. Predictions, Observations, and the Free Lunch (2011)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2012
01. The Impact of President Felipe Calderón’s War on Drugs on the Armed Forces – The Prospects for Mexico’s “Militarization” and Bilateral Relations (2012)
02. Insanity – Four Decades of U.S. Counterdrug Strategy (2012)
03. India’s Changing Afghanistan Policy – Regional and Global Implications (2012)
04. Venezuela as an Exporter of 4th Generation Warfare Instability (2012)
05. A National Security Staff for the 21st Century (2012)
06. Op-Ed – Can Sanctions Be More Effective Than Military Action In Iran? (2012)
07. Learning by Doing – The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad (2012)
08. Op-Ed – Getting to the Win (2012)
09. The Moral Corrosion within Our Military Professions (2012)
10. The Energy and Security Nexus – A Strategic Dilemma (2012)
11. Jihadist Cells and “IED” Capabilities in Europe – Assessing the Present and Future Threat to the West (2012)
12. Beyond the Battlefield – Institutional Army Transformation Following Victory in Iraq (2012)
13. State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya (2012)
14. How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents (2012)
15. Russia’s Homegrown Insurgency – Jihad in the North Caucasus (2012)
16. Op-Ed – The Romance of Great Powers in Northeast Asia (2012)
17. A “Hollow Army” Reappraised – President Carter, Defense Budgets, and the Politics of Military Readiness (2012)
18. The Future of American Landpower – Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in Europe (2012)
19. Lead Me, Follow Me, Or Get Out of My Way – Rethinking and Refining the Civil-Military Relationship (2012)
20. Key Strategic Issues List Update No. 2 (2012)
21. Russia and the Current State of Arms Control (2012)
22. Finding “The Right Way” – Toward an Army Institutional Ethic (2012)
23. The Prospects for Security Sector Reform in Tunisia – A Year After the Revolution (2012)
24. Hidden Dragon, Crouching Lion – How China’s Advance in Africa is Underestimated and Africa’s Potential Underappreciated (2012)
25. Perspectives on Russian Foreign Policy (2012)
26. Op-Ed – Rethinking the American Way of War and the Role of Landpower (2012)
27. The Promise and Pitfalls of Grand Strategy (2012)
28. 2012-13 KSIL Update No. 01 (2012)
30. Op-Ed – The New Security Reality – Not Business as Usual (2012)
31. Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America – An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority (2012)
32. Arms Control and European Security (2012)
33. Culture, Identity, and Information Technology in the 21st Century – Implications for U.S. National Security (2012)
34. Against All Odds – Relations between NATO and the MENA Region (2012)
35. 2012-13 Key Strategic Issues List (2012)
36. The Next Arms Race (2012)
37. Op-Ed – Fixing the Future Rather Than the Past (2012)
38. Breaking News Analysis – The Future of the U.S. Political and Military Relationship with Egypt (2012)
39. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol 2 – National Security Policy and Strategy, 5th Ed. (2012)
40. End Game Strategies – Winning the Peace (2012)
41. Colloquium Brief – Visual Propaganda and Online Radicalization (2012)
42. U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Vol. 1 – Theory of War and Strategy, 5th Ed. (2012)
43. Can Russia Reform? Economic, Political, and Military Perspectives (2012)
44. Op-Ed – Relearning War (2012)
45. The Role of Small States in the Post-Cold War Era – The Case of Belarus (2012)
46. Colloquium Brief – Learning By Doing – The PLA Trains at Home and Abroad (2012)
47. Disjointed Ways, Disunified Means – Learning from America’s Struggle to Build an Afghan Nation (2012)
48. Op-Ed – Where Do We Go From Here? (2012)
49. Lessons of the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Program for Iraq’s Future and the Arab Revolutions (2012)
50. Ambassador Stephen Krasner’s Orienting Principle for Foreign Policy (and Military Management)—Responsible Sovereignty (2012)
51. Enabling Unity of Effort in Homeland Response Operations (2012)
52. Drug Trafficking, Violence, and Instability (2012)
53. Conflict Management and “Whole of Government” – Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy? (2012)
54. Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO (2012)
55. Op-Ed – Heading Toward the NATO Summit (2012)
56. Project on National Security Reform – Vol. 2 – Case Studies Working Group Report (2012)
57. Delegitimizing Al-Qaeda – A Jihad-Realist Approach (2012)
58. The Impact of Visual Images – Addendum (2012)
59. Op-Ed – Zen and the Art of Social Selfishness (2012)
