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Certiorari

Certiorari often abbreviated as cert., is a type of writ seeking judicial review, recognized in Roman, U.S., English, Canadian, Philippine,[3] and other law, meaning an order by a higher court directing a lower court, tribunal, or public authority to send the record in a given case for review.

Certiorari is the present passive infinitive of the Latin verb certioro (“to inform, apprise, show”).[4]

  • Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, most cases cannot be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court as a matter of right; therefore, a party who wants that court to review a decision of a federal or state court files a “petition for writ of certiorari” in the Supreme Court. — CertiorariBallotpedia,
  • The certiorari removes the cause; habeus corpus only supersedes the proceedings

A word from Law Latin, meaning to be more fully informed. If an appellate court has the power to review cases at its discretion, certioari is the formal instrument by which that power gets used.  A writ of certiorari orders a lower court to deliver its record in a case so that the higher court may review it.  The U.S. Supreme Court uses certiorari to pick most of the cases that it hears.

Found in: Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, vol. 2 > CHAPTER VI.: OF COURTS OF A SPECIAL JURISDICTION. > [here]

V. **77]A fifth species of private courts of a limited, though extensive, jurisdiction, are those of the principality of Wales, which, upon its thorough reduction, and the settling of its polity in the reign of Henry the Eighth,(l) were erected all over the country; principally by the statute 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 26, though much had been before done, and the way prepared, by the statute of Wales, 12 Edw. I., and other statutes. By the statute of Henry the Eighth before mentioned, court-barons, hundred, and county courts are there established, as in England. A session is also to be held twice in every year in each county, by judges(m) appointed by the king, to be called the great sessions of the several counties in Wales: in which all pleas of real and personal actions shall be held, with the same form of process, and in as ample a manner, as in the court of common pleas at Westminster:(n) and writs of error shall lie from judgments therein (it being acourt of records) to the court of king’s bench at Westminster. But the ordinary original writs of process of the king’s courts at Westminster do not run into the principality of Wales:(o) though process of execution does;(p) as do also prerogative writs, as writs of certiorari, quo minus, mandamus, and the like.(q) And even in causes between subject and subject, to prevent injustice through family factions or prejudices, it is held lawful (in causes of freehold at least, and it is usual in all others) to bring an action in the English courts, and try the same in the next English county adjoining to that part of Wales where the cause arises,(r) and where the venue is laid. But, on the other hand, to prevent trifling and frivolous suits, it is enacted, by statute 13 Geo. III. c. 51, that in personal actions, tried in any English county where the cause of action arose, and the defendant resides in Wales, if the plaintiff shall not recover a verdict for ten pounds, he shall be non-suited and pay the defendant’s costs, unless it be certified by the judge that the freehold or title came principally in question, or that the cause was proper *[*78to be tried, in such English county. And if any transitory action, the cause whereof arose and the defendant is resident in Wales, shall be brought in any English county, and the plaintiff shall not recover a verdict for ten pounds, the plaintiff shall be nonsuited, and shall pay the defendant’s costs, deducting thereout the sum recovered by the verdict.4

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“The Earth and everything that’s in it”

Petiton for a Writ of Certiorari – The confirmation bias of absolute immunity, as precedent, has for too long made manifest evil look accepted benign and inevitable.

Overview

The U.S. Supreme Court gives full consideration to but a small fraction of the cases it has authority to review. With many important categories of cases, the party seeking Supreme Court review does so by “petitioning” the Court to issue a “writ of certiorari.” (See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 1257, 2350.) (Note: Some state appeals courts — e.g., Ala., Ark., Colo., Conn., Fla., Ga., La., N.J. — employ the same terminology.) If the Court decides to review one or more issues in such a case it grants “certiorari” (often abbreviated as “cert.”). If the Court decides not to review the case it denies “cert.”

While a decision to deny cert. lets the lower court’s ruling stand, it does not constitute a decision by the Supreme Court on any of the legal issues raised by the case. Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules lists some of the considerations that may lead the Court to grant certiorari. But the decision to grant or deny cert. is discretionary. Under long-standing internal Court practice if four justices favor granting a petition for cert. it will be granted.

certiorari1Originally, the writ of certiorari was a proceeding through which a superior court required a lower court to submit the full record of a case for review. Under the current rules and practice of the Supreme Court, however, key elements of the proceedings below are submitted along with a petition for certiorari. (See Supreme Court Rules, Rule 14.) And in some states the old terminology has been replaced. In Arizona, for example, relief formerly obtained by the writs of prohibition, mandamus and certiorari is now obtained through a “special action.”

Example:

In Roman law, Certiorari was suggested in terms of reviewing a case—much as the term is applied today—although the term was also used in writing to indicate the need or duty to inform other parties of a court’s ruling. It was a highly technical term appearing only in jurisprudential Latin, most frequently in the works of Ulpian.

The term certiorari is often found in Roman literature on law but applied in a philosophical rather than tangible manner when concerning the action of review of a case or aspects of a case. Essentially, it states that the case will be heard.

