Emergency Management and Response
Information Sharing and Analysis Center
The EMR-ISAC InfoGram for July 3, 2013 contains the following articles:
1. Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
2. Coping with Traumatic Events: NIH Resources
3. Hay Fires and Spontaneous Combustion
4. Updates on MERS and the H2N2v Flu Strain
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has released a information sheet for first responders (PDF, 371 Kb) on the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS), the guideline helping DHS regulate security at chemical facilities considered to be high-risk.
Examples of such facilities are mining operations; chemical storage, distribution, or manufacturing facilities; or even healthcare centers.
Chemical facilities should engage emergency responders in the development of the Site Security Plans, enabling responders to know what threats, vulnerabilities, and risks they may face and prepare well before a potential incident.
Likewise, emergency responder agencies may bring up issues and concerns the facility staff hadn’t considered.
The CFATS program has a number of tools available:
•The Help Desk provides support for facility owners and operates an anonymous tip line for reporting security issues;
•The Knowledge Center stores articles, documents, and an FAQ section;
•Subject matter experts and security inspectors are available for calls and outreach meetings.
Coping with Traumatic Events: NIH Resources
Neuroscience and Psychiatry video
Several deadly natural disasters, accidents, and incidents of violence occurred in United States in the past year, all shocking and saddening. Partially because of this, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) has updated their web page on coping with traumatic events.
People respond to crisis, strong images, and traumatic stress differently. Depending on a person’s life events or background, images on the news may bring back pain or trauma from their past. Information on anxiety disorders, depression, and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is included on the NIH site, along with details for finding more resources on dealing with these issues.
The Worst Yet to Come
Children are especially susceptible to stress and traumatic images from violence or disasters. Emergency responders may unwittingly bring home stories or personal stress that can affect their children.
Children may see images of hurricane destruction on TV and worry their home is next. NIH provides guides to parents, community members, and rescue workers for talking with children and adolescents about these topics.
Hay Fires and Spontaneous Combustion
Spontaneous combustion caused Farnham barn fire
Every year, improperly dried and stored hay ruins harvested crops, kills livestock and destroys barns or storage facilities.
The U.S. Fire Administration (USFA) released the Coffee Break Training “Spontaneous Heating of Agricultural Products”
(pdf) Coffee Break Training – Fire Protection Series – Fire Dynamics to inform firefighters about the causes of these fires.
Freshly cut hay, straw and other crops continue to respire, providing and optimal environment for bacteria or mold. If the hay is baled while it is too moist, bacteria and mold will continue to grow and produce heat.
Once the bale reaches 185 degrees it may produce hot spots; if it reaches 212 degrees, it will likely ignite.
Several hidden hazards exist with hay fires, and firefighters in heavily agricultural areas should be prepared for them.
•Pesticides on the hay may present toxic smoke
•Gasoline or other flammable chemicals may be stored nearby and explode;
•Unseen burned out cavities may exist within hay bales, causing instability of each bale and of the stack itself.
According to the National Ag Safety Database, stored hay should have a moisture level of 25% or less, depending on the size of the bale.
They also recommend any firefighter checking the temperature of stored hay should be in full turnout gear,
Oklahoma State University has a 5-minute video about hay fires that discusses conditions leading to hay fires in more detail.
Updates on MERS and the H3N2v Flu Strain
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is monitoring the progression of the Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV), the SARS-like disease first seen in 2012. The CDC updates their MERS website regularly with new information; the latest is a guide for travelers visiting Saudi Arabia.
No cases of MERS have been seen in the United States so far, but as more than11,000 Americans visit Mecca each year and are expected between July and October, medical workers should review the CDC’s MERS guidance for health care workers and laboratory staff in the event so me travelers return home infected.
Last year, 309 people tested positive for swine flu strain H3N2v in the United States
The first cases for this year were reported in Indiana last week.
June 27, 2013
H3N2v detection of four cases of variant influenza A (H3N2v).
All individuals visited the Grant County Agricultural Fair, June 16-22, prior to illness.
Most of the cases last year and all the cases so far this year were related to visits to fairs with swine exhibits.
The CDC recommends people with a high risk of contracting the flu stay away from such exhibits at fairs
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards and the Role of Emergency Responders
In October 2006, Congress authorized and required the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to regulate security at chemical facilities that DHS determines are high-risk.
To implement this authority, DHS issued the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards regulation (CFATS) in 2007. Under CFATS, facilities that have been finally determined by DHS to be high-risk are required to develop and implement
What are the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards?
CFATS is a risk-based performance program that sets the standards for security at the Nation’s highest risk chemical facilities.
High-risk facilities contain Chemicals of Interest (COI) that give rise to one or more security issues, to include the release of toxic chemicals, the theft or diversion of chemicals, and chemicals that can be used for sabotage or contamination.
CFATS-covered facilities are required to have a Site Security Plan that addresses risk-based performance standards (RBPS).
Facilities subject to CFATS include but are not limited to:
- Colleges and universities
What is the Role of the Emergency Responder?
Collaboration between CFATS facilities and emergency responders is critical to ensuring a secure and resilient community.
Emergency responders play an important role as CFATS-covered facilities develop and implement their Site Security Plan. The SSP is created in coordination with the emergency response community, adhering to DHS
risk-based performance standards. Several risk-based performance standards may impact the emergency response community including:
- Detect, deter, delay
- Specific threats, vulnerabilities, or risks
- Identifying security incidents
- Reporting security incidents
How is Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI) Protected?
is a new category of information protection authorized by Congress for this regulation. CVI protects information about CFATS-covered facilities and security operations.
