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Tehran, July 1953. Mossadeq’s supporters and members of Tudeh carry placards denouncing Britain and the US: a local boy is depicted giving John Bull and Uncle Sam the push

Photo: July 1953. Mossadeq Supporters and members of Tudeh carry placards denouncing Britain and the US: a local boy is depicted giving John Bull and Uncle Sam the push.

The Coup

Our Enemy – The State

This regime was established by a coup d’Etat of a new and unusual kind, practicable only in a rich country. It was effected, not by violence, like Louis- Napoleon’s, or by terrorism, like Mussolini’s, but by purchase.  It therefore presents what might be called an American variant of the coup d’Etat.

Our national legislature was not suppressed by force of arms, like the French Assembly in 1851, but was bought out of its functions with public money; and as appeared most conspicuously in the elections of November, 1934, the consolidation of the coup d’Etat was effected by the same means; the corresponding functions in the smaller units were reduced under the personal control of the ExecutiveThis is a most remarkable phenomenon; possibly nothing quite like it ever took place; and its character and implications deserve the most careful attention.

It would be interesting to know the exact distribution of the burden of jobholders and mendicant political retainers – for it must not be forgotten that the subsidized “unemployed” are now a permanent body of patronage – among income-receiving citizens.

Counting indirect taxes and voluntary contributions as well as direct taxes, it would probably be not far off the mark to say that every two citizens are carrying a third between them.

At the present time, a citizen lives under half-a-dozen or more separate overlapping jurisdictions, federal, state, county, township, municipal, borough, school-district, ward, federal district. Nearly all of these have power to tax them directly or indirectly, or both, and as we all know, the only limit to the exercise of this power is what can be safely got by it.

‘You do not know and will never know who the Remnant are, or where they are, or how many of them there are, or what they are doing or will do. Two things you know, and no more: first, that they exist; second, that they will find you.’ (Albert Jay Nock)

If we look beneath the surface of our public affairs, we can discern one fundamental fact, namely:
a great redistribution of power between society and the State. This is the fact that interests the
student of civilization. He has only a secondary or derived interest in matters like price-fixing, wage-fixing, inflation, political banking, “agricultural adjustment,” and similar items of State policy that fill the pages of newspapers and the mouths of publicists and politicians. All these can be run up under one head. They have an immediate and temporary importance, and for this reason they  monopolize public attention, but they all come to the same thing; which is, an increase of State power and a corresponding decrease of social power.

Cronyism, winners and losers.

The Courthouse Door Stays Open, But It’s Not Over Yet

The Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in Douglas v. Independent Living Center, a case challenging California’s cuts in Medicaid reimbursement rates, can be summed up by the movie title: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly.  The Good is the majority’s holding that refuses to deny court access to low-income Medicaid beneficiaries who had difficulty obtaining medications and other services when California slashed rates in violation of federal law.  The Bad is the narrowness of the court’s decision, which is limited to simple instructions to the lower court on remand.  And the Ugly is the dissent seeking to slam the courthouse doors on the poor.

The plot (or facts) in this case bears no resemblance to the movie.  When California slashed Medicaid provider rates to save money, ignoring the impact on beneficiary access to care, providers and beneficiaries sued the state.  Federal Medicaid law requires states to ensure adequate access to care.  So, the state laws cutting reimbursement rates conflicted with federal law.  The suit alleged that the state rate cut statute was “preempted” under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution by the contrary federal law.  Businesses routinely bring preemption challenges to state laws that allegedly conflict with federal law.

The state tried to get the case thrown out of court, arguing that beneficiaries could not bring a preemption suit to enforce the Medicaid statute.  But the Ninth Circuit, relying on over a century of Supreme Court cases permitting preemption cases to go forward, held that poor people have the same right to bring preemption challenges as businesses, and let the case proceed.  All other Circuits to consider whether preemption is available in these circumstances were in agreement.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, numerous states and the Justice Department (over objections from Health and Human Services) joined California in arguing that beneficiaries should not be granted access to the courts to invalidate state laws that conflict with federal law.

The Good: Even with all the forces of government power aligned against the disadvantaged, a majority of the Justices refused to dismiss the suit. Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the opinion, joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan. The Court noted that about a month after oral argument, the federal agency had approved some of the rate cuts and the state had withdrawn its request to implement the remaining cuts. This changed the factual posture of the suit, permitting the beneficiaries to make a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act that they could not have brought previously. The majority remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for consideration of this new development, instructing the Court of Appeals to apply usual deference to the agency’s determination.

The Bad: The decision is focused on instructions to the Ninth Circuit, and therefore understandably narrow. But the Court missed an important opportunity to underscore that the extensive body of case law permitting preemption claims is as applicable to suits alleging violations of safety-net statutes as it is to suits by businesses challenging state regulatory law.

The Ugly: The dissent ignored a century of cases and advocated carving out the claims of the poor from the Court’s preemption jurisprudence. Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. wrote the dissent, joined by Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito. The dissent made no attempt to distinguish the multitude of cases permitting preemption challenges, including cases in the past decade allowing Medicaid preemption claims to proceed. The dissent noted that other legal tools of enforcing Medicaid had been closed off by recent Supreme Court cases, and concluded that, as a result, all doors should be shut to the poor. The dissent suggested that preemption claims be limited to “defensive” actions, even though the claims in this case are no different than other preemption claims by big business which these justices have embraced.  The dissent’s approach is fundamentally unjust, permitting court access only for the powerful.

Luckily, the majority of the Court has preserved court access for the poor, at least for now, although final resolution of the court access question has been left for another day.

*********

18 usc chapter 115 – treason, sedition, and subversive – U.S. Code

18 U.S.C. 2382 Brown DisclosureGov. Brown Rolls with Royce Lewellen

Brown – The 2nd Class

Citizen’s President/Governor

Just like the President of Federal Citizen’s United States, Governor’s “appoint” their own judges under their own laws that double over Federal Citizens.

This 1975 news paper report illustrates, and links the connection between big money business and “campaign bought” judgeships in local areas:

Brown

10-18-75

Independent

Press Telegraph

Brown named two new Superior Court judges and six Municipal Court judges, bringing to 46 the number of court vacancies he has filled since taking office.

Municipal Court Judge Huey P. Shepard, 39, of Rancho Palos Verdes, was Appointed to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.

Named to the Santa Barbara County Superior Court in Santa Maria was Solvang Justice Court Judge Royce R. Lewellen.

The fatally defective problem is they do not operate by the rule two which they took an oath.  Their very contract demands they breach Supremacy oath right out of the box, which specifically prohibits local Sheriff armed forces and double laws, e.g.

But they’ve divined overlapping powers, fabricating a state of double citizenship and laws for which there is zero provision in the United States’ Constitution.  To the contrary, there is no constitutional joint or shared or concurrent power:

The Tricks Played

Privileges/Immunities

Exempt From All Taxing

A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have had original subject matter jurisdiction over that suit.[1]

It is clear and indubitable that when an act of Congress conflicts with the Constitution, it is the duty … to declare, and to enforce the Constitution.[2]

Only one time in history was concurrent or twin powers to regulate the exact same strain of crimes constitutionally authorized; prohibition: 18 – “The … States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”[3]  21 – “The eighteenth … amendment … is … repealed.”

 

Exempt From Double 101 – Americans’ Privilege


[1] 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987)

[2] Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. – 261 U.S. 525 (1923).

[3] 18th Amen, Section 2 -1919.

Gov. Brown Rolls with Royce LewellenView photos    Download allYou are invited to view Cash’s album. This album has 25 files.

 

1 03-19-13 SAC’s Sheriff DA Concurrent Con.doc
02-22-61 Royce Lewellen Son Michael Rutledge.pdf
05-17-49 Royce Theta Phi Fraternity.pdf
05 08-07-12 Delcared Illegal Bar Chamber Kane.doc
06-09-43 Royce Lewellen Party MO.pdf
09-05-76 Royce Murder Trial Waterfield.pdf
12-30-57 Royce Judy Lewellyn MO House.pdf
100 Pope’s Book Burning Fact.doc
0 Brown Royce Lewellyn Cover.doc
0a 02-12-13 Mayor Strong Arm Sheriff Breach.doc
0a 02-27-13 Local 1 2 3 Citizenship Classes.doc
0a Architect Earl Petersen A.doc
0a Royce Lewellen Family Marriage.doc
0b 10-18-75 Royce Appointed by Brown.pdf
0b 11-05-12 USDA Supremacy Nexus US.doc
0g Art of Lying Match Pricing Big Lie A.doc
0h 08-26-12 State Bar Patrick Kelly Speech Police.doc
0h 12 01-15-12 Shess B Double Kidnapping.doc

*********

Gary Joseph Bonas II

25852 McBean Parkway #748

Santa Clarita, California 91355

January 07, 2010

 

William Hebert & James Towery        Milken Institute

California State Bar                      1250 Fourth Street

1149 South Hill Street                      Santa Monica, Cal. 90401

Los Angeles, Cal. 90015-2299                                                

            info@milkeninstitute.org

Re:      About Owning Birth “Trust” Stock Cash and Certificates

Good day Mrs. Hebert & Towery:

            I write to inquire about the State Bar’s current position on the practice of claiming ownership of Bank Birth Notes.  As you know, that claim is applied to most, but not all people born here.

First, I outline the reality about our bank birth stock and corresponding accounts:

A)                The numbers on one’s birth certificate, and that it is a bank owned note;

B)                 The fact that these certificates are claimed to be owned and have been sold to federal buyers for, during one window of time, between $650,000 and $750,000;

C)                The fact that birth notes are U.C.C. 7-207 “Goods” cast as “warehouse receipts”:

                                  the location of the warehouse where the goods are stored … (residence)

·                     the date of issue of the receipt…..(“Date issued”)

·                     the consecutive number of the receipt…(on back or front of the certificate)

·                     a description of the goods … (name, sex, date of birth, etc.)

·                     the signature of the warehouseman, which may be made by his authorized agent … (municipal clerk or state registrar’s signature)

D)                The fact that ownership bank birth notes is the root of all loans to us, and banks capture as much in the process as possible by a variety of charges (interest prices, late fee prices, point prices and so forth – see attached).

Second, directly related to the above, I remind of this definition:

1.                  A situation [where] … one … has absolute power of the life, fortune and liberty of another.

2.         The practice of keeping individuals in such a state of [debt] bondage or [billing TRW – Equifax, TransUnion et al.] servitude.[1]

 Third, directly related to both paragraph’s one and two above, there is a rule about directly or indirectly causing one to be in debt to another at birth, thereby claiming to own all or part of one’s income across the course of his or her life: 

[No] … Involuntary [debt] servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.   13th Amendment.

The distinction between voluntary and involuntary debt servicing resides in a simple question:

Issue:  Does the Federal Reserve legally own bank birth certificate notes absent a knowing gift or otherwise lawful contract?[2]

Rule: No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.  14th Amendment

Analysis: I never knowingly gifted my vested citizenship rights (including my bank birth note) to anyone.  Neither did my parents.  I never knowingly gave up a single one of my vested rights by way of contract for any service, state or federal, by way of some unspoken and unidentified contract in which the drafter clearly spelled out all material terms.