Common law and Commonwealth jurisdictions

At common law, certiorari was a supervisory writ, serving to keep “all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority … [protecting] the liberty of the subject, by speedy and summary interposition”.[5] In England & Wales and, separately in Northern Ireland, the Court of King’s Bench was tasked with the duty of supervising all lower courts, and had power to issue all writs necessary for the discharge of that duty; the justices of that Court appeared to have no discretion as to whether it was heard, as long as an application for a bill of certiorari met established criteria, as it arose from their duty of supervision. “The underlying policy is that all inferior courts and authorities have only limited jurisdiction or powers and must be kept within their legal bounds. This is the concern of the Crown, for the sake of orderly administration of justice, but it is a private complaint which sets the Crown in motion”.[6] As Associate Justice James Wilson, the person primarily responsible for the drafting of Article Three of the United States Constitution,[7] explains:

In every judicial department, well arranged and well organized, there should be a regular, progressive, gradation of jurisdiction; and one supreme tribunal should superintend and govern all the others.
An arrangement in this manner is proper for two reasons:
1. The supreme tribunal produces and preserves a uniformity of decision through the whole judicial system.
2. It confines and supports every inferior court within the limits of its just jurisdiction.
If no superintending tribunal of this nature were established, different courts might adopt different and even contradictory rules of decision; and the distractions, springing from these different and contradictory rules, would be without remedy and without end. Opposite determinations of the same question, in different courts, would be equally final and irreversible.[8]

Consistent with Justice Wilson’s explanation, the power to issue writs of certiorari is invested in the highest court of every Commonwealth jurisdiction, in some way, shape, or manner. While some incorporate this remedy into their Constitutions, e.g., India,[9] others treat it as an implied power of superior courts, e.g., Australia,[10] but in all Commonwealth jurisdictions—as distinguished from its American counterpart—it has evolved into a general remedy for the correction of plain error, to bring decisions of an inferior court or tribunal or public authority before the superior court for review so that the court can determine whether to quash such decisions.[11]

United States

Federal courts

In the United States, certiorari is most often seen as the writ that the Supreme Court of the United States issues to a lower court to review the lower court’s judgment for legal error (reversible error) and review where no appeal is available as a matter of right. Before the Evarts Act,[12] the cases that could reach the Supreme Court were heard as a matter of right, meaning that the Court was required to issue a decision in each of those cases.[13] That is, the Court had to review all properly presented appeals on the merits, hear oral argument, and issue decisions. As the United States expanded in the nineteenth century, the federal judicial system became increasingly strained, with the Supreme Court having a backlog several years long.[14] The Act solved these problems by transferring most of the court’s direct appeals to the newly created Circuit Courts of Appeals, whose decisions in those cases would normally be final.[15] The Supreme Court did not completely give up its judiciary authority, however, because it gained the ability to review the decisions of the courts of appeals at its discretion through writ of certiorari.[16]

Since the Judiciary Act of 1925 and the Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988,[17] most cases cannot be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court as a matter of right. A party who wants the Supreme Court to review a decision of a federal or state court files a “petition for writ of certiorari” in the Supreme Court. A “petition” is printed in booklet format and 40 copies are filed with the Court.[18] If the Court grants the petition, the case is scheduled for the filing of briefs and for oral argument.

A minimum of four of the nine Justices is required to grant a writ of certiorari, referred to as the “rule of four“. The court denies the vast majority of petitions and thus leaves the decision of the lower court to stand without review; it takes roughly 80 to 150 cases each term. In the term that concluded in June 2009, for example, 8,241 petitions were filed, with a grant rate of approximately 1.1 percent.[19] Cases on the paid certiorari docket are substantially more likely to be granted than those on the in forma pauperis docket.[20] The Supreme Court is generally careful to choose only cases over which the Court has jurisdiction and which the Court considers sufficiently important, such as cases involving deep constitutional questions, to merit the use of its limited resources. See also Cert pool. While both appeals of right and cert petitions often present several alleged errors of the lower courts for appellate review, the Court normally grants review only of one or two questions presented in a certiorari petition.

The Supreme Court sometimes grants a writ of certiorari to resolve a “circuit split”, when the federal appeals courts in two (or more) federal judicial circuits have ruled differently in similar situations. These are often called “percolating issues.”

Certiorari is sometimes informally referred to as cert., and cases warranting the Supreme Court’s attention as “cert. worthy”.[21] The granting of a writ does not necessarily mean that the Supreme Court disagrees with the decision of the lower court. Granting a writ of certiorari means merely that at least four of the justices have determined that the circumstances described in the petition are sufficient to warrant review by the Court. Conversely, the Supreme Court’s denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari is sometimes misunderstood to mean that the Supreme Court approves the decision of the lower court. As the Court explained in Missouri v. Jenkins,[22] however, such a denial “imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the case. …” In particular, a denial of a writ of certiorari means that no binding precedent is created by the denial itself, and that the lower court’s decision is treated as mandatory authority only within the region of jurisdiction of that court. The reason for this was given in Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, Inc., in which the Court discussed that many rationales could underlie the denial of a writ which have nothing to do with the merits of the case.

Since the vast majority of petitions for certiorari are routinely denied without comment, it is normally unnecessary to indicate that fact in citations to decisions of lower federal courts, unless it happened within the last two years or was otherwise particularly relevant (e.g., to support an inference that a particular appellant is a vexatious litigant).