Although most information needed by emergency responders is not CVI, DHS anticipates that certain situations will arise where emergency responders and CFATS-covered facilities would need to share some CVI. In these instances, the emergency responder would need to complete the CVI training and DHS would make a determination on their need to know prior to sharing the information.
Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information
Section 550(c) of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 provides the Department with the authority to protect from inappropriate public disclosure any information developed pursuant to Section 550, “including vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other security related information, records, and documents.” In considering this issue, “the Department recognized that there are strong reasons to avoid the unnecessary proliferation of new categories of sensitive but unclassified information, consistent with the President’s Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies” of December 16, 2005, entitled “Guidelines and Requirements in Support of the Information Sharing Environment.” With Section 550(c), however, Congress acknowledged the national security risks posed by releasing information relating to the security and/or vulnerability of high risk chemical facilities to the public generally. For all information generated under the chemical security program established under Section 550, Congress gave the Department broad discretion to employ its expertise in protecting sensitive security and vulnerability information. Accordingly, the Department proposes herein a category of information for certain chemical security information called Chemical-terrorism Security and Vulnerability Information (CVI).
Civil penalties may apply for the improper use or disclosure of CVI. More information on this category of information and CVI training can be accessed at
Areas of concern?
In May, 1999, India surprised the CIA — and nearly everyone else except, perhaps, Pakistan, who seems to have been nearly ready — by setting off several underground nuclear explosions. Then Pakistan, claiming self-defense, followed suit. But what would actually happen if India and Pakistan had a nuclear exchange?
Most people in India and in Pakistan (and in the U.S.) probably do not know that as many as 9 out of 10 people — or more — who die from a nuclear blast, do not die in the explosion itself. Most people probably think that if they die from a nuclear blast, they will simply see a flash and get quickly cooked.
Those within approximately a six square mile area (for a 1 megaton blast) will indeed be close enough to “ground zero” to be killed by the gamma rays emitting from the blast itself. Ghostly shadows of these people will be formed on any concrete or stone that lies behind them, and they will be no more. They literally won’t know what hit them, since they will be vaporized before the electrical signals from their sense organs can reach their brains.
Of the many victims of a nuclear war, these are the luckiest ones, of course.
Outside the circle where people will be instantly vaporized from the initial gamma radiation blast, the light from the explosion (which is many times hotter than the sun) is so bright that it will immediately and permanently blind every living thing, including farm animals (including cows, sacred or otherwise), pets, birds while in flight and not to mention peasants, Maharajah’s, and Government officials — and soldiers, of course. Whether their eyes are opened or closed. This will happen for perhaps 10 miles around in every direction (for a 1 megaton bomb) — further for those who happen to be looking towards the blast at the moment of detonation. Even from fifty miles away, a 1 megaton blast will be many times brighter than the noonday sun. Those looking directly at the blast will have a large spot permanently burned into their retinas, where the light receptor cells will have been destroyed. The huge bright cloud being nearly instantly formed in front of them (made in part from those closer to the blast, who have already “become death”), will be the last clear image these people will see.
Most people who will die from the nuclear explosion will not die in the initial gamma ray burst, nor in the multi-spectral heat blast (mostly X-ray and ultraviolet wavelengths) which will come about a tenth of a second after the gamma burst. Nor will the pressure wave which follows over the next few seconds do most of them in, though it will cause bleeding from every orifice. Nor even will most people be killed by the momentary high winds which accompany the pressure wave. These winds will reach velocities of hundreds of miles an hour near the epicenter of the blast, and will reach velocities of 70 miles per hour as far as 6 miles from the blast (for a 1 megaton bomb). The high winds and flying debris will cause shrapnel-type wounds and blunt-trauma injuries.
Together, the pressure wave and the accompanying winds will do in quite a few, and damage most of the rest of the people (and animals, and structures) in a huge circle — perhaps hundreds of square miles in area.
Later, these people will begin to suffer from vomiting, skin rashes, and an intense unquenchable thirst as their hair falls out in clumps. Their skin will begin to peel off. This is because the internal molecular structure of the living cells within their bodies is breaking down, a result of the disruptive effects of the high radiation dose they received. All the animals will be similarly suffering. Since they have already received the dose, these effects will show up even if the people are immediately evacuated from the area — hardly likely, since everything around will be destroyed and the country would be at war.
But this will not concern them at this time: Their immediate threat after the gamma blast, heat blast, pressure wave and sudden fierce wind (first going in the direction of the pressure wave — outwardly from the blast — then a moment later, a somewhat weaker wind in the opposite direction), will be the firestorm which will quickly follow, with its intense heat and hurricane-force winds, all driving towards the center where the radioactive mushroom-shaped cloud will be rising, feeding it, enlarging it, and pushing it miles up into the sky.
The cloud from a 1 megaton blast will reach nearly 10 miles across and equally high. Soon after forming, it will turn white because of water condensation around it and within it. In an hour or so, it will have largely dissipated, which means that its cargo of death can no longer be tracked visually. People will need to be evacuated from under the fallout, but they will have a hard time knowing where to go. Only for the first day or so will visible pieces of fallout appear on the ground, such as marble-sized chunks of radioactive debris and flea-sized dots of blackened particles. After that the descending debris from the radioactive cloud will become invisible and harder to track; the fallout will only be detectable with Geiger counters carried by people in “moon suits”. But all the moon suits will already be in use in the known affected area. Probably, no one will be tracking the cloud. One U.S. test in the South Pacific resulted in a cigar-shaped contamination area 340 miles long and up to 60 miles wide. It spread 20 miles *upwind* from the test site, and 320 miles downwind. Where exactly it goes all depends on the winds and the rains at the time. It is difficult to predict where the cloud will travel before it happens, and it is likewise difficult to track the cloud as it moves and dissipates around the globe. While underground testing is bad enough