60. Categorical Confusion? The Strategic Implications of Recognizing Challenges Either as Irregular or Traditional (2012)
61. Busting the Myths About the North Korea Problem (2012)
62. Once Again, the Challenge to the U.S. Army During a Defense Reduction – To Remain a Military Profession (2012)
63. Op-Ed – Weekend at Osama’s (2012)
64. The Importance of Images to America’s Fight Against Violent Jihadism (2012)
65. Preserving U.S. National Security Interests Through a Liberal World Construct (2012)
66. Op-Ed – The Technology Avalanche and the Future of War (2012)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2013
01. New Realities – Energy Security in the 2010s and Implications for the U.S. Military (2013)
02. Op-Ed – Will the Syrian Civil War Last 10 More Years? (2013)
03. Africa’s Booming Oil and Natural Gas Exploration and Production – National Security Implications for the United States and China (2013)
04. Dangerous Ground – The Spratly Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches (2013)
05. Politics and Economics in Putin’s Russia (2013)
06. U.S. Governmental Information Operations and Strategic Communications – A Discredited Tool or User Failure? Implications for Future Conflict (2013)
07. Op-Ed – What Our Civilian Leaders Do Not Understand About the Ethic of Military Professions – A Striking Example of the Current Gap in Civil-Military Relations (2013)
08. What Is Next for Mali? The Roots of Conflict and Challenges to Stability (2013)
09. Washington’s Debt, Beijing’s Bubble, and the Discussion No One is Having (2013)
10. State Collapse, Insurgency, and Counterinsurgency – Lessons from Somalia (2013)
11. Building Better Armies – An Insider’s Account of Liberia (2013)
12. Reforming the Police in Post-Soviet States – Georgia and Kyrgyzstan (2013)
13. Central Asia After 2014 (2013)
14. Changing Minds In The Army – Why It Is So Difficult and What To Do About It (2013)
15. Forging an American Grand Strategy – Securing a Path Through a Complex Future. Selected Presentations from a Symposium at the National Defense University (2013)
16. NATO Missile Defense and the European Phased Adaptive Approach – The Implications of Burden-Sharing and the Underappreciated Role of the U.S. Army (2013)
17. Conflict Management and Peacebuilding – Pillars of a New American Grand Strategy (2013)
18. Strategic Landpower Task Force Research Report (2013)
19. The Army Should Embrace A2/AD — A Rebuttal (2013)
20. Op-Ed – Doubts on China’s “New Model for Great Power Relationship” (2013)
21. A Transatlantic Bargain for the 21st Century – The United States, Europe, and the Transatlantic Alliance (2013)
22. The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns (2013)
23. The Real “Long War” – The Illicit Drug Trade and the Role of the Military (2013)
24. An Assessment of the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (2013)
25. Closing the Candor Chasm – The Missing Element of Army Professionalism (2013)
26. Op-Ed – Is Strategy Really A Lost Art? (2013)
27. The Security Concerns of the Baltic States as NATO Allies (2013)
28. 2013-14 Key Strategic Issues List (2013)
29. Nuclear Weapons Security Crises – What Does History Teach?
30. The Causes of Instability in Nigeria and Implications for the United States (2013)
31. Cartel Car Bombings in Mexico (2013)
32. Development of the Baltic Armed Forces in Light of Multinational Deployments (2013)
33. AFRICOM at 5 Years -The Maturation of a New U.S. Combatant Command (2013)
34. Op-Ed – Reflections on “The China Threat” (2013)
35. A Framework for Restructuring the Military Retirement System (2013)
36. Op-Ed – The Army Should Embrace A2/AD (2013)
37. Russian Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa (2013)
38. The Army’s Campaign Against Sexual Violence – Dealing With The Careerist Bystanders (2013)
39. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya – Reviewing Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR (2013)
40. Joint Strategic Planning System Insights – Chairmen Joint Chiefs of Staff 1990 to 2012 (2013)
41. The Struggle for Yemen and the Challenge of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2013)
42. Nigerian Unity – In the Balance (2013)
43. Op-Ed – Abraham Lincoln and the Obligations Of International Law (2013)
44. The Future of the Arab Gulf Monarchies in the Age of Uncertainties (2013)
45. Avoiding the Slippery Slope – Conducting Effective Interventions (2013)
46. Return of the Balkans – Challenges to European Integration and U.S. Disengagement (2013)
47. Asia-Pacific – A Strategic Assessment (2013)
48. Academic Engagement Notes – 2013 International Studies Association (ISA) Annual Convention (2013)