In legal citations, “cert. granted sub nom” is an abbreviation of the legal phrase “certiorari granted sub nomine“, meaning “judicial review granted, under name”, indicating that a petition for certiorari of a case has been granted, but that the court granting certiorari is hearing the case under a different name than the name under which the subordinate courts heard the case. For example, the case of District of Columbia v. Heller was known as Parker v. District of Columbia in the court below.

State courts

Some U.S. state court systems use the same terminology, but in others, writ of review, leave to appeal, or certification for appeal is used in place of writ of certiorari as the name for discretionary review of a lower court’s judgment. A handful of states lack intermediate appellate courts; their supreme courts operate under a mandatory review regime, in which the supreme court must take all appeals in order to preserve the loser’s traditional right to one appeal (except in criminal cases where the defendant was acquitted). However, mandatory review remains in place in all states where the death penalty exists; in those states, a sentence of death is automatically appealed to the state’s highest court.

Administrative law

In the administrative law context, the common-law writ of certiorari was historically used by lower courts in the U.S. for judicial review of decisions made by an administrative agency after an adversarial hearing. Some states have retained this use of the writ of certiorari in state courts, while others have replaced it with statutory procedures. In the federal courts, this use of certiorari has been abolished and replaced by a civil action under the Administrative Procedure Act in a United States district court or in some circumstances a petition for review in a United States court of appeals.

See also

References

  1. Jump up ^ “Certiorari ! Define Certiorari at Dictionary.com”.
  2. Jump up ^ “definition of certiorari from Oxford Dictionaries Online”.
  3. Jump up ^ “Philippine Supreme Court Circulars”. Chan Robles Virtual Law Library. Retrieved July 17, 2012.
  4. Jump up ^ “Definition at Lewis and Short Latin Dictionary”.
  5. Jump up ^ 3 Wm. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 42 (1765).
  6. Jump up ^ Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 (India)(internal quotation omitted) indiankanoon.org
  7. Jump up ^ The Oyez Project, Justice James Wilson [1] (last visited April 4, 2011).
  8. Jump up ^ 2 The Works of James Wilson 149–50 (J. D. Andrews ed., 1896).
  9. Jump up ^ India Const. art. 32, cl. 2
  10. Jump up ^ Klewer v Dutch, [2000] 99 FCA 217 (H.C.)(discussion); High Court Rules 2004, Statutory Rules 2004 No. 304 as amended, made under the Judiciary Act 1903, Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, Nauru (High Court Appeals) Act 1976 and High Court of Australia Act 1979 austlii.edu.au
  11. Jump up ^ Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Comm’n [1969] 2 AC 147; [1969] 2 WLR 163 (Court may correct any lower court decision “depart[ing] from the rules of natural justice,” per Lord Pierce) [2]
  12. Jump up ^ Ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
  13. Jump up ^ Russel R. Wheeler & Cynthia Harrison, Fed. Judicial Ctr., Creating the Federal Judicial System 17–18 (3d ed. 2005).
  14. Jump up ^ Wheeler & Harrison, supra, at 12, 16.
  15. Jump up ^ Evarts Act § 6., 26 Stat. at 828.
  16. Jump up ^ § 6, 26 Stat. at 828.
  17. Jump up ^ Supreme Court Case Selections Act, Pub.L. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988)
  18. Jump up ^ United States Supreme Court Rule 33
  19. Jump up ^ Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, __ (2009) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (slip op. at 11). See also http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/justicecaseload.pdf (10,000 cases in the mid-2000s); Melanie Wachtell & David Thompson, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures 16 Geo. Mason U. L. Rev. 237, 241 (2009) (7500 cases per term); Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at University of Guanajuato, Mexico, 9/27/01 (same).
  20. Jump up ^ Thompson, David C.; Wachtell, Melanie F. (2009). “An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures”. George Mason University Law Review 16 (2): 237, 249. SSRN 1377522.
  21. Jump up ^ TIPTON V. SOCONY MOBIL OIL CO., INC., 375 U. S. 34 (1963)
  22. Jump up ^ 515 U.S. 70 (1995)