Conclusion: No bank birth certificate note is owned by any bank, Reserve or otherwise.

            Fourth, knowing the BAR has never educated members or the public about the above process, could you please advise – for educational & CLE purposes – of the BAR’s current position on the above points?  As you know, by lobbying plus, big bank brokers position on this point is clear; collecting for the reserve made them rich[er]:

James Dimon             Billionaire & N.Y. Fed Reserve Board of Director – Till 2012

Henry Paulson           $392,000,000 Net worth Max – reported by Open Secrets 05!

Ken Lewis (B of A)    $20,404,009 Annual Compensation for one year – 2007!

John Snow                   $130,000,000 Net worth Max end reported by Open Secrets 2006!

Last, the attached provides related page patches.  I look forward to hearing from you.

Warmest Regards,

acebooks.yolasite.com                                                  U.C.C. – “all rights reserved.”

Gary Joseph Bonas II

 

P.S.  No State Bar is permitted to pretend to regulate any law or practice entirely under U.S.A control (10th), which trafficking and treason are, thus banning states from interfering.[3]

 

cc: Mark Solomon, Neil Barofsky, Oprah Winfrey, Michael Moore, Elisa Odabashian ….


[1]Black’s Law Dictionary, Abridged 8th Edition at page 1156 (Thompson/West 2005).

[2]Did one know that one does not have to have one’s bank birth certificate bond monetized and, thereby, become responsible for a host of unwanted or “involuntary” bills?  Does any bank have the legal right to broker through a Birth Bank Account absent full disclose of all material facts about it?  “Truth in Lending” is also a conclusive point!

[3]Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); accord, Benninghoff v. Superior Court (State Bar of California) 136 Cal. App. 4th 61, 74 (2006) (interpreting Sperry as preventing State Bar from regulating federal … practice in general).

**********

Gary Joseph Bonas II

26255 Bungalow Court

Valencia, California 91355

 

April 4, 2007

 

CEO Angelo R. Mozilo                                                            Charles Murray

CFO Eric P. Sieracki                                                                                            California State Bar

Countrywide Financial                                                                            Assistant Counsel
4500 Park Granada                                                                  180 Howard Street
Calabasas, California 91302                                                     San Francisco, CA. 94105

Re:      Debt Certificates, Source, Disclosure, Unequal Preferences

Dear Countrywide et al.,

I write about your use of the word “loan,” which is really a “lien” on a specific account controlled through this District’s Regional Reserve; you brokered this client her own value from the Reserve’s value conversion services.

This process, my friend, is no loan; this you know or should know.  It’s a lien on a citizens’ own account, which is owned by no one but that citizen – completely.

The subject “loan” (as you call it) was brokered from the trust account of the one from whom you now seek to collect, on behalf of the Reserve, in part.  In this vertical arrangement of yours, you both failed to disclose this contract lynching reality:

“The … amount [ initially] … $1,000,000 [and another] $500,000 [when] … married….” [the certificate is monetized like the birth certificate].[1]

I am concerned because one is a very stressed out single mother of two, breaking out in hives over losing her castle based on your threat of using your troops to evict her by “foreclosing,” through statesmen backing your “state anointed bills of credit emission” ops, which you all know is banned by Article 1:10.

Your client’s stress causes me stress, which I am to alleviate.  Accordingly, I invoke basic rights via the below synopsis of your simple material breach of basic contract duties.

Background & Misrepresentation

 

Angelo R. Mozilo is Chairman and C.E.O. of Countrywide Financial Corporation, a company he co-founded in 1969 on the principle that every family in America desiring to achieve the dream of homeownership should have the opportunity to do so. Today, Countrywide is a global leader in residential citizen U.C.C. Trust Depository Account Liens, which are not loans.  Angelo is a member of the S&P 500, Fortune 500 and Forbes Global 2000 with more than 900 offices operating on three continents. Mr. Mozilo is active in all aspects of Countrywide’s businesses, which include mortgage banking, national banking, a securities broker-dealer, life and casualty insurance, real estate closing services and a global mortgage fulfillment operation.

Competitive Pricing Defined

 

Competition defined, above, is called the Total Revenue = Total Costs rule:

 

●          “In … competitive … price is equal to cost and each seller knows his…cost.” [2]

 

●       You … determine the price of all things price tagged, charged and attempted to be collected based on the cost characteristics or component parts of the thing priced.[3]

 

●          If … reasonableness … become an issue…. its philosophy would be supplanted by one alien to … free competition; … not … the … freedom … intended….”[4]

                                                                  

One Simple Issue

 

            One simple illegality issue is how you calculated the charge of filing a U.C.C. lien on citizens’ all capitalized name trust accounts held by or through each of the twelve Regional Reserve Banks, without disclosure, to loan her value from her own account:

A)                The Bank did not loan anything it owned;

B)                 “IT” is already fully financed by the client/owner;

C)                The mortgage contract is void for no consideration; and

D)                A full refund is owed for interest tax paid to a private operation.

 

            “No person shall … be deprived of … property, without due process of law; nor shall private [money] property be taken for public [and never for private] use, without just [equal measured] compensation.”[5]

100% Consideration Failure

 

            The hinge of the validity of any contract is called consideration, defined:

A)        “7.        …[S]omething of value given or done in exchange for something of value given or done by another to make a binding contract….”[6]

 

B)        Value Defined:

 

1)                  [A] fair or proper equivalent in money … especially for something sold or exchanged ….[7]

 

To determine the equal value traded in your broker contracts requires your disclosing the sources of your funding Ms. Client (and everyone else).  Until you’ve done that, I respectfully submit that there is no valid mortgage contract and not a single penny owed on IT.  In fact, because of IT the entire transaction is California Business and Professions Code Section 16722:

A)                Absolutely Void;

B)                Absolutely Unenforceable; and

C)                Absolutely Illegal in Law and Equity.

 

            It means it is illegal and there is no defense.  Citizens owe zero.  Nothing is legally billed and collected.  A full refund (tripled) is owed back.  That’s exactly what the statute means, forbidding “Trusts” – 16720 TRUST: defined as a combination of acts the purpose of which 16720 (e) Affects price, based on in and out house “contracts, agreements and obligations.  There is no defense.

            Mrs. Mozilo and Sieracki know this process first hand.  Both gentlemen have over 30 years of experience in the U.C.C. mechanics’ liens in the “refinancing” industry.[8]

Banks do not issue loans

 

1)         You want a loan.

2)         JP Morgan falsely advertises that it loans money.

3)         You “apply” for a “loan.”

4)         Bank of America et al. put you through the ringer to make you feel lucky to be approved for a loan from your own TDA account.

5)         They have you sign a promissory note.  And here’s the part you’re never supposed to know.

6)         The promissory note is sold to the Regional Reserve/Federal Reserve – the owner/trustee of your All Cap Name Trust Account, reflected by its purchase of one’s birth and marriage certificates from the state and Treasury – it’s a certificate of debt.

 

The Mechanics Lien

The U.C.C. Trust Set Up

“The … amount [is initially] … $1,000,000 [and another] $500,000 [when] … married….”[9]

7)         The bank (Angelo) deposits the asset into your TDA account for approximately the amount of the note.

8)         The bank cuts you a check from your own account, a deposit & account you never knew about.

9)         And you think you owe money back on a loan, when in fact all that was made was an exchange of your note for your money.

 

Top bankers and brokers get bigger chunks by nibbling, in concert, for stock holders.  They do so in open breach of the essence of textbook defined competition in setting up prices.  Two key elements of these prices are paid for the 30 year gig, for zero service provided.  These realities illustrate the “splintering” of protocol, in breach:

1)          Points, based on nothing;

2)          Title fees, a penalty without a breach;

3)          Escrow fees, a penalty without a breach; and

4)          Tons of other nibbles, all in “Umbrella” concert.

 

Tying Charges & Access

 

“Tying is an agreement to sell on the condition that a different (or tied) charge is also paid; it is absolutely unlawful when the server has economic power and commerce in it is ‘not insubstantial’.”[10]

 

The felony “tying” principle is exactly the same as the felony getting, obtaining & using a rivals’ pricing to set up prices principle: it is not faithfully measuring all costs associated with serving “IT” and setting a single charge, all rolled up in one, accordingly, employed to cheat revenue equals cost caps, for holders of a stake in others hard work who reap where they never sowed.

It is Axiomatic – Direct

Evidence Disclosure Concealment

 

            Invoking textbook rights are no stretch of anything.  Textbook instruction is all Americans’ law of this land: “[W]ith direct evidence [of breach] “the fact finder is not required to make inferences to establish facts.”[11]

 

A Singular Textbook Protocol

 

IT is metaphysically correct price protocol impossible to “add all costs associated with “serving “IT” twice:  prime rate and the mark up over prime rate.  The rule for sophisticated MATH pros, like economic majors and MBA’s, is real simple:

Rule:   [T]he mature or educated measure individual service … costs and price accordingly.” [12]

 

            Contract price math proof, on request, is Mr. CEO his executive team’s only possible personal liability defense, based on the plain language in textbook Total Revenue = Total Cost instruction, which is embedded in California Business and Professions Code 16725; it pierces corporate shells, veils and executive committees. 

Tops Cartel Protocol

 

            Textbook deviant pricing designs commonly employed are here marked:

A.        Our … scheduled strategies are made with and based on core rivals….

A.        They are developed at very high levels and include all items within specific categories. 

A.        All [charge] … lines within all categories are included.[13]

 

Duty – U.S. Attorney

And Attorney Generals

 

            [I]t shall be the duty of the several … States attorneys … under the direction of the Attorney General, to institute proceedings to prevent … violations.[14]

 

            The word “shall” is firm, just like the words “NO” and “COMMERCE” in Webster’s dictionary.  15 U.S.C. 4 stands, the Sherman Tank – nothing trumps it.

Closing – All State Bars

We could put your felony collection acts on ICE while we seek some kind of advisory opinion on the rule every naturalized American is required to know: No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of any local Commerce ….  Article 1:9.

            Thank you for your contract courtesy.

Kind regards,

Gary Joseph Bonas II


[1] Title 26 USC – section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), $1,000,000.

[2] Posner, Antitrust Law, An Economic Perspective, Ch 7, at 133, 136 (University off Chicago Press, 1976).

[3] Lewis C. Solmon, at trial transcript page 1751:2-10 (1 by 1).

[4] Container, 393 U.S. 333, at page 338, citing Socony Vaccum, 310 U.S., at pages 220 –221 (1940). 

[5] Amendment V.

[6] Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, page 297 (1988 Simon & Schuster, Inc.).

[7] Webster’s New World Dictionary, Third College Edition, page 1474 (1988 Simon & Schuster, Inc.).

[9] Title 26 USC – section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), $1,000,000.