49. The Challenge of Drug Trafficking to Democratic Governance and Human Security in West Africa (2013)
50. War and Insurgency in the Western Sahara (2013)
51. Op-Ed – Downsizing the Army Profession (2013)
52. Cyber Infrastructure Protection – Vol. II (2013)
53. Sharing Power? Prospects for a U.S. Concert-Balance Strategy (2013)
54. Egypt’s New Regime and the Future of the U.S.-Egyptian Strategic Relationship (2013)
55. Op-Ed – Developing A New Approach To Conventional Arms Control (2013)
56. Making Strategic Sense of Cyber Power – Why the Sky Is Not Falling (2013)
57. From Chaos to Cohesion – A Regional Approach to Security, Stability, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (2013)
58. Governance, Identity, and Counterinsurgency – Evidence from Ramadi and Tal Afar (2013)
59. Op-Ed – Drones Are Making A Difference In Yemen (2013)
60. Cyberspace – Malevolent Actors, Criminal Opportunities, and Strategic Competition Conference (2013)
61. Colloquium Brief – Kingston Conference on International Security (KCIS-2012) – International Security in an Age of Austerity (2013)
62. Op-Ed – Thinking Inside A New Box – The Coming of the New Age of Mutualism; The End of Another (2013)
63. Strategic Stability – Contending Interpretations (2013)
64. Routine, Disciplined, and Results-Oriented – Joint Plans and Operations (JPOx) and Decisionmaking Processes in U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) (2013)
65. Talking Past Each Other? How Views of U.S. Power Vary between U.S. and International Military Personnel (2013)
66. Op-Ed – The Need For A “Half-Pivot to the Americas” (2013)
*
US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 2014
01. Visual Propaganda and Extremism in the Online Environment (2014)
02. Revival of Political Islam in the Aftermath of Arab Uprisings – Implications for the Region and Beyond (2014)
03. European Missile Defense and Russia (2014)
04. Russia’s Contribution as a Partner in the War on Terrorism (2014)
05. Democratization and Instability in Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus (2014)
06. The Paracel Islands and U.S. Interests and Approaches in the South China Sea (2014)
07. Operational Reservations – Considerations for a Total Army Force (2014)
08. Moving Beyond Pretense – Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (2014)
09. 2014-15 Key Strategic Issues List (2014)
10. Countering Radicalization and Recruitment to Al-Qaeda – Fighting the War of Deeds (2014)
11. The Growing Complexity of Sino-Indian Ties (2014)
12. Memorandum for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – Secure Balance and Flexibility In Future Joint Forces (2014)
13. Cyberterrorism after STUXNET (2014)
14. The Future of American Landpower – Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in the Pacific (2014)
15. Islamism and Security in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2014)
16. From War to Deterrence? Israel-Hezbollah Conflict Since 2006 (2014)
17. Soldiers of Misfortune? (2014)
18. The Resurgence of Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq (2014)
19. Russian Military Transformation – Goal In Sight? (2014)
20. Russia After Putin (2014)
21. A Soldier’s Morality, Religion, and Our Professional Ethic – Does the Army’s Culture Facilitate Integration, Character Development, and Trust in the Profession? (2014)
22. The Evolution of Los Zetas in Mexico and Central America – Sadism as an Instrument of Cartel Warfare (2014)
23. Assessing the People’s Liberation Army in the Hu Jintao Era (2014)
24. Augmenting Our Influence – Alliance Revitalization and Partner Development (2014)
25. Russia’s Counterinsurgency in North Caucasus – Performance and Consequences (2014)
26. Defense Planning for National Security – Navigation Aids for the Mystery Tour (2014)
27. Turkey-Kurdish Regional Government Relations After the U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq – Putting the Kurds on the Map? (2014)
28. Legality in Cyberspace – An Adversary View (2014)
29. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Information Warfare (2014)
30. Senior Officer Talent Management – Fostering Institutional Adaptability (2014)
31. Strategic Implications of the Evolving Shanghai Cooperation Organization (2014)
32. Military Power, The Core Tasks Of A Prudent Strategy, And The Army We Need (2014)
33. Strategic Retrenchment and Renewal in the American Experience (2014)
34. Iran’s Emergence as a Cyber Power (2014)
35. Russia and the Caspian Sea – Projecting Power or Competing for Influence? (2014)
36. Colloquium Brief – The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in 2025 (2014)