Further reading

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Expected Delivery By:
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First-Class Mail®
No.                                                          
Eastern Missouri U.S. District Court Case No.  4:12-cv-703-CEJ 
A humble pro se[1] EMERGENCY PETITION for a WRIT OF CERTIORARI, 10.07 years[2] of deprivation, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
________________________________________________________________
— PETITIONER FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
David G. Jeep and heir
v.
– RESPONDENT(S) ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
The Government of the United States of America,[3] et al, Defendants/Respondents
·   President Barack Hussein Obama, His Justice Department and The Government of the United States of America
·   Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, and The Government of the United States of America (Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 11-8211)
·   The Supreme Court of the United States of America and The Government of the United States of America (Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 11-8211 and 07-11115)
·   Chief United States District Judge Eastern Missouri 8th Circuit Catherine D. Perry and The Government of the United States of America (8th Circuit Court of appeals Appeal: 10-1947, 11-2425 and 12-2435),
·   Mike Christian (FBI), Lyonel Mrythill (FBI), Dan Bracco (FBI), Robert O’Connor (USMS), Chris Boyce (USMS) and Raymond Meyer (AUSA) and The Government of the United States of America (8th Circuit Court of appeals Appeal: 10-1947),
·   US Supreme Court, Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, Samuel Alito, Anthony Kennedy, Chief Justice John G. Roberts and The Government of the United States of America (Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 07-11115)
·   8th Circuit US Court of Appeals and The Government of the United States of America (07-2614, 08-1823, 10-1947, 11-2425 and 12-2435), 
·   Carol E. Jackson, US District Court Judge and The Government of the United States of America, 4:07-CV-1116 CEJ Jeep v. Jones et al and Jeep v. Government of the United States of America 4:12-cv-703-CEJ (07-2614 and 12-2435),
·   Charles A. Shaw, Senior US District Judge and The Government of the United States of America, Case 4:10-CV-101-TCM Jeep v. United States of America, et al & 4:11-cv-00931-CAS Jeep v. Obama(10-1947 & 11-2425),
·   Scott O. Wright, Senior US District Judge and The Government of the United States of America, 4:07-cv-0506-SOW Jeep v. Bennett et al (08-1823),
·   Commissioner Philip E. Jones, Sr., Sharon G. Jeep (ex-wife), Kristen M. Capps (ex-stepdaughter), Joseph A. Goeke, Robert S. Cohen, Michael T. Jamison, Emmett M. O’Brien, Steven H. Goldman, Barbara W. Wallace, James R. Hartenbach, John A. Ross, Michael D. Burton, Larry L. Kendrick, Richard C. Bresnahan, Melvyn W. Wiesman, Maura B. McShane, Colleen Dolan, Mark D. Seigel, Barbara Ann Crancer, Mary Bruntrager Schroeder, Brenda Stith Loftin, Dale W. Hood, Thea A. Sherry, Gloria Clark Reno, John R. Essner, Ellen Levy Siwak, Patrick Clifford, Bernhardt C. Drumm, Dennis N. Smith, Judy Preddy Draper, Sandra  Farragut-Hemphill, Douglas R. Beach, John F. Kintz, Gary M. Gaertner, Phillip E. Jones, Carolyn C. Whittington, Tom W. DePriest, David Lee Vincent, St. Louis County and State of Missouri (4:07-CV-1116 CEJ, 03FC-10670M / 03FC-12243),
·   Jack A. Bennett, Associate Circuit Judge, Devin M. Ledom, Asst. Prosecuting Attorney, Alex Little, Officer Badge #920, Tim Taylor Officer Badge #913, W. Steven Rives, Prosecuting Attorney, W. James Icenogle, Prosecuting Attorney, Bruce Colyer, Associate Circuit Judge, Jay Nixon Attorney General, State of MissouriCamden County, and City of Osage Beach (4:07-cv-0506-SOW/ CR203-1336M),
All Defendants/Respondents are included and asserted liable, as Government actors and as INDIVIDUAL actors
Defendants/Respondents
________________________________________________________________
 (NAME OF COURT THAT LAST RULED ON MERITS OF YOUR CASE)PETITION
IN THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY STATE OF MISSOURI CIRCUIT COURT
TWENTY-FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, DIVISION 65
Commissioner Phillip Jones, Presiding (03FC-010670)
(07-2614, 10-1947, 11-2425 and 12-2435 8th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals)
and
IN THE CAMDEN COUNTY STATE OF MISSOURI CIRCUIT COURT
TWENTY-SIXTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, ASSOCIATE DIVISION
The Honorable Bruce Colyer, Judge (CR203-1336M)
(08-1823, 10-1947, 11-2425, and 12-2435 8th Circuit U.S. Court Appeals)
________________________________________________________________
QUESTION(S) PRESENTED I am requesting the court to rule on three questions:
1.       Is the application forJudicial Order ofservice ofholding  for and/or refusal to support and defend the constitution as regards a NOT “facially valid court order[4] a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws?[5]
2.       Is the 1st Amendment’s lawfully un-bridge-able right “to petition the Government for a redress of grievances” the right to sue the sovereign/government for a justifiable grievance under Article III and the 7th Amendment as timely[6] and explicitly made precedent by Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803):
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury.  One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection.  In Great Britain, the King himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court”?
3.       Is a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws a violation of § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (now codified in Federal Statute laws as Criminal 18 U.S.C. § 241 & 242), the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now codified in Federal Statute laws as Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985) and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (now codified in Federal Statute laws as Civil Rights Act of 1964) by “Every person”[7] or “Whoever”[8] is substantively involved as referenced in said statute law?
________________________________________________________________
LIST OF PARTIES [X] All parties appear in the caption of the case on the cover page.  I was able to serve only the Solicitor General via First Class Mail due to my impoverished position as supported by the in forma pauperis orders of the United States 8th Circuit Court of Appeals and United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division.
________________________________________________________________
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment below.
________________________________________________________________
OPINIONS BELOW
[X] For cases from federal courts:
A copy of the United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Doc#5) and ORDER OF DISMISSAL (Doc#6) both dated April 27, 2012 as regards case 4:12-cv-703-CEJ are attached as referenced in the appendix.
1.  Any assertion of a “domestic relations exception”[9] to authorize an unconstitutional “general warrant” is absurd.  To say that our constitutional rights are of no use when the primary issues of a person’s, life (children), liberty (custody/visitation of children) and property (home and EVERYTHING a person owns) is involved, is just  ludicrous.  Constitutional rights would then only be of use in the secondary issues of life.  Again it is ludicrous to think that constitutional rights are to be so narrowly construed… “the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people.””[10]
2.  Any assertion of absolute immunity QUASHES the essence of Rights.  The reference to Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003) has no controlling interest because the issue in question was not “a facially valid court order.[11]
A copy of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals JUDGMENT affirming the lower court (Entry ID:3938448, 3 pages) dated August 2, 2012 and ORDER (Entry ID: 3952011) dated August 12, 2012 Case #12-2435 are attached as referenced in the appendix.
________________________________________________________________
JURISDICTION
[X] For cases from federal courts:
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under THE RULE OF LAW, USC 28 USC § 1331 – Federal question (The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.)  29 USC § 412 – CIVIL ACTION FOR INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS; JURISDICTION and 28 USC § 1254 – Courts of appeals; certiorari; certified questions(acknowledging pro-se 28 U.S.C. § 2111. Harmless error[12]).
________________________________________________________________
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED:
The facially[13] understood, reckonable[14] Constitution for the United States of America Article VI Second paragraph, 1st, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, treaties made “The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ” (PART II, Article 2, Section 3), Title Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & 1985, Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242 and Blackstone’s English Common Law (1765–1769) as quoted into Supreme Court precedent by Chief Justice John Marshal in the landmark case Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 163 in (1803).
“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain, the King himself (the sovereign) is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.” (Marbury v. Madison,  5 U.S. 163 in (1803))[15]
________________________________________________________________
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The case in chief, in 2003 (03FC-010670) and 2004 (CR203-1336M) in the State Courts of Missouri I was subjected to a facially[16]invalid court order referencing TWO fraudulent infamous persecutions illegally combined into a facially IN-valid court order[17] while being denied the most basic elements of Due Process of Law, Probable cause and Exculpable evidence. 
The Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 455, Abuse—Adults and Children—Shelters and Protective Orders Section 455.035 does not authorize a “general warrant.”  The sense and reason of the statute obviously limits the scope of any warrant/order to “for good cause shown in the petition” of “an immediate and present danger of abuse to the petitioner.”  There was none.  It was thus NOT a “facially valid court order[18]
I seek an EMERGENCY ORDER, escalating damages and injunctive relief as detailed herewith. 
As a person, a 56 year old NATURAL born citizen of the United States of America all I can do is HUMBLY beg, HELP!!
________________________________________________________________
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The facially[19] invalid petition/court order is attached here.
“Reasonable”[20] probable cause is by definition the raison d’être[21]for the jurisdiction of any court order.  Without “facially”[22] “reasonable”[23] “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,”[24] a court/government order has no valid jurisdiction.  The original court order at the center and inception of this issue, in 2003 did not have “facially”[25] “reasonable”[26] “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,”[27]  The original court order at the center and inception of this issue, in 2003, was NOT “a facially valid court order.[28] The issuing Judicial Officer did not have “facially”[29] “reasonable”[30] “probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,”[31] for the stated charge[32] it was “taken in a complete absence of all jurisdiction.”[33]  “Reasonable” probable cause is the raison d’être[34] for any court order.  The police officers service of a NOT “facially valid court order[35] has been a deprivation of rights.  The Commissioner’s order for hearing on Thursday November 20, 2003, of the NOT “facially valid court order[36] has been a deprivation of rights.  The Commissioner’s findings, created on the fly, as yet nearly 10 years later still undisclosed for the NOT “facially valid court order[37] has been a deprivation of rights.  Every Court who has to date held for the NOT “facially valid court order” has been a deprivation of rights.  Every GOVERNMENTAL step of the process since the original issue of the NOT “facially valid court order,” has been a deprivation of rights.
“To ignore evil is to become accomplice to it.”
Martin Luther King
In the 9.58 years since there has never been any mention of “exigent circumstances” nor “good faith” mistakes/remedies nor clerical errors  nor has there been any suggestion of “other remedies[38]; the order stands on its own alone as NOT “a facially valid court order” a deprivation of rights.
Now if you could somehow get past the constitutional prohibiotn a “general warrant” with a requirement for REASONABLE probable cause, which you cannot.  The 8th Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishments” for an alleged misdemeanor traffic violation (later proven a malicious persecution, the result of the perjury and the denial of exculpable evidence) precludes the imposed punishment, the deprivation of my son, my home, my paternity, my liberty my everything 
The civil domestic dispute has been ongoing for 9.58 years it is, as it was for Bivens, “damages or nothing.”[39]  Since 2003 the Commissioner Jones and the original petitioner Sharon G. Jeep both contradicted their original assertions, although neither took the RESPONSIBILITY necessary for a “Good Faith” exemption!!! 
“Most Human rights issues do not come to be recognized until people begin to die.”
Strict scrutiny is the most stringent standard of judicial review used by United States courts to weigh the government’s interest against a constitutional right or principle.  I do not care how stringent the standard, if there is absolute immunity for corrupt, malicious or incompetent action against a constitutional right or principle, “it’s just words on paper, what our Framers would have called a “parchment guarantee.”[40]  Judicial independence was never meant to be independence from the facially reckonable reading of a constitutional right or principle.
If you deny this petition you are again putting the rule of corrupt judges in front of the facially reckonable[41] “sense and reason”[42] rule of We the People‘s Supreme Law of the Land. You have done it before[43] and you probably will again unless We the People rise up in rebellion. 
________________________________________________________________
CONCLUSION
The confirmation bias of absolute immunity, as precedent, has for too long made manifest evil[44] look accepted benign and inevitable.
The petition should be granted to give creditability AGAIN to the facially[45] reckonable[46] rule of the Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be The Supreme Law of the Land.
The Founding Fathers and We the People as represented by BOTH houses of congress in 1866[47] and 1871[48] were not and are not delusional.  The Founding Fathers and We the People did not “intended sub silentio to exempt,”[49] under color of law, “all persons — governmental or otherwise — who were integral parts of the judicial process,”[50] especially those entrusted with judicial,[51] prosecutorial[52] and enforcement[53] power from the federal Constitution’s paramount binding authority[54] and its requisite procedural and substantive Justice![55]  To establish Justice and secure the blessings of liberty via the facially reasonable and reckonable[56] protection of the law is the Constitution’s raison d’être.[57] To assert otherwise, as the confirmation bias of Supreme Court precedent currently does, is an incredible,[58] fantastic or delusional scenario.[59]
The confirmation bias of absolute immunity has defeated the will of We the People to “establish Justice” under a “reckonable” “Supreme Law of the Land.”  “Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility,[60] both under the federal and the State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican form to each of the latter.[61]  “Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will be any other than that of the people.[62]

 

________________________________________________________________
Appendix
1.  A copy of the United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri, Eastern Division MEMEORANDUM AND ORDER (Doc#5) and ORDER OF DISSMISSAL (Doc#6) both dated 04/27/12 as regards case 4:12-cv-703-CEJ.
2.  A copy of the United States 8th Circuit Court of Appeals Order JUDGMENT (Entry ID:3938448, 3 pages) dated August 2, 2012 and ORDER Entry ID: 3952011) dated August 12, 2012 Case #12-2435
3.  A copy of the original ex parte order of protection dated November 3, 2003 this petition.
4.  Statement of injunctive relief and escalating DATED spreadsheet breakout for the damages[63] dated Friday June 07, 2013 10:35:19.91 AM
5.  A “MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS” “IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES” dated Friday, May 24, 2013, notarized
6.  Proof of Service Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Solicitor General of the United States U.S. Department of Justice dated Monday June 10, 2013 per Supreme Court Rule 29.  In that I am quite literally IMPOVERISHED I do not have the funds to copy all listed respondents and I seek exemption based on my 10 year struggle the last five as a homeless and indigent person.
7.  I note and acknowledge all prior court records in the State of Missouri District Court, State of Missouri District Appeals Court, Eastern Missouri U.S. District CourtEighth Circuit Court of Appeals, United States Supreme Court AS CONFIRMED IN MY BLOG WWW.DGJEEP.BLOGSPOT.COM.
  

________________________________________________________________
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted, Monday, June 10, 2013 11:45.45 AM
                       
David G. Jeep
David G. Jeep
c/o The Bridge
1610 Olive Street
Saint Louis, MO 63103-2316
E-Mail Dave@DGJeep.com (preferred)
(314) 514-5228
The plaintiff is homeless and without the will to go on because of this issue AND SEEKS EMERGENCY RELIEF!!!!

 

Injunctive Relief and Damages
Monday, June 10, 2013
I seek injunctive relief and damages, noting that criminally[64]offending Judicial Officers were involved, as follows:
1.     Injunctive relief to overturn and expunge the DWI Conviction (Case No.:CR203-1336M) and remove all reference of it from my Driving Record and the 33 year old 1978 DWI conviction.[65]
2.     Injunctive relief to overturn all orders of protection between  Sharon G. Jeep and David G. Jeep and remove all record of them (Case No.:03FC-10670M).
3.     Injunctive relief to overturn the subsequent and coupled Property and Custody Order (Case No.:03FC-12243) currently in effect between David G. Jeep and Sharon G. Jeep as regards the joint marital property as of November 3, 2003 and the custody of the Minor Child Patrick Brandon Jeep (DOB 12/22/94) and remand it to a new judge for resettlement based on this ruling.

 

4.     A Jury[66] demand for DAMAGES[67]:
·        Actual Damages in the amount of:                            
Sseventy million eight hundred thirty-six thousand  dollars   and   zero  cents……………………………………. $70,836,000.00
·        Punitive damages[68] in the amount of:                         
One hundred forty-one million six hundred seventy-three thousand  dollars   and   zero  cents…………………………………… $141,673,000.00
·        Total[69] in the amount of:                                     two hundred twelve million five hundred nine thousand  dollars   and   zero  cents…………………………………… $212,509,000.00[70]
5.    I would also request that the case Eastern District Court of Missouri Case #4:09-cr-00659-CDP be expunged from my record also, WITH PREJUDICE.
6.    I am homeless, destitute and unable to pay any filing fee for this JURY DEMAND.  Do I have to light myself on fire in the street to get the rights granted by my creator to all men, like the Tunisia suicide protester Mohammed Bouazizi?[71] 