[10]Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 at pages 5-7 (1958).

[11]In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1999).

[12] Competitive Strategy, Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors, Michael E. Porter, at page 242 (1980 The Free Press).

[13] The Firms’ Coached truth and perjury benders, Edward Heredia Live, at trial transcript pages 1876:25-1877:1.

[14] § 4 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4

********

Gary Joseph Bonas II

25852 McBean Parkway #748

Santa Clarita, California 91355 

December 20, 2007

 

Mr. Angelo Mozila et al.                                                           NCIS Headquarters 

Resolution Management Group                                     The Bonus Program

400 Countrywide Way, MS SV – 314                          Naval Investigative Service

Simi Valley, California 93056 – 6297                            27130 Telegraph Road

Fax: (800) 658-9364                                                                Quantico, VA 22134 

 

Re:      Countrywide – Textbook Material Contract Breaches and Crimes

 

Good Day Bank Executive Teams,

I received your 04-25-07 contract letter responding to my 04-04-07 contract validity letter, which you slid as my 04-17-07 letter.

In my contract validity letters to you I reminded of textbook law and duty, e.g.:

●          You … determine the price of [all prices fixed] … based on the element characteristics of serving it….[1]

●          “Points” and other prices called fees based on nothing tied to the cost of serving a transaction breaches textbook duty; and’

●          “Tying or conditioning this or that service or price be purchased and paid separate and apart from another contract piece or part (in large multi-party deals) that are not compliant with textbook pricing duty is illegal.”[2]

●          [W]ith direct evidence “the fact finder draws no inferences to establish facts.”[3]

I also received your 05-07-07 business letter, responding to my 04-17-07 “declared illegal” contract points.  You slid this letter as a response to a 04-18-07 letter from me to you.  Regardless, in that briefing I detailed some major white collar crimes, including, verbatim:

 

Stock Price Crimes

 “Subject to Injunction”

Business Prof. Code 6754.5

●          For purposes of this section, “person” shall include, but not be limited to, individuals….[4]

And I have your third letter to me, confirming your receipt of my 05-03-07 letter.  In that business communication I detailed you on some key parts of textbook protocol breaches, highlighting, verbatim:

●          White collar crime pays big, see: Angelo received $121.85 million in 2006-— TX Gov. Perry [George Bush’s friend] joined Countrywide!

            I sent you these three compliance briefings in a 30 day window in 2007.  After that this fact was posted on Nov 12th 2007 9:35AM by Douglas McIntyre:

“[Mozila’s] Countrywide, which trades below $14, down from a 52-week high of over $45, could go much, much lower.[5]  And, it did.  Today you were under $9 8.77 -0.24 (-2.66%) (04:00 PM EST on 12/20/2007).

Textbook Elements

Wall Street Not Included

 

As a friendly reminder, the textbook overhead elements involved in setting a legal price, independently and somewhat honestly do not and have never included a single penny or a single minute of salary time involved in going and staying listed on any exchange.

Angelo’s Affiliations

 

Countrywide Financial Corp.

The Home Depot, Inc.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

Pepperdine University

Fordham University

Gonzaga University

Countrywide Capital Markets, LLC

National Italian American Foundation

 

Angelo’s Italian Bio

Son of A Bronx Butcher

 

Born: 1939, in New York, New York.

Education: Fordham University, BS, 1960.

Family: Married Phyllis (maiden name unknown); children: five.

 

            On a related note, do you think it’s wise to send anyone in my circle any bill for anything listed on any Wall Street exchange?

            Freelance and/or consulting services are available if interested.

 Kind regards,

Gary Joseph Bonas II


[1] Lewis C. Solmon T&T, 1751:2-10 (On MR=MC, 1 by 1).

[2]Northern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 at pages 5-7 (1958).

[3]In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1999).

[4] C.B. Prof. Code, section 16721.5.

[5] 

http://cfc.bloggingstocks.com/2007/11/12/countrywide-cfc-signals-more-trouble-ahead/

**********

Gary Joseph Bonas II
25852 McBean Parkway #748

Santa Clarita, California 91355 

January 22, 2013

 

Bill L. Lewis (Assistant)                                                            Marshal David Singer

Federal Investigation Bureau                                                     L.A. Marshal Service
Suite 1700
                                                                                312 N. Spring St., Rm. G-23   
Los Angeles, CA 90024                                                          
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012

Re:      The Bureau’s Local Federal Civil Rights Program

 Mr. Lewis,

   This report adds to prior showings pursuant to the Bureau’s published duties:

A)                Protect civil rights

The FBI is the lead agency for investigating violations of federal civil rights laws…and we take that responsibility seriously.  We aggressively investigate and work to prevent hate crime, color of law abuses, human trafficking … — the top priorities of our civil rights program. We focus on all of these in Los Angeles.[1]

B)                Territory/Jurisdiction

The Los Angeles Division covers the Central District of California, which consists of seven counties across 40,000 square miles: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Luis Obispo, Santa Barbara, and Ventura.

C)                Resident Agencies

Along with our main office in Los Angeles, we have 10 satellite offices known as resident agents in the area.[2]

            Again I thank you for receiving, reviewing and keeping a dossier on the names and incidents provided to date.  And I thank you for “investigating and preparing for filing” actions rooting in “local federal civil rights crimes” in our Federal L.A. Districts.

Colors of “Supremacy” Clause Authority

            To date, some local “colors of authority” (judgers included) have demonstrated repeated instances of confusion about federal citizen rights.  They evasively feign a lack of capacity to grip the reality that two lanes of citizen “jurisdiction” exist: one that is not optional (federal) and the other that is (at present) optional (local city-states):

●          “There are two classes of citizens under our form of [two republic] government[s], citizens of the United States and of the state; and one may be a citizen of the formerwithout being a citizen of the latter.”[3]

●          The States/counties within the United States are not sovereign and thus not states in the international legal sense.  A superior force, the Constitution of the United States stands above them [all].[4]

         “The limitations inherent in … due process and equal protection … extend to judicial … government, so … judgment may not be rendered in violation of … guarantees.”[5]

         “An order that exceeds the jurisdiction of the court is void, and can be attacked in any proceeding in any court where the validity of the judgment comes into issue.[6]

●          “[T]he duty is to declare and enforce the rule of the supreme law and reject that of an inferior act of legislation which,” transcending the Constitution is of no effect and binding on no one.”[7]

            In the past five or so years I have reviewed and observed repeated instance of Lee Baca’s county troops taking of prisoners based on their own “reports, process and procedure.”  They do not first consult either the U.S. Marshal Service or the FBI about “shared or concurrent jurisdiction/power before taking prisoners.”  They do so before their D.A. even reviews and files alleged charges.  Their protocol is to take at whim, making one pay cash up front (bail) to secure the freedom to address one sided allegations.  They do so to some (not all) local residents.  They do so to minors and young adults with single moms whose lives are imbedded in the areas they occupyThey do so without any inquiry into the status their resident targets’ federal citizens rights, privileges and immunities as opposed to local state citizenship.

            This template provides a backbone of supreme legal gear to aid our little “Sheriffs’ street justice and local DA-Court business” problems:

“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment , it is that the government may not prohibit … expression … simply because [some locally armed] society finds the [worded] idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”[8]

I’ve shared some files with U.S. Attorney Ronald Cheng and Richard “Dick” Robinson, e.g.  Assuming they haven’t quit or otherwise taken a “million dollar signing bonus” with a firm like Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher (as Debra Wong Yang did after certifiably abusing office under Bush), they can be used to secure grand jury indictments.

Thank you for investigating and preparing for formal indictment(s).

Kind regards, 

Gary Joseph Bonas II


[3]Gardinav. Boardof Registrarsof JeffersonCounty, 48 So. 788, 160 Ala. 155 (1909).

[4] Magruders, required High School law 101 on government actors, page 6 note 2.

[5] Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 2 L Ed 2d 1283, 78 S Ct 1228.

[6] See Rose v. Himely (1808) 4 Cranch 241, 2 L ed 608; Pennoyer v. Neff(1877) 95 US 714.

[7]Adkins v. Children’s Hospital of District of Columbia, 261 U.S. 525, 544 (1923).

[8]Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 179 L. Ed. 2d 172 (2011).

********

Gary Joseph Bonas II

25852 McBean Parkway #748

Santa Clarita, California 91355

February 09, 2013

 

Sheriff Bill Gore et al.                                                                NCSI – Mark D. Clookie

John F. Duffy Admin. Center                                                    c/o Judge Advocate General

P.O. Box 939062                                                                     3405 Welles Street, Suite 1

San Diego, Calif. 92193-9062                                      San Diego, Cal. 92136-5050

Re:      The County’s Bench v. Bonas

Conviction by Contract Fraud

U.S. Marshal and DOJ (Bordley),

This clarifies (with certified proof) main parts of San Diego County’s concerted, decade long running fraud on The People of America in the Bonas matter.

I.                   Background – Bench Fraud

In simple English (for those unversed in the language of law), on 02-22-06 a county bench singed a form page against Bonas.  Exhibit A.  This bench page tells federal citizens that:

It ethically, with no bias or conflict, prudently reviewed and considered the Bonas files.  It did so with no ulterior motive to evade, mislead, deceive or cover up anything.  After its prudent review, it honorably concluded that zero cause could possibly exist to appeal.[1]

            Even a quick look at key pages in this county’s Bonas file cements years of bench fraud based on this 02-22-06 “probable cause certificate.”  This one page is a “form page.”  It was signed pursuant to laws akin to signatures made under “penalty of perjury.”

II.                The Bench’s 02-22-06 Page and Its “DA” 12-30-03 Page

            The County Bench’s 02-22-06 page fuses to its 12-30-03 “Bonas conviction contract” (also a one page document).  Exhibit BIt represents to have signed as “a party” – not as an “impartial referee” overseeing a “pre-negotiated agreement.”  It purports to have signed as an adversary on behalf of DA complainers.  Simple law forbids it from doing so – period:

“[T]he court has no authority to substitute itself as the representative of the People in the negotiation process … under the guise of ‘plea bargaining’ …..[2]

            Again, this 12-30-03 strain of contract for conviction page requires three signatures.  Because three signatures do not exist (and can’t be backdated), from the attempted 12-30-03 conviction date forward there’s nothing “lawfully entered against Bonas” – conviction or otherwise.  For a decade the bench has deceived its own staff about the validity or legality of its power to order, execute and punish based on this flagrantly infected page.  The County Bench used its own gunmen (Sheriffs) to exact repeated violent acts for airing this and like points.

            The definition of “a guilty plea/conviction” is conclusive “authority” on this dead issue:

A negotiated agreement between a prosecutor and a defendant whereby the defendant pleads guilty in exchange for some concession by the prosecutor – like a more lenient  sentence or a dismissal of … charges.[3]

Again, no “negotiated agreement between the parties” ever took place.  The Bench has known this for more than ten years now.

 

III.             The County’s Upper Bench Joined The Ring

The County’s upper Bench read the lower bench’s 12-30-03 transcript, attempted conviction, unsigned contract and 02-22-06 certificate.  Knowing no “guilty conviction contract plea” is lawfully in place, it published these tilted words to deceive The People about it:

Regarding Bonas’s claim the trial court made him lie [to get out of jail], he …cannot challenge the validity of his guilty plea … without a certificate of probable cause.

Regarding the double jeopardy claim, Bonas was charged in federal court [by] … members of [Chicago and] Los Angeles law firms.  Bonas … can challenge only a search … without a certificate of probable cause. He cannot claim double jeopardy … because he entered a guilty plea and has not obtained a certificate of probable cause.[4]

 

No DA/complainer can or did oppose Bonas’ appeal.  Only the Bench did – without standing.

IV.              Closing – The County Bench’s Guns and Cages

On Bonas’ 03-22-04 hearing record, the lower Bench explained its “get Bonas” agenda:

I always thought federal judges never made a mistake.  But this judge in L.A. screwed up big time, and you walked awayYou’re not going to walk away from this one.[5]

 

            Related, recently the subject County Bench made direct contact with Bonas through its gunned agents.  Unannounced, it came to Bonas’ private residence.  In a phone call it explained that its guns’ police speech for it, and it decides what is “appropriate.”  In the U.S.’s view, is it “appropriate” to remind inferior county benches and their gunmen of 18 U.S.C. 241’s law?

 

If two or more [Bench/Sheriff] persons … oppress … any person … in the free exercise … of any right … secured to him by the Constitution … of the United States … and if … such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap … they shall be fined … or imprisoned for any term of years or for life … or may be sentenced to death.

 

            Thank you for your consideration and feedback.  See attached A-G papers, which are in the record, timely dated – forever preserving the issues and counter actions involved.

 

Kind regards,

Gary Joseph Bonas II

 

Table of Proof

(Declaration)

            I, Gary “Cash” Joseph Bonas II, declare that the following are true and correct copies of key excerpts from the certified file in Milberg’s Bench People v. Bonas, Case No. SCD159416 (San Diego Sup. Ct.) and/or copies of files that have been removed from the certified files in the related, back to back Wall Street Firms’ criminal-criminal Fed-State actions against Bonas:

Exhibit 1 – 10-06-03    Court – “Will re-consider O.R. bail with current Psych. Report”

Exhibit 2 – 11-24-03    MD JD Alan Arthur Abrams Bonas Report for O.R. Bail

Exhibit 3 – 12-14-03    Ph.D Katherine Difrancesca Bonas Report for O.R. Bail

Exhibit 4 – 12-30-03    Hearing Transcript re: O.R. Bail/Trial Readiness – Not an O.R. Hearing

Exhibit 5 – 12-30-03    The Power Contract, Not Negotiated and Not Signed By Both Parties

Exhibit 6 – 12-06-04    Court abducts Bonas, certified bate stamped numbers 0037, 0038 & 0041. 

Exhibit 7 – 02-03-05    Bonas’s U.P.S. to court, one of many (tracking No. 56937735). 

Exhibit 8 – 12-01-05    Court had its troops transport Bonas to “say good byes” to dying mom.

Exhibit 9 – 02-22-06    State’s Certificate of Probably Cause

            I swear under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct.

Date:    January 20, 2012                                              By: ____________________________

                                                                                                Gary “Cash” Joseph Bonas II

A coerced confession is an involuntary confession that comes from overbearing … conduct instead of a defendant’s “rational intellect and free will.”[6]

[I]important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will.[7]

“The testimony of centuries, in governments of varying kinds over populations of different races and beliefs, stood as proof that … mental torture and coercion had brought about the tragically unjust sacrifices of some who were the noblest and most useful of their generations.  And they who have suffered most from secret and dictatorial proceedings have almost always been the poor … and the powerless.”[8]

         “Acts in excess of judicial authority constitutes misconduct, particularly where a judge deliberately disregards the requirements of fairness and due process.”[9]


[1]See Exhibit A 02-22-06 “Certificate of Probable Cause” – signed by Robert Trentacosta under colors of authority.

[2]People v. Segura, 44 CAL. 4th 921 (2008), citing People v. Orin (1975), 13 Cal.3d at p. 943.

[3] Black’s Law Dictionary, at page 969 (2005 Abridged 8th Edition).

[4] 09-21-06 California v. Bonas, San Diego’s Unpublished opinion; citing United States v. Bonas (9th Cir. 2003) 344 F.3d 945.

[5] 03-22-04 DA-County Bench v. Bonas, hearing transcript, at page 33.

[6] Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960).

[7]Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).

[8]Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237 (1940).

[9] *Cannon v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications,14 Cal. 3d 678, 694 (1975).

 

*********

Gary Joseph Bonas II

25852 McBean Parkway #748

Santa Clarita, California 91355

October 30, 2011

 

Sean McKessy                                                                                     Naval Investigative Service

SEC Headquarters                                                                               27130 Telegraph Road

100 F Street, NE                                                                                  Quantico, VA 22134   

Washington, DC 20549                                                                        NCISFOIA@navy.mil

 

Re:      Context – Who Does What? – “Fully Understanding”

 

Dear Mr. Mckessy and staff,

 

            This adds to prior disclosures, focusing here on “who does what” in “the process” of forecasting and achieving defined “super-inflated” revenues to The People in S.E.C. reports, e.g.

            Inside large retail chains there are three basic levels in the structural pricing “responsibility”: I) Top executives who pre-fix super-competitive prices to forecast artificially inflated revenues, II) Mid-level executives whose function is to “maintain up” pre-fixed, ultra-competitive prices to meet over competitive level revenue objectives or “budgets”; and III) Low level managers who “watch” the reports produced by top and mid-level price operation teams.  Section IV) identifies one reason for the confusion about this “process,” and, importantly, exactly who is responsible for exactly what.  Section V) concludes this short showing about the no longer “perplexing” problem with Wall Street covering up its internal systems:

The Process

Pre-Fixed                   Inflated

Pricing Pyramid[1]

 

I.                   Top Executives Price Makers

 

The following testimony in a case against three Wall Street listed rivals explains the role top executives play in the pre-fixed price context:

a.                   Albertsons/American Stores/Lucky Top Executive Romeo Cefalo

 

To estimate super-inflated revenues, top executives’ agree to, author and issue pre-arranged price, unit and revenue instructions.  In house, these instructions are implemented by those beneath them.  Romeo Cefalo authored one such document, which reads verbatim:

Executive Strategic Plan

 

Positioning

 

5% spread between Lucky, Vons and Ralphs

2-3% spread between Lucky and Albertsons

Even to 1% spread vs. Stater Brothers

 

This particular document links all five of the identified chains to an “overall” business element agreement.  See attached 1996 and 1997 “Strategic Plan” documents.

Significantly, it is impossible to put together and “agree on” an overall “spread” pricing schedule like the above absent rival companies’ “exchanging” a whole lot of price related data.  It is the “exchange of price data” among rivals that identifies the “process”:

[B]y which firms … set— their prices at a prefixed …, supra competitive level ….”[2]

 

b.                  Kroger/Ralphs Top Executive Al Marasca/George Golleher

 

One of the top executive’s referenced in the above document (Ralphs) explained how the overall price “spread between rivals” plan “rolls out” in house.

A.                 WITNESS:  We have a general overall pricing strategy by category matrix that laid into an overall pricing guideline matrix, by category, and then subcategory, monitored and maintained.[3]

A.        [I]t is a very delicate balance between -our sales volume and your pricing structure.  And if you raise your price, you lose a certain amount of sales. And if you raise your price too much, and you lose sales, you end up with less profit.[4]

Q.        Were the costs … a factor in Ralph’s pricing policy ….?

A.        Not a major factor.

Q.        And why not?

A.        Because our pricing … was based on maintaining a deferential from our overall competition.  And so costs did not really have much of an impact on that – on that pricing equation.[5]

A.        [C]heckers “typically introduce themselves to the store managers, state who they are, where they are from, what [list/schedule] they are doing specifically and request permission to … [audit] the store.[6]

A.                 Generally, this happens every time, it is a common courtesy.[7]

 

c.                   Safeway/Vons Top Executive Larry Del Santo

 

THE WITNESS:  Once again, I – in the Executive Committee, which was five people, we set the overall umbrella pricing policy, which was to be within the pricing schedule of Lucky American Stores …, but lower than Ralphs [schedule].[8]

A.        Generally, I would just see an overall report that said…we have 300 prices higher, 800 prices lower.[9]

Q.                Okay.  You said that the Executive Committee set general pricing policy.  What exactly did the Executive Committee do, in general?

A.                 Well, we instructed Harold Rudnick on the overall pricing policy that we wanted in effect for the company.

 

And, now, you have to understand that in any given week [our cost] prices fluctuate up and down, and people like Dick Goodspeed & Terry Peets watch pricing very closely because it’s an important element.  And depending on – on where our pricing was vis-à-vis our competitors, they would interact with John Weber and affect this kind of a memo.  But that is – that’s kind of a dynamic process.  It’s continuing.[10]

A.                 THE WITNESS: People like Peets and Rudnick interpreted that and published documents like this, again, in this level of detail, but I did not see these documents.

 

Q.                By Ms. Smith:  Okay.  So you generally would not see documents of this type of detail?

A.                 That’s right.

 

Q.                Okay.  You said the “Executive Committee.”  Actually, that is the first time you said that, that I remember.  Who was on the Executive Committee in 1997?

A.                 Dick Goodspeed, the President, Pamela Knous, the Chief Financial Officer.  That’s K-n-o-u-s.  Terry Peets, Terry Wallach, general counsel, and Sue Klug, K-l-u-g.[11]

 

Q.        Sue Klug, what was her position?

A.        She was Senior Vice President of Marketing.

 

Q.        Is she still at Vons?

A.        No.  She is now at Lucky (Albertsons).[12]

Q.        Okay.  Then in 1989 through ’94 you were employed by American Stores?

A.        Uh-huh.

Q.        And what was your title?

A.        Senior Vice President.[13]

 

II.                Mid-Level Executive Price Systems

 

a.                  Kroger/Ralphs Pricing Director Mark Orr

 

Q.        Can you briefly describe what marketing analysis is?

A.        Marketing analysis works with basically three sources of data:  Store scan data; store transaction data, which is essentially scan data attached to customer orders, includes additional information such as how the order was paid for, the date and the time, if coupons were used, and geo-demographic data (race, income, area).

 

            Using those three sources individually and in combination, they provideregular reports to a number of people throughout the company.[14]

 

b.                  Safeway/Vons Pricing Director Frank Woodard

 

Q.            Why do you seek rival prices?

A.        To set prices.[15]

A.                 We are spending a fortune on price-checking, and cutting it down – you know, 5,000 or so can help.[16]

Q.        The list of … stores that are being surveyed that you keep, is that kept on computer or hard copy?

A.        Computer.

Q.        What is the purpose behind that?

A.        Market intelligence.[17]

 

c.                   Albertsons/American Stores/Lucky Pricing Director Ed Heredia

 

A.        There are objectives ‑‑ in strategic plan documents that dictate where we are to be priced with competitors.  So as an example, it may be that against Albertsons our objective is to be two percent lower on that basket of goods that I talked about yesterday.  It could be at Vons that we could be at four to five percent lower, as an example.  With Stater brothers it could be one percent, it could be even, it just depends upon the competitive environment that we are in.  But there is a plan that is stated that says this is where we need to be ….[18]

Q.        When you do a … check … do you record the regular price or do you record the sale price [or both]?

A.        We include the sales price.  And we have a designation within our system … identifies the retail as being a promotional retail.[19]

Q.        Now, … you have a budget of … half a million dollars a year for … price‑checkers that go out …, correct?

A.        That is correct. [20]

 

A.        They have to go out and do their job which, is checking those retails ….[21]

Q.        Are you at the top of the pyramid?

A.        Within this … pricing department, yes.[22]

Q.        When you say ‘budget,’ what exactly are you talking about?

A.        There are … performance expectations from our parent company, American Stores, for our division.  My responsibility is to make sure that we achieve those target ‑‑ targeted margin goals for grocery, general merchandise and liquor.”

 

Q.        Did I read that correctly?

A.        Yes, you did.[23]

Q.        And have you ever asked anyone why you don’t get the [spread list] price checks that Norco does out in the marketplace?

A.        I wouldn’t want them. [24]

 

Q.        You spend 5, almost $500,000 a year sending people out … to do … checks-

A.        That is correct –[25]

 

Q.        – but you wouldn’t want the ones that are being supplied by … vendors …, is that correct?

A.        That is correct …, the reason … is that we’ve got bad data that is out there.[26]

Q.        Is there any reason why you couldn’t just look at one Vons store in Southern California to do a comparison of Lucky’s prices to Vons’ prices?

A.        As mentioned before, for all of the data, because we do collect a great deal of data on competitors, we do a number of price checks from San Diego, National City, Chula Vista, up to the central coast area,  Atascadero, Pismo Beach, Santa Maria, Las Vegas, Palm Springs, Riverside, different areas in the county, Los Angeles County, Orange county.   We are literally, everywhere we do business we are out doing price checks.

 

            What we have … in the data is that our competitors … pricing strategies or zones, however you want to name them, so that they are priced differently throughout the areas that we do business.  And the reason why there is a check for our Los Angeles stores with an L.A. Vons is because we determined that this particular Vons may be representative of the pricing that they have for the majority of their stores in the Vons area, as an example.[27]

 

III.             Low-Level Manager Price Watch Staff 

 

a.                   Safeway/Vons Bill Gensemer/John Cohen

 

A.                 We were constantly checking our competition to make sure we were in line.  And we would be watching that … every week and make sure we are not out of line.  There were times when we would get a little out of line, and we would back up.[28]

A.        We had average ‑‑ reports every week on movement [aka, units & dollars] …. 

 

A.                 [We] … knew exactly what [We] … were selling [relative to rivals] every week.  And we would monitor that and make sure that we weren’t losing … sales. 

 

A.                 [W]e would look at Nielsen and IRI.  Now, granted that was only measuring supermarkets and didn’t take into consideration a lot of the others ‑‑ but we would look at that and see, did our share change, because we were measuring the same thing all the time. 

 

A.                 So if you took that as a constant and -our share was not changing [we] … could [we] … were selling what [we] … should be selling ….[29]

Q.        And so it’s fair to say that the vast majority of … locations on ‑‑ going back to now Exhibit 2100 – that week of August, that this report reflects the vast majority of … locations were priced at 2.09 [WIC MAX] … , right?

A.        I guess so.  I didn’t do the math as we went along there.  I guess.[30]

Q.        Are you familiar with a … program called “Project Wilderness”?

A.        Yes.

 

Q.        Can you tell me briefly what that was?

A.        It was an ill-conceived program, [cost] pricing program, that was brought to us by an outsider, I guess you would say, someone who came into our company.  And it was basically pretty much a bogus program that only lasted a short time.

 

Q.        How did it differ from the program that was in place prior?

A.        It was just a lot of numbers that were put together that were supposed to generate a pricing program, and it didn’t work.  I was just probably trying to implement it.  So you would have to ask someone better informed than me.[31]

 

b.                  Kroger/Ralphs Ken Hanshaw

 

A.        The ‑‑ I get the form.  I compare … reported prices … in that particular format.  And I, atthat point in time, determine if it’s in line with the … policy.  If it’s not, I’ll make the change in that particular region where the pricing … is not in line.

 

That’s essentially – [IT].[32]

A.                 Rival prices are available to me through the computer system.[33]

A.                 There is a report issued weekly to each Category Manager regarding pricing moves within their area of responsibility.[34]

A.                 [I]t’s available to me through my computer that ‑‑ when they check teams] are completed filling it in, usually that afternoon.[35]

Q.        Is it Ralphs’s policy to sell … at the lowest price possible?

A.        It is Ralphs’ policy to follow the current stated pricing, not … the lowest possible price. [36]

 

Q.        Why do you need to know what Ralph’ competitors’ are charging …?

A.        So that we can set prices ….[37]

Q.        And you … describe that, “It is not and has not been my responsibility to define the pricing regions or to determine which stores belong in which pricing regions,” correct?

A.        Yes.[38]

 

Q.        What do you do when the target store has a sale on eggs, for example?  Do you still match that price?

A.        We ignore sale and promotional prices in our basic pricing policy.

 

Q.        And would you just go by the previous week’s price?

A.        More than likely.[39]

 

c.                    Albertsons/American Stores/Lucky Sharon Gutierrez

 

A.        I maintain the prices for products within my category.

Q.        What does maintain mean?

A.        What do you mean by “maintain”Establish the price on a product, base price or promotional price.

Q.        How do you establish the base price for a product?

A.        Well, then I actually have to go back to “maintain.”[40]

Q.        Can you set the price … at whatever you chose?

A.        No.

Q.        Why?

A.        Because I have people I report to.[41]

A.                 No, I never considered supply and demand as a factor” in … price ….[42]

A.        Staples are very sensitive items.  I’ve noted no major rival…allows us to be too much under on staples, because consumers are very aware of prices.  So we…price staples in a 2-3 penny range….[43]

Q.        And you had people who went out and checked [up on] the price of competitors … [to do IT], right?

A.        Our pricing department (heads) had people go out and check [up on] the prices.  I got the results of those surveys.[44]

 

IV.              The Expert Testimony – Transparent Perjury

 

Navigating through the above process in formal litigation is no simple task.  The main reason for that is the screens set in place by the firms representing Wall Street in the discovery through trial process.  For example, the main economic price expert in the subject case testified that in formulating his economic opinions as follows:

A.                 Some economists in my field don’t agree with this, but I really like to talk to people, interview people who work in the trenches in a particular industry.

 

A.                 In this case I interviewed a number of people, some of them you’ve seen, people like Ms. Gutierrez, and I think you’ve seen Mr. Hanshaw and some others that I talked to who could give me insight into pricing matters that I was interested in this case.”[45]

Q.        Right.  And that reference to his boss that you are talking about, that was in the case where if he wanted to go down and match that lower price, he had a limitation that he couldn’t just go down and do it on his own, right?

A.        That’s my recollection, that … these managers have a range ‑‑ and we’re talking you know thousands and thousands of products.  And nobody can cover the whole waterfront on this.  They have a range.  And if they want to go outside that range, they need to get permission from their superior.

 

Q.        He would have to go up the chain to go down, you said here, you would need permission ‑‑ would you highlight that?  ‑‑ “JC would need permission from his boss to match this lower price,” right?

A.        That’s what he reported to me, to go that low he would need to talk to Mr. Lee.[46]

Q.        Haven’t you examined other what you call cartels where they look to some established figure as a barometer before?

A.        I’ve looked at cartels where they have agreed on a particular barometer or price or floor price, yes.

 

Q.        And did you have any conversation with anybody and ask them if they had agreed on or had conversations with their — with the other stores about all using the WIC price as the barometer?  Did you have those conversations with anybody in your interview?

A.        No, I did not.[47]

Q.        Did you ever speak to Mr. Frank Woodard, who is referred to in that paragraph?

A.        No, I have not spoken with Mr. Woodard.[48]

Q.        Sue Klug, do you know who she is at Vons?  (marked for id: 181: 9-4-96 Sue Klug memo)

A.        No, I don’t.

 

Q.        And so you don’t know whether she came from Lucky before going to Vons?

A.        No, I don’t know that.

 

Q.        You didn’t read any testimony about that here?

A.        I don’t remember Ms. Klug and her career trajectory.

 

Q.        And she wasn’t anyone that you interviewed or talked to?

A.        No, I didn’t talk to Ms. Klug, of that I am certain.

 

Q.        And you again don’t recall reviewing or considering this in connection with your work here, is that correct?

A.        No, I don’t remember that.[49]

Q.        And with regard to price surveys, you told the jury here yesterday something about price surveys being pro-competitive?

A.        Yes, I believe they are.

 

Q.        And you remember telling me in your deposition that price surveys can be used to compete or they can be used not to compete?

A.        That’s correct.  If the price survey is part of a cartel to monitor against cheating, then it would be anti-competitive.

 

Q.        And you have no personal knowledge here yourself of what was said or not said between the people at these different stores who are the defendants here during that — those price monitoring surveys that were conducted in Southern California over the last six or seven years, do you?

A.        What was said between the price-checker — and who is the other person?

Q.        When the … checkers go into the store, you have no personal knowledge about what conversations they had or didn’t have with the people at those stores, right?

A.        No.  I have no personal knowledge of that, no.[50]

 

V.                 Conclusion

 

The above information has never before been synthesized.  These facts are hidden by this fabricated esquire theory:

Conscious … price coordination, … the processby which firms … set— their prices at a prefixed maximizing, supra competitive level ….”[51]

 

This “theory of proving” an increase, stabilize and hold up allegation exists only through reams of perjury and back door pacts between opposing price economic counsel.  This illustrates:

Q.        Mr. Howarth also asked you about the WIC program ….  Do you recall that?

A.        Yes.

 

Q.        You were present during almost all of Dr. Solmon’s testimony, weren’t you?

A.        I was here for almost all of it.  And that which I missed … I read the transcript of.

 

Q.        And Dr. Solmon didn’t mention WIC during any of his testimony, did he?

A.        I don’t recall WIC coming up during his testimony.

 

Q.        Would you expect, in a case like this, that if there was an issue that — of economic importance that the economist testifying on behalf of the plaintiffs would talk about it during his testimony?

A.        Well, if WIC was somehow part of the protocol or a vehicle for how the cartel operated, I would expect the economist who claims there’s a cartel to explain that or talk about it or make that part of his analysis.[52]

 

Perjury 101

 

Q.        In … the period ’85 to ’94 in pricing [W.I.C.] …, did Vons consider the W.I.C. reimbursement rate?

A.        No. [53] [This is direct proof of perjury – viewed in context of simple documents].

 

Thanks for authenticating the credibility of my work product, which D.A. still lies about.

 

Kind regards,

NCISFOIA@navy.mil

ncistipline@ncis.navy.mil

Gary Joseph Bonas II


[1] Blomkest Fertilizer et al. v. Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, Inc. et al. (02-17-00, 8th Circuit) (Beam, Circuit Judge), citing Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478 (1st Cir. 1988).

[2] JACOB BLINDER & SONS v GERBER PROD CO, Filed January 12, 1999 – U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Cir. (Nos.: 97-5609 & 98-5125).

[3] George Golleher Deposition testimony, Exhibit on Appeal number EA00758.

[4] Al Marasca Video deposition at page 114:17-22.

[5] 08-16-99 George Golleher deposition played at trial, Exhibit on appeal pages EA00780-781.

[6] George Golleher deposition at page 201:16-20. 

[7] George Golleher deposition at page 189, see also pages 21-24 & 202:2-4

[8]McCampbell v. Ralphs, San Diego Sup. Ct. Case #703-666, Appellate Appendix Document #EA00884.

[9] Del Santo Deposition at page 23:68-124:69.  See, e.g., Trial Exhibit 1144-042-047. 

[10] Appellate Appendix Document #EA00885.

[11]McCampbell v. Ralphs, San Diego Sup. Ct. Case #703-666, Appellate Appendix Document #EA00884.

[12] Appellate Appendix Document #s EA00884-885.

[13] Appellate Appendix Document #s EA00860. (’75-84 “Chicago”).

[14] Mark Orr Depo, at page 16.

[15] Frank Woodard Deposition testimony at page 344

[16] Frank Woodard Deposition testimony at page 42-43.

[17] Frank Woodard – Video Recorded Deposition at page 51:13-16.

[18] Albertsons/Lucky Edward Heredia, under oath at page 1937:3-27.

[19]Albertsons/Lucky Edward Heredia at trial page 1948:7-12.

[20] Ed Heredia at trial page 1878:13-22.

[21] Ed Heredia at trial page 1881:13-14.

[22] Ed Heredia at trial page 1871:22-23

[23] Ed Heredia TT, 1867:8-17

[24] Ed Heredia at trial page 1897:20-1898:1.

[25] Ed Heredia at trial pages 1897:20-1898:1.

[26] Ed Heredia at trial pages 1897:20-1898:1.

[27] Ed Heredia at trial page 1952:21-1953.

[28] Safeway/Vons Bill Gensemer, at trial page 2572:16-23.

[29] Safeway/Vons Bill Gensemer under oath at page 2607:26-2608:12.

[30] John Cohen, trial testimony at page 2517:15-21.

[31]PMK EA00835.

[32] David Noonan’s Ken Hanshaw TT, 3353:18-24.

[33] Ken Hanshaw TT, 3354:21-22.

[34]Hanshaw RT, 217:23-25. 

[35]Hanshaw RT, 3354:19-23; Hanshaw RT, 3352:15-3354:26.  (Emphasis). 

[36] Ken Hanshaw Video Deposition at page 344:11-344:13.

[37] Ken Hanshaw Video Deposition at page 246:13-16. 

[38] Ken Hanshaw at trial page 3272:22-26.

[39] Ken Hanshaw deposition at pages 308:10-310:14.

[40] Wall Street’s Lucky Gutierrez deposition, at page 200.

[41]PMK Sharon Gutierrez deposition testimony, Exhibit on Appeal (EA) Number EA00634.

[42] Mike Czaykowski deposition at page 62:14-63:08.

[43] Zucarro at trial page 3164:21-27

[44] Zuccaro at trial pages 3174:26-3175:1.

[45] Dr. Ken Elzinga at trial page 3918:7-3919:1.

[46] Doctor Ken Elzinga at trial page 4163:1-16.

[47] Ken Elzinga, trial transcript page 4141:25-4142:10.

[48]Ken Elzinga, at trial page 4173:22-24.

[49] Ken Elzinga, at trial pages 4176:9-4177:2.

[50]Ken Elzinga, at trial page 4184:4-24.

[51]In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation, 166 F.3d 112 (3d. Cir.1999).

[52] 08-19-99 Trial Transcript, Ken Elzinga at page 4205:13-4206:3.

[53] PMK EA00835.

********

Gary Joseph Bonas II

25852 McBean Parkway #748

Santa Clarita, California 91355

April 24, 2012

 

Neal Stephen Brody                                                                             Honorable Ray Mabus

ARCO (Atlantic Richfield – BP)                                                            NCSI, S.W. Field Office

515 S Flower St                                                                                   3405 Wells Street, Suite 1

Los Angeles, CA 90071                                                                       San Diego, Calif. 92136

BPInvestorRelationsN@bp.com                                                           ogc@navy.mil

 

Re:      Gas/Oil’s Oral Gas Contract(s)

Structural Alignment Protocol

 

Dear Gas Chain Executives,

            I have yet to receive a response to my previous oral contract pricing questions, which all sectors of the United States military have a vested interest in – domestically at the county level, countrywide and abroad.

            This follow up identifies gas chains’ “match up and hold up” pricing protocol based on surveying to align and move up and down in concert, always over defined competitive numbers.

I.                   Background

            As background, attached is a memo dated 02-23-12 summarizing chains’ zone pricing generally.  The information is directly applicable to every “gallon” contract price you sell on a “
take it or leave it” basis.  At base, I’d like to confirm whether you complied with the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealings in fixing the price per gallon at which you have in the past and do at present offer to sell:

“A price to be fixed … means a price … fix[ed] in good faith.  U.C.C. §2-305 (2). 

Good

Faith               Fair

Dealings[1]

            With regard to contract price economics, if you didn’t comply with this contract obligation (by pre-mediating to overcharge in concert with any one or more rival), that is called a “material breach.”  The rule on this easy subject reads:

Material Breach: A breach of contract that is significant enough to permit the aggrieved party to elect to treat the breach as total (rather than partial), thus excusing that party from further performance [to pay] and affording it the right to sue for damages.[2]

            It’s a simple question.  It’s obviously not my or any other consumer’s burden to prove your compliance with “good faith.”  It’s a gas chain CEO’s burden, obviously.  You know how it works – every retail gas company asks (or, more accurately, demands) the exact same “cost equals price” information or “proof of good faith or fair markup” papers I’m requesting in buying stuff from their “sellers/suppliers. 

a.                  The CEO Cake Money – and Eating It Too”?

            Plotting to conceal what you actually do in this regard has long been observed by many authoritative authors.  One summed up your thinking this way:

 We must burn the law of faithful pricing systems from those we rule over.  We want the benefits of this law in the contracts we enter, but we cannot make as much money if we comply with that in selling to those we rule over.  So lets prosecute those who learn about our deeds and do not convert under a “moral turpitude” heading, the people will trust us.[3]                       

This passage buttons up the criminal psychology involved in the concealment of your simple system.

            To be clear, it is only by the below system, which directly conflicts with the system used in chain buying contracts, that that generates so much “extra bank” that one gas man was given, for example, a $400 million dollar “parachute” – plus a wad in other perks:

In 2005 Exxon made the biggest profit of any company ever, reporting $36 billion, and its retiring chairman appears to be reaping the benefits.  Exxon is giving Lee Raymond one of the most generous retirement packages in history, nearly $400 million, including pension, stock options and other perks, such as a $1 million consulting deal, two years of home security, personal security, a car and driver, and use of a corporate jet for professional purposes.  Last November, when he was still chairman of Exxon, Raymond told Congress that gas prices were high because of global supply and demand.[4]

            In short, what follows are some twin “parallels” of certified proof to spot your deeds.

II.                Gas Chain Firms’ On Zone Pricing Trade Secrets

            As you know, and as is reported in many public documents, including FTC merger papers, gas chains have commonly employed a “zone pricing” protocol.  About this system, a team of firms that gas chains have contracted with verified in one court document:

●          “[I]f a competitor were to learn [another’s] … pricing “zone” or “region” system, it could gain … inside information about [pricing] … strategies to more easily “predict” what [it] … may do ….  

●          “[I]f competitors learned how [each] … determines where it will conduct price surveys and how it schedules price [check] comparisons, they could change prices to manipulate the [price] information [it] … collects to take advantage of [the] … pricing strategy.”

●          “[T]his … could also result in … non-competitive prices ….”[5]

See Exhibits 1 and 2.

 

         As you know, big gas chains do exactly what their own counsel verified is “anti-competitive.”  Through common “survey” contracts and commonly adopted arithmetic formulas, each deciphers its rivals’ confidential pricing information.  Their common price-checking or survey contracts (through in and/or out house labor) are designed to:

 

a.                  Learn each others’ pricing structures;

b.                  Learn each others’ pricing zone strategies;

c.                   Learn each others’ pricing survey schedules;

d.                  Align with each others’ confidential pricing on a zone basis;

e.                   Pre-fix, at super-inflated levels, regular prices stabilized over defined competitive levels; and

f.                    Forecast stabilized overcharge prices and revenues (called super-competitive) for Securities and Exchange reporting purposes.

 

         “Learning and using” to each other’s confidential pricing data to line prices to Americans way above defined competitive levels is how “zone pricing” works.  Without ever having been presented with the details above this process, courts never the less refer to this situation as:

 

[P]rice coordination … the process  … by which firms in a concentrated market … share monopoly power, setting their prices at a prefixed … , supra competitive level ….[6] 

[This] … pricing harms the consumer in the same way that monopoly does ….  The loser … [is] the consumer, who benefits from competition, not peaceful coexistence between suppliers.[7]

            This system is not lawful.  That’s why you pay men like David Noonan and firms like Munger Tolles to conceal, hide and fib about it.  One premier chain expert testified about it:

Q.        And you remember telling me in your deposition that price surveys can be used to compete or they can be used not to compete?

A.        That’s correct.  If the price survey is part of a cartel to monitor …, then it would be anti‑competitive.[8]

“Acts which may be legal and innocent in themselves, standing alone, lose that character when incorporated into a conspiracy to restrain trade.”[9]

            Gas chains have long used their price surveys to monitor compliance with pre-fixed, artificially inflated above competitive level prices.  Those prices, as you know, are jointly set up a year in advance – for S.E.C. reports.  All in your camp have this information at their finger tips.  You all do exactly the same thing.  You pay firms huge sums of cash to hide and lie about it.  That’s marks how much “extra” its worth.  Exhibit 2 is a short list of some gas lubed firms.

III.             Gas Chain Firms’ Lack of Candor

As previously shown, on public record one gas chain firm actually said this:

What I am saying your honor, is that there is no basis in the law to suggest that we have some [contract] obligation to have cost-plus pricing policies or to base our prices to the public based solely on costs or only to charge a certain dollar amount above costs.  We know that’s not the real world.[10]

            It is a risky business to tell Congress, courts and the publicly stuff about economic law” that directly contradicts the very “law” you use in buying goods and services:

●          Correct pricing: measure costs and setting a good faith price accordingly.[11]

●          In a competitive market, price is based on cost rather than on value.[12]

●          In … competitive markets price equals costs; each seller knows his costs.[13]

            It’s even riskier to advice a court that one’s big retail chain client is not contractually obligated to sell to consumers pursuant to the same cost based pricing protocol it uses in settling the price of items it buys for resale.  Some basic discovery in this regard would explain the double-speak and double standard gas chains pay firms to advance, don’t you think?

“[T]hey … meet … in secret venues around the world, creating false ‘covers’ — ….”[14]

IV.              Gas Chain Firms’ Ask “How Should We Price”?

One gas chain firm asked, again on public record, the following question:

How do plaintiffs suggest that retailers price products?  You can’t have zone pricing, you can’t have base pricing, as Mr. Stone says, you can’t match a priceWhat are we talking about?  Cases caution courts against becoming pricing czars.[15]

V.                 Closing

“Corruption in any form is despicable, but when such occurs within the food industry, it

erodes public trust in products and threatens the industry as a whole,” said Herbert M. Brown, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Sacramento Field Office. “The FBI continues to tirelessly combat white collar crime – motivated by unscrupulous greed.”[16]

I might entertain your thoughts on how you’d like to proceed.

Have a nice day, 

Gary Joseph Bonas II


[1] Kirke La Shelle Company v. The Paul Armstrong Company et al. 263 N.Y. 79 (1933).

[2] Black’s Law Dictionary, at page 156 ((Abridged 8th Ed. 2005).

[3] Beyond the Cloak of Deception, Politics, Religion & Economics in the Price System, By Skip R. Sievert at pages 39-57 (2006).

[5]Exhibit 1, 01-08-99 White Shoe Firms’ Confidential Position Paper (Fraud), at page 4:3-11 and 3:21-24. 

[6] JACOB BLINDER & SONS v GERBER PROD CO, Filed January 12, 1999 – U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Cir. (Nos.: 97-5609 & 98-5125).

[7] Blomkest Fertilizer et al. v. Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, Inc. et al. (02-17-00, 8th Circuit) (Beam, Circuit Judge).

[8] Doctor Ken Elzinga, on trial at trial page 4184:8-11.

[9] ES Development, Inc., 939 F.2d 547 (8th Cir. 1991).

[10] The firms under oath, 10-15-99 trascript, page 69, LINES 5-9 (69:5-9).

[11] Competitive Strategy, Michael Porter (1980 Free Press); see Beasley v. Wells Farg, 235 Cal.App.3d 1395 (1991).

[12]In re HIGH FRUCTOSE CORN SYRUP ANTITRUST LITIGATION, 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).

[13]Richard A. Posner, Antitrust: An Economic Perspective, Chapter 7, at pages 133-136 (1976).

[14] June 2, 2006 Seven Steps to Better Cartel Enforcement, by Thomas O. Barnett.

[15] The Yoke 10-15-99 Hearing Transcript, at pages 69-70.

[16] 03-23-12 DOJ Press Releast, SK Foods.

 ********

Gary Joseph Bonas II

25852 McBean Parkway #748

Santa Clarita, California 91355

Cell No. 661-600-5222

April 22, 2012

 

Christy Romero                                                                                    Mary Schapiro, Chairman        

Special Inspector General                                                                     Sean McKessy

Troubled Asset Relief Program                                                 Whistleblower Division
1801 L Street, NW                                                                              SEC Headquarters
Washington, D.C. 20220                                                                      100 F Street, NE

SIGTARP.response@do.treas.gov                                                       Washington, DC 20549

Re:      Chains’ Zone Systems, Law & Bank

Dear Regulators,

            The aim of this memo is to aid a full understanding of how gas, bank and other chains’ regularly pre-fix, at artificially inflated levels, prices to Americans.  They do so, as you may know, by mathematically aligning their price zones through price survey exchange contracts. 

Gas alone, for example, reports billions and billions over competitive levels annually: 

2010    Shell                             All costs +        +X       +$35.344 billion[1]

2010    Exxon                           All costs +        +X       +$30.46 billion[2]

2010    Chevron                       All costs +        +X       +$19.024 billion[3]

These artificial numbers are obtained in violation of defined competitive contract revenues through the defined “illegitimate” use of orchestrated price survey contracts.  Definitions control:

In a competitive market price is equal to cost and each seller knows his own cost.[4]

The purpose of legitimate price exchanges is to eliminate … the ignorance of buyers or sellers concerning the conditions of supply and demand – i.e., price dispersion.

With legitimate information exchanges there is no reason to expect the average market price, or price level, to change.

If it does change, that is evidence that the purpose of the exchange of information was not … a legitimate objective – but rather to raise prices above the competitive level.[5]

            This certified chain system memo, which is a flexible template to all head to head chain rival ops, is organized: I) Introduction; II) Matched Strategies; III) Match Zone Mandates;; IV) Firms Distort Policy; V) Firms’ Deceit; VI) Private A.G. Conflict; & VII) Conclusion.

I.                    Introduction

 Fronted here is the extreme sensitivity of regional “narrow ambit” or “match” structural pricing policies.  Attached Exhibits 1-3 are certified, rarely seen and explained inside chain computer pricing document.  Exhibit 1 is only four pages, which provides critical information to how chain systems operate.  With this information in mind, Exhibit 2 is certified document identifying chains’ overall store assignment application of the policy in Exhibit 1.  Exhibit 3 is a specific application of a line of items sold pursuant to the computerized systems identified in Ex 1.  It reveals how one rival location is locked onto, regularly “surveyed and monitored,” serving as a price point for a bundle of stores assigned to a given zone. 

            This process is best understood with a working knowledge of zone price data exchange systems, which certified backdrop is provided in memos dated 12-23-12 and 12-24-12.

            Chains’ pay big and small firms a great deal of money to conceal and distort the reality of their pre-fixed zone alignment strategies.  This is because the pre-fixed “narrow ambit” or “matching” a rival’s prices (above defined competitive numbers) is the main object of cartel activity.  It is axiomatic that this object cannot be achieved unless rivals jointly pre-arrange not to price compete – by getting and using each others’ current prices in a synchronized way.  In trust parlance, this process is referred to as exchange of information analysis.

II.                Matched Strategies

Retail chain cartel members agree not to abide by lawfully measured contract consideration price limits.  They align up with each other through linked strategies.  At trial in one chain action, under question/answer examination, the admired Dr. Ken Elzinga explained:

Q.        Okay.  Well, let me ten turn to the second of these points.  The second one that you have up there refers to … pricing policies ….  What do you mean by that?

A.        What I mean … is … … that … a lot of what we know about cartels we’ve learned from Germany, because they had so many cartels — the German expression is a “Cartel-meister,” the master of the cartel, person who organizes it, runs it, operates it, sort of the genius behind the cartel, the person that consumers should dislike very much.  If you are going to be a cartel-meister looking for an industry to cartelize, ideally you would want to find a group of firms that were competitors, of course, who … had and could continue to have a very similar overall pricing strategy or pricing protocol ….[6]

Q.        I’m sorry I didn’t mean to cut you off.

A.        An example … is banking.  In Europe, this has gone on for a long time, when the central bank in Germany changes what they call the discount rate or the interest rate, Denmark always follows.  The Danish central bank just copies that move.  They are very open about that.  Everybody knows that in the European banking community.  Denmark has decided, “We can save a lot of money on economists, analysts.  So the Germans are going to pay that money, they are going to do the research.  If they think the international financial market will sustain an increase or decrease in the discount rate, we are just going to copy them.”  So if you were to look at the … policy of the two countries, they are identical.  The Dutch, incidentally, are very similar in that regard, too, almost the same as the Danes.[7]

III.             Match Zone Policy

In key part, this testimony explains chains’ “aligned, matchup by zone” pricing:

Q.        Now, the policy directive [for zone/region 1] that first appears here on September 12, 1996, to match … Lakewood –

A.        Yes.

Q.        And let’s go to Region 2, for the city.  Match … Lakewood?

A.        Yes.

Q.        Keep going.  Keep going all the way over.  And in … Region 6, match … Lakewood, is that policy directive unique …?

A.        No.[8]

Q.        Now, what does it mean when a particular location would be surveyed on a weekly basis?

A.        What that means is as we have done our geographic analysis, as I mentioned before, to determine how we were going to align our zones….[9]

Q.        And you further explained that the [chain] … stores have been grouped in pricing regions since 1981, correct?

A.        Various pricing regions since 1981, yes.[10]

Q.        Policy with regards to … Zone 1 is to match …, is it not?

A.        On all price sensitive items it’s to be within two cents.[11

A.                 Staples are very sensitive items.  I’ve noted no major rival…allows us to be too much under on staples, because consumers are very aware of prices.  So we…price staples in a 2-3 penny range….[12]

            Again, by definition the process undertaken to craft a matching price strategy system requires the exchange of what should be highly confidential business information.  Such policies are developed by very top executives.  They require frequent rival surveys to insure compliance with fixed price floors.  Executive strategies are obviously required to be adhered to.  They are monitored and maintained through rival price checkup reports, which are created in-house.  These reports are provided to lower monitoring staff.  This recorded testimony explains:

Q.        Now, … you use … pricing surveys …?

A.        Yes.

Q.        Currently?

A.        Yes.

Q.        And how do you use them?

A.        The ‑‑ I get the form.  I compare what the reported prices are in that particular format.  And I, at that point in time, determine if it’s in line with the pricing policy.  If it’s not, I’ll make the change in that particular region where the pricing policy is not in line.[13]

Q.        When was the last time that you deviated from matching the … Lakewood … prices –

A.        I don’t recall.

Q.        Do you recall doing that at all during 1988?

A.        I don’t recall.

Q.        You have done it before, though; right?

A.        There may have been an instance when we did that.

Q.        How many times in the last ten years have you deviated from the pricing policy…?

A.        I have no idea.

Q.        Would it be more than ten times?

A.        I don’t know.[14]

IV.                Firms Distort Policy

What the above certified facts mean is conclusive proof that “survey” contracts are illegitimately used to establish a sophisticated system calculated to stabilize prices over competitive lines.  Again, the rule on this subject is concrete:

With legitimate information exchanges there is no reason to expect the average market price, or price level, to change.  If it does change, that is evidence that the purpose of the exchange of information was not … a legitimate objective – but rather to raise prices above the competitive level.[15]

When called to answer about their systems, chains spend huge recourses to divert attention from their match and hold above competitive level protocols.

a.                  Chain Economist’s Fabricated Price Charts

With billions in excess at stake, chains engage dark tactics to convince enforcers they have not adopted cartel systems.  In one case, e.g., three big chains paid three firms to craft and present charts that completely contradict their own design.  They carefully selected shops within a three mile radius, each of which was assigned to a different price grouping, contrary to policy:

Q.        Dr. Bronsteen, let me just pick up a little bit of your background.

Q.        You billed about a quarter of a million dollars in this case?

A.        Yes, I think that’s correct.

Q.        And one of the things that you did, one of the first things … was these charts … this different series of charts where you looked at individual stores within a three‑mile radius, right?

A.        Yes.[16]

A.        We were asked to prepare the correlations, and we did that.    

Q.        When you say “we,” Dr. Elzinga asked you to prepare it, right?

A.        “We,” meaning the Princeton Economics Group.    

Q.        And you did prepare it, this is one of the things you prepared and gave to him in connection with this project, right?

A.        Yes, that’s correct.[17]

Q.        By the way, you knew that no one at any of these stores ever used charts like the ones you created to make any pricing decisions, correct?

A.        I don’t know ….

Q.        Well, you know that what you did was done purely for purposes of … litigation and it didn’t exist before you did it, right?

A.        Well, that’s certainly true.

Q.        And therefore it wasn’t used as a basis for pricing by anyone that you know of, right?

A.        No, it wasn’t.[18]

b.                  Chain Economist Falsifies Policy via Falsified Charts

The charts prepared by the chains here, to illustrate, were not based on the chains’ own plan.  They blended different zones to escape the reality of their own systems.  It’s like comparing apples to oranges, to convey the false impression that they do not maintain the same or similar strategies – and do not follow top executive instruction. 

Again, Exhibit 3 confirms that one chain keyed in on its rival’s Lakewood location to fix all prices for all stores assigned to that group.  The chains’ litigation charts were calculated to avoid this reality.  The chains own pro, who was paid a lot of cash to design it, even admitted it:

Q.        You didn’t do any charts which showed … Lakewood, for example, compared to other stores outside of whatever that three‑to‑six mile radius was, right?

A.        That’s correct.  

Q.        Did anybody ever suggest that you do such charts?

A.        No.[19]

c.                   Chain Firms Falsify Policy via Falsified Charts

Chains chronically falsify facts and systems.  This recorded dialogue is insightful:

THE PEOPLE:                         Your Honor, I object. Now we are getting more charts.

THE COURT:                          I share that concern.  How many are you going to put up?

ARNOLD & PORTER:           Enough, your Honor, to suggest that the defendants were

not matching one another’s prices.[20]

ARNOLD & PORTER:           The point was this witness took the stand today and said

there were policies of matching at individual stores.

ARNOLD & PORTER:           And it’s just not true.  And we are entitled to

demonstrate to the jury that it’s not true.[21]

POST KIRBY:                         That’s a cause for my concern.

THE COURT:                          Counsel, this record has been made.  Counsel, can I get a

stipulation from your side that when one attorney from the

defense has raised an issue, all join in.

THE PEOPLE:             Yes, your Honor.[22]

THE COURT:              Mr. Noonan, you in particular have a right to be concerned.  If I

remember, one of the exhibits is [your chain client’s] … exhibit.

POST KIRBY:             Three of them.[23]

Un-cleverly relying on falsified charts – to conceal policy, on record one firm said:

MUNGER:       Indeed, what charts O, P AND Q proveis the absence of evidence of

parallel [zone] pricing.[24]

d.                  Chains’ Second Pro – False Conclusion Based on Falsified Charts

            Chains pay economists to attest not about their zone pricing, but about fabricated charts:

Q.        Okay.  Let me, let me ask you this.  If we focus, first of all, on this chart that the jury has before it, Exhibit 3061.  And I think it’s Page 143, does that show a pattern of pricing that would be like what a cartel would generate?

A.        No, in my judgment it does not.

A.                 It is not consistent, it is not a portrayal of a fixed price.  It is not a portrayal, in my judgment, of what I would call lock‑step or parallel pricing.  There’s nothing lock‑step with the … prices that puts them in sync ….[25]

V.                 Firms’ Deceit

What billions in super excess revenues can buy is shocking.  The three chains referenced herein, for example, entered direct contracts with socially reputable firms to conceal their systems.  Part of the services involved making untruthful statements about law, including these:

POST KIRBY:             Why would anybody conduct business without … getting all …

information about where your competitor is?  You would have to

be an idiot.[26]

 

MUNGER TOLLES:   And … obtaining the [data] … is condoned by the antitrust laws.[27]

ARNOLD & PORTER:           Going and obtaining information is what is condoned by

[chain] experts…  And case law.  Biljack says it right out. 

It’s an express statement.[28]

 

VI.              Private A.G. Conflict

Private economic regulation firms that specialize in class wide securities and antitrust economic litigation have a major conflict.  They employ the same protocol as those they sue in fixing their hourly price schedules, aligning up with rivals at way over cost levels.  See Bonas’ Private A.G. Hausfeld-Milberg et al. files.  The motive is the same – big revenues, often tens of millions per case.  This explains why no cogent briefing such as this has ever been presented. 

VII.           Conclusion

            “In summary, the record shows that the chains sought and obtained from targeted competitors who were part of the arrangement information about the competitors’ prices ….  “[I]n the majority of instances,” once one had this information, he charged substantially the same price as the targeted competitor, although a higher or lower price would “occasionally” be quoted.  Thus, the exchange of prices made it possible for individual chains confidently to name a price equal to that which their competitors were charging.  The obvious effect was to “stabilize” prices by joint arrangement ….”[29]

            Lawful contract consideration enforcement is a flexible design that fits all general market contract scenarios: one player (monopoly), two players (duopoly), three players (oligopoly) or more.  See Exhibit 4.  In Latin, this reality is called “res ipsa loquitur” – the thing speaks for itself.  Currently, however, public servants openly anoint defined anti-competitive contract promises and results.  They do so by impairing contract’s consideration obligation, which the rule book prohibits.  Article 1:10:1.  Addressing this root problem, as opposed to the chronic symptoms created by it, would aid in curing a lot of the “infamous problems” now faced.

            My contact information is noted should you have any questions.  See Exhibits 5-15 aids.

Kind regards, 

Gary Joseph Bonas II

 


[4] Antitrust Law, An Economic Perspective, Ch 7, at 133, 136 (University of Chicago Press, 1976).

[5]Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Engineers and Gypsum Decisions, 67 Georgetown Law Journal 1187 (1979).

[6] Chains’ Economist Ken Elzinga, under oath at page 3940:15-3941:2.

[7] Chains’ Economist Ken Elzinga, under oath at page 3988:3-21.

[8] Post Kirby’s Chain Client Ken Hanshaw, at trial page 3303:14-25.

[9] Noonan’s Kroger Chain’s Thomas Dahlen, at trial page 2333:15-19. 

[10] Chains’ Ken Hanshaw, Rival Price Watch Manager, by category, at page 3272:15-3273:8.

[11]Chain’s John Cohen, under oath at page 2507:1-4.

[12] Chain’s Lucky Zucarro, trial transcript page 3164:21-27.

[13] Chains’ Ken Hanshaw, under oath at page 3353:12-23.

[14] Chains’ Ken Hanshaw, at deposition played at trial page EA00940.

[15] Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the Engineers and Gypsum Decisions, 67 Georgetown Law Journal 1187 (1979).

[16] Chains’ Dr. Bonsteen, at trial page 3690:19:20 – 3692:8.

[17] Chains’ Bronsteen, at trial page 3732:27-3733:7.

[18]Munger’s Dr. Bronsteen , at trial page 3695:9-3696:2.

[19] Munger’s Troll, Dr. Bronsteen at page 3695:9-3696:2.

[20] Arnold & Porter, Trial Testimony, 1845:28-1847:6.

[21] Arnold & Porter, Trial Testimony, 1849:15-25.

[22] Arnold & Porter, Trial Testimony, 1849:15-1850:12.

[23] Post, Kirby, Noonan & Sweat, trial testimony, at 1850:13-22.

[24] Reporters’ Transcript, 6-14-99, page 147:11-12.

[25] Chains’ Ken Elzinga, at page 3953:4-3954: 11.

[26] David Noonan & Steve Perry on the 08-23-99 record burn, at 4438:8-12.

[27] On the 08-23-99 record burn, at 4437:4-6.

[28] 8-23-99 Record Burns, at 4437:9-15.

[29]U.S. v. Container, 393 U.S. 333 (1969).

*********

UNITED STATES
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20549
September 28,2011
DIVISION OF
ENFORCEMENT
Sean McKessy, Chief
Office of the Whistleblower
Fax: (703) 813-9322
McKessyS@sec.gov
Gary Joseph Bonas II
25794 Coval a Court
Valencia, California 913255
Submission dated: September 11,2011
Dear Mr. Bonas:
Thank you for your information and request to be considered for an award under the SEC’s Whistleblower Program. We greatly appreciate your bringing this matter to our attention. The success of the whistleblower program depends on individuals providing the Commission with specific, timely, and credible information.
Members of the staff of the Division of Enforcement may contact you for additional assistance or information. In addition, we encourage you to submit any additional supporting information or materials that you believe will assist us in analyzing and fully understanding this matter.
On August 12,2011 the final Whistleblower rules went into effect. It is now required that you submit a signed Form-TCR (including the declarations page) in order to be considered for a whistleblower award.

You are encouraged to submit the form using our online questionnaire, which you can access at http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower. That website also has link to a pdf of the Form-TCR that you may also complete and sign and send to us via hard copy at Office of the Whistleblower, 100 F Street, NE, Mail Stop 5971, Washington, DC 20549 or fax it to (703) 813-9322.
Thank you again for taking the opportunity to submit your information to us. Efforts by persons such as yourself are critical to the success of this program,
Please do not hesitate to contact the Office of the Whistleblower if you have any questions or concerns.
Best regards,
Sean McKessy

*******

Welcome to the Office of the Whistleblower

Sean McKessy, Chief, Office of the Whistleblower
Sean McKessy
Chief, Office of the Whistleblower

Assistance and information from a whistleblower who knows of possible securities law violations can be among the most powerful weapons in the law enforcement arsenal of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Through their knowledge of the circumstances and individuals involved, whistleblowers can help the Commission identify possible fraud and other violations much earlier than might otherwise have been possible. That allows the Commission to minimize the harm to investors, better preserve the integrity of the United States’ capital markets, and more swiftly hold accountable those responsible for unlawful conduct.

The Commission is authorized by Congress to provide monetary awards to eligible individuals who come forward with high-quality original information that leads to a Commission enforcement action in which over $1,000,000 in sanctions is ordered. The range for awards is between 10% and 30% of the money collected.

The Office of the Whistleblower was established to administer the SEC’s whistleblower program. We greatly appreciate your interest, and we hope that this website answers any questions you may have.

We understand that the decision to come forward with information about securities fraud or other wrongdoing is not one taken lightly, and we are here to answer any questions you may have. You can reach the Office of the Whistleblower at (202) 551-4790.

http://www.sec.gov/whistleblower

******

Jose Ortega y Gasset on the revolt of the masses

 

http://mises.org/etexts/ourenemy.pdf

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