 US Army War College - Strategic Studies Institute

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US Army War College – Strategic Studies Institute – 1992-2014 PDF Library (Size: 743.19 MB)

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Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) | US Army War College

Publications by YearStrategic Studies Institute – U.S. Army

The Military Balance 2014 | IISS

strategic studies institute of the army 2014

Child Fatalities and Near Fatalities – Do We Need the Details?

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Child Abuse

The Children’s Advocacy Institute (CAI) continues to work tirelessly to shine light on one of our nation’s  biggest tragedies  – child deaths due to abuse or neglect.  As phrased by political cartoonist Nick Anderson, these are “very real weapons of mass destruction.”  But why are the private details of these tragedies important for public consumption?  The short answer is simply that we can learn from them and do better. We need to continue to shout from the rooftops until we see real change to protect our children.

On average, more than 4,000 children are removed from their homes and enter foster care each week.  According to the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s Kids Count Data Center, more than 250,000 children entered foster care in 2010.  Unfortunately, not all removals from a parent’s home are warranted.  The Daily Beast recently reported that in that same year, “nearly 40 percent of children who had been removed from their homes – more than 85,000 children that year – were later returned with no finding of abuse or neglect, according to the Department of Health and Human Services.”

How was it that these children were returned to their homes without a finding of abuse or neglect?  Because when a child is removed, counsel are appointed for the parents, a Guardian ad Litem is appointed for the child, and a series of hearings must occur (including an initial hearing within 48 hours of the child’s initial removal) to assure both that reasonable efforts were made to avoid removal and that reasonable efforts are being made to reunify the child and parents.  There are several checks in place to assure that when a child is removed from her home the removal decision was correctly made.

But what about the children that aren’t removed, and instead are left in their home, perhaps erroneously?  We can’t assume that all non-removals are correctly decided.  Logic and the numbers simply do not bear that out.  Since there’s no system of checks in place for them, we can only hope to learn from their tragic cases after the fact by accessing and analyzing public records.

foster careThe U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) established a national collection and analysis program on states’ data regarding child abuse and neglect.  States voluntarily submit their own data and it is then used to create annual reports which help better understand child abuse causes, demographics, and the systems assisting children.  As part of this data collection, DHHS looks at child fatalities due to abuse and neglect.  In 2009, 34 states reported their child fatality data.  In those 34 reporting states, nearly one in every eight child fatalities involved children whose families had received family preservation services in the past 5 years.

But it is imperative to go beyond the cases that escalated to the point of receiving services, and beyond states’ self-reports to instead take a look at cases where there were any prior child protective services contact.   CAI requested information from all of California’s 58 counties on fatalities and near fatalities due to child abuse and neglect for the period of July 21, 2006 through December 31, 2006.  During that time period, there were 30 near-fatalities and 53 fatalities reported.  Of the 30 cases of near-fatalities, 63% (19) of the children’s families had a child protective services history and 37% (11) had a child protective services history which CAI identified as substantially related to the reported near fatality.  Of the 53 fatalities, 82% (41) of the children’s families had a child protective services history and 53% (28) had a child protective services history which CAI identified as substantially related to the reported fatality.

By going beyond the self-reported numbers, CAI can see an unfortunate trend where more than three-quarters of all child fatalities due to abuse or neglect involve families with a child protective services history.

While there are “checks” in place to ensure the propriety of a child’s removal from their home, this doesn’t help the children that are being left in homes where abuse was known to be occurring.  When this happens, there is no systemic check in place to save these children.  These are the cases where our system has failed and where we must step in.

Anecdotal evidence shows that when we learn from these deaths – often because they are reported in the media – positive systemic change can occur.  Reporting of various child deaths in San Diego, Sacramento, and Los Angeles counties have all lead local agencies to revisit and improve their practices with respect to child protection.  When a child’s death to due abuse or neglect occurs, it is imperative to do more than look the other way.

This is why CAI continues to put pressure on states to release all their information related to child abuse and neglect deaths.  The information we learn can often provide great insight into system’s failings and is the only silver lining we can hold on to from these most tragic cases.

 Related:

Find statistics on child fatalities due to child maltreatment, as well as research on risk factors and perpetrator characteristics.