[1] Because I am a humble non-legal professional and I have been impoverished by this criminal issue I cite the potential for Harmless error – 28 USC § 2111, “On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”  The inherent unconstitutional denial of justice based on the malicious, corrupt, dishonest, incompetent and UNCONSTITUTIONAL  ruling in Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 335 (1983), “the common law provided absolute immunity from subsequent damages liability for all persons — governmental or otherwise — who were integral parts of the judicial process,” makes a professionally prepared petition and or appeal untenable to the average victim.  Most are not only impoverished by the injustice, but also in jail behind bars.  With 5% of the world’s population our POLICE STATE now incarcerates 25% of the world’s prisoners.
If I may have not been humble enough or ignorantly or inadvertently not utilized the correct humble enough method and/or legal Latin jargon in making my prior petitions (see 8th Circuit court of Appeals prior Filings in 11-2425, 10-1947, 08-1823 and 07-2614) e.g., a writ of habeas corpus, a writ of audita querela, a writ of coram nobis, a writ of error, a writ of praemunire, a writ of supersedeas, a writ of recurso de amparo or etc., it is as result of my impoverishment via the unconstitutional denial of rights.
[2] 10.07 years, 3,675 calendar days, 58,806 waking hours, 3,528,384 waking minutes,or 211,703,018 waking seconds, as of Friday June 07, 2013 10:35:19.91 AM
[3] This is not a typo, there was a motion made to correct this caption at the inception of the issue, see the court RECORD.  I suing my Government in the respectful form of a petition!!!!!
[4] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[5] § 2 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act (now codified in Federal Statute laws as Criminal 18 U.S.C. § 241 & 242), and the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (now codified in Federal Statute laws as Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985) and the Civil Rights Act of 1875 (now codified in Federal Statute laws as Civil Rights Act of 1964)
[6] Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL was involved in the creation and ratification of the Constitution for the United States of America and the Bill of Rights, specifically the 7th Amendment.
[7] 42 USC § 1983 – Civil action for deprivation of rights
[8] 18 USC § 242 – Deprivation of rights under color of law
[9] Kahn v. Kahn 21 F.3d 859, 861
[10] “It would be most strange and, in civilized law, monstrous were this not the rule of interpretation. As has been again and again decided by your own Supreme Court of the United States, and everywhere else where there is wise judicial interpretation, the largest latitude consistent with the words employed is uniformly given in construing such statutes and constitutional provisions as are meant to protect and defend and give remedies for their wrongs to all the people.” Cong.Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. App. 68 (1871). Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 348 (1983)
[11] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)

[12] 28 USC § 2111. Harmless error, On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.

[13] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[14] “reckonability” is a needful characteristic of any law worthy of the name.”  Antonin Scalia: The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules,  56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81 (1989)
[15] The oath office requires that if sued in the respectful form of a petition (1st Amendment right to petition), never fail to comply with the judgment of a 7th Amendment civil court.
[16] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[17] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[18] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[19] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[20]The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
    “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
[21] “Whatever other concerns should shape a particular official’s actions, certainly one of them should be the constitutional rights of individuals who will be affected by his actions. To criticize section 1983 liability because it leads decision makers to avoid the infringement of constitutional rights is to criticize one of the statute’s raisons d’etre.” Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U. S. 656 (1980)
[22] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[23] Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
[24] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
[25] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[26] Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
[27] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
[28] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[29] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[30] Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
[31] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
[32] Missouri Revised Statutes Chapter 455, Abuse—Adults and Children—Shelters and Protective Orders Section 455.035, where he is tasked by statute to “for good cause shown in the petition“, issued a warrant without any probable cause.  A Judges’ power is necessarily limited by the Constitution and statute.
[33] Mireles v. Waco,502 U.S. 9, 11-12, 112 S.Ct. 286, 116 L.Ed.2d 9 (1991) (per curiam)
[35] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[36] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[37] Penn v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[38] “the law has provided for private parties numerous remedies, and to those remedies they must, in such cases” Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 354 (1871)
[39] Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 410 (1971) ” Finally, assuming Bivens’ innocence of the crime charged, the “exclusionary rule” is simply irrelevant. For people in Bivens’ shoes, it is damages or nothing.”
[40] Antonin Scalia  “Considering the Role of Judges Under the Constitution of the United States” Wednesday, October 5, 2011, Hart Senate Office Building, Room 216, 2:30 p.m.
[41] “reckonability” Antonin Scalia, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81 (1989)
[42] Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)  “The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the substance and spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism.
“It is not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it that makes the law; the letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is the soul.””
[44] mass murder Blyew v. United States – 80 U.S. 581 (1871), massacre/pogrom United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), forced sterilization Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) and absolute immunity for any malicious, corrupt or incompetent actions “for all persons — governmental or otherwise — who were integral parts of the judicial process.”  Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)
[45] PENN v. U.S. 335 F.3d 786 (2003)
[46] “reckonability” Antonin Scalia, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81 (1989)
[47] 1866 Civil Rights Act, 14 Stat. 27-30, April 9, 1866 (now Now codified as Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242 into the United States Code of Law to hold “Whoever” criminally liable for the deprivation of rights under color of law)
[48] The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, enacted April 20, 1871 (now codified as Title Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983 & 1985 into the United States Code of Law to hold “Every person” civilly liable for the deprivation of rights under color of law).
[49] “To assume that Congress, which had enacted a criminal sanction directed against state judicial officials, [(The Civil Rights  Act of 1866 now codified as Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242) Footnote 2/26] intended sub silentio to exempt those same officials from the civil counterpart approaches the incredible. [(The Civil Rights Act of 1871 now codified as Title Civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983) Footnote 2/27]”  Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 363 (1983)  I would assert it a fantastic or delusional scenario!!!!!
[50] Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983)
[51] Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 349 (1871)
[52] Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 428 (1976)
[53] Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 345 (1983)
[54]“There is no such avenue of escape from the paramount authority of the federal Constitution.”  Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 398 (1932).  
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby” Article. VI, 2nd Paragraph Constitution for the United States of America
[55] Justice without regard to equity impoverishes the victim at the expense of the evil they have suffered.  I have been forced into poverty, homelessness for 4.75 YEARS! 
The 1st Amendment secures the constitutional right to a lawfully un-abridge-able justifiable redress of grievance from the government: “Congress shall make no law abridging the right of the people to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” 
The 7th Amendment secures the right to settle all suits: “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law” assures justice as regards equity.
[56] “reckonability” Antonin Scalia, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175, 1175-81 (1989)
[58] Ibid. Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 363 (1983)  I would assert it a fantastic or delusional scenario!!!!!
[59] Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) and Denton v. Hernandez – 504 U.S. 25 (1992)
[60] There are TWO constitutional prohibitions for the grant of Nobility i.e., “Absolute Immunity,” Article 1, Section 9, 7th paragraph  “No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States” and Article 1, Section 10, 1st paragraph “No State shall… grant any Title of Nobility.” 
You some how want to argue that “the grant of Nobility” was about something other than the ROYAL Status of IMMUNITY. You want to argue that hereditary property rights were linked to a Colonial interpretation of Nobility?  That would undermine Free-Enterprise.
There is not now and there was not then any titular value other than Royal status as immunity – being above the law?  Did Nat “King” Cole violate the constitution?  No one is that petty.  Nobility conferred ONE-THING of interest now and then, IMMUNITY from the RULE OF LAW!!!!!!!!!!!!!
[61] FEDERALIST No. 39, “The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles” For the Independent Journal. Wednesday, January 16, 1788, James Madison
[62] FEDERALIST No. 84, “Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution Considered and Answered” From McLEAN’s Edition, New York. Wednesday, May 28, 1788 by Alexander Hamilton
[63] Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., New York Times, September 11, 2012, By DAVID KOCIENIEWSKI, Sometimes, crime does pay.  If crime pays that well, I would think that my struggle for broad based Civil Rights for all should pay at least if not better than CRIME!!!!
[64] Fraud is still a crime, fraus omnia corrumpit!!!! Not to mention the denial of rights, Title Criminal 18, U.S.C, § 241 & 242 – These statute(s) makes it unlawful for (one or) two or more persons to conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person of any state, territory or district in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him/her by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, (or because of his/her having exercised the same).
After a period of not less than ten years, an individual who has pleaded guilty or has been convicted for a first alcohol-related driving offense which is a misdemeanor or a county or city ordinance violation and which is not a conviction for driving a commercial motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and who since such date has not been convicted of any other alcohol-related driving offense may apply to the court in which he or she pled guilty or was sentenced for an order to expunge from all official records all recordations of his or her arrest, plea, trial or conviction.
[66] 7th Amendment – “In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”
[67] As of Friday June 07, 2013 10:35:19.91 AM
[68] As regards Punitive Damages, without punitive damages the federal/state/local electorate may assume the risk.  Is that not what the racist did with “Jim Crow.”  The Racist succeeded with “Jim Crow” because the odds of the risk were on their side with Judicial Immunity attached to their like minded criminal judges.   The assumption of RISK has to be deterred by the potential for open ended punitive damages and the 7th Amendment.  Let’s not let the same thing happen with “Jane Crow,” sexual discrimination in Family for the Mother over the Father, as we did with “Jim Crow.”
[69] This amount is escalating based on the most recent denial in the 8th Circuit Court of appeals on Tuesday June 14, 2011 12:00.00 AM see attached dated spread sheet for current escalating total dated Wednesday May 22, 2013 01:23.48 PM.
[70] If this is not whistle blowing I do not know what is.  This is corruption on a massive scale.  Whistle-Blower Awarded $104 Million by I.R.S., New York Times, September 11, 2012, By DAVID KOCIENIEWSKI, Sometimes, crime does pay.  If crime pays that well, I would think that my struggle for broad based Civil Rights FOR ALL should pay at least if not better than CRIME!!!!
[71] Tarek al-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi (29 March 1984 – 4 January 2011; Arabic: محمد البوعزيزي‎) was a Tunisian  street vendor who set himself on fire on 17 December 2010, in protest of the confiscation of his wares and the harassment and humiliation that he reported was inflicted on him by a municipal official and her aides.


Thanks in advance

To Kill a Mocking Bird, The Denial of Due Process
“agere sequitor esse”
“Time is of the essence”
David G. Jeep
http://dgjeep.blogspot.com/
E-mail is preferred Dave@DGJeep.com, DGJeep@DGJeep.com
(314) 514-5228
David G. Jeep
c/o The Bridge
1610 Olive Street,

Saint Louis, MO 63103-2316

The Court’s orders “granting” or “denying” cert. are issued as simple statements of actions taken, without explanation.

See, e.g. Jimenez v. Quarterman 555 U.S.__(2009).

RG

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