Child Fatalities
Series Title: Related Organizations Lists
Author(s): Child Welfare Information Gateway
Availability: View
Download (PDF – 0KB)
Year Published: 2014 – 3 pages
This directory lists national organizations that disseminate information about child fatalities. The organizations provide advocacy, professional training, program development, public awareness, and research services.

 Protecting Children From Abuse and Neglect: Trends and Issues:

 

Resources:

Child Abuse & Neglect Fatalities

U.S. Foster Care: A Flawed Solution That Leads To More

The Fleecing of Foster Children – Children’s Advocacy Insti

(2014). Child Maltreatment 2012: Summary of key findings .

After Rise in Foster Care Deaths, DFPS Approves New

Foster-Care System Stretched Too Far – ABC News

DCFS-involved abuse and neglect deaths: 61 children, 61

Foster Care Facts | Promises2Kids

Here’s A Story About What Foster Care Is Like For An

Statistics & Research | Children’s Bureau | Administration for ..

Adoption & Foster Care Statistics | Children’s Bureau

Childhelp

Protecting Children From Abuse And Neglect: Trends

No Right to Remain Silent in California Without Being Guilty

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california-state-flagPlease do not read this article without acknowledging our First Amendment right under the U.S. Constitution.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

The reason this article started off with the First Amendment to the constitution is because it would appear that we must now assert our constitutional rights before we’re entitled to them – according to the California Supreme Court.

rightnotsilentIn a bizarre and preposterous ruling, People v. Tom – California Courts, the first of its kind that we know of in the nation, you don’t have the right to remain silent before being informed of those rights.

If you are silent before being informed of your Miranda Rights the state has a right to assume and argue that your silence proves your guilt, so said the California Supreme Court in a controversial 4-3 ruling.

In short, your federal Constitution Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination, your fundamental right to remain silent has been nullified in the golden state.

Fifth AmendmentThe court actually ruled that a criminal defendant’s silence after the event for which he was charged with a crime was properly used against him in court to prove his guilt, and only after the cops arrested and then advised the defendant that he had a right to remain silent did he begin to enjoy the right without his silence being used against him as proof of his guilt.

 

This begs the questions:

Why is it ever necessary at all to advise the accused of the right to remain silent if he is already aware of it, exercising it, and remaining silent? Why should that right be a nullity until the cops formally advise of it? Why is there no right to remain silent before being advised of the right? Why isn’t the right always operative?

The fact is that suspects are usually not aware of their rights. That’s why the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona ruled decades ago that police must advise of the right before questioning the suspect.

 

Deafening SilenceIgnorance is no excuse!

You as a citizen are expected to know all of the 29 Codes that consist of California law.

You are also now required to get intimate with your constitutional protections and, your constitutional rights appear to have no validity unless you assert them. You as a citizen are only entitled to your right to remain silent when you assert them by informing law enforcement that you have the right to remain silent before they read you your Miranda rights.

Much like your right to remain silent, you probably wont be entitled to protections against unreasonable or warrantless search either unless you assert those rights before the search commences. You probably wont enjoy freedom of speech protections and the media wouldn’t enjoy freedom of the press either unless they start out every article by citing the first amendment much like this article started out with asserting the rights under the first amendment. 

“The court today holds, against common sense expectations, that remaining silent after being placed under arrest is not enough to exercise one’s right to remain silent,” said Justice Goodwin Liu.

 

Related:

California State Legislature—Laws and Constitution

California Law consists of 29 codes, covering various subject areas, the State Constitution and Statutes. Information presented reflects laws currently in effect:

Business and Professions Code Civil Code
Code of Civil Procedure Commercial Code
Corporations Code Education Code
Elections Code Evidence Code
Family Code Financial Code
Fish and Game Code Food and Agricultural Code
Government Code Harbors and Navigation Code
Health and Safety Code Insurance Code
Labor Code Military and Veterans Code
Penal Code Probate Code
Public Contract Code Public Resources Code
Public Utilities Code Revenue and Taxation Code
Streets and Highways Code Unemployment Insurance Code
Vehicle Code Water Code

Resources:

Constitution of California

California Primary Law

California State Law 2014 All 29 Codes & Rules

People v. Tom – California Courts

Can the government use arresteessilence against them

right to remain silent

You Have The Right To Remain Silent (WARNING: May Not ..

Authority!:Remain Silent in California

Enforcing Constitutional Rights

Damages: A Remedy for the Violation of Constitutional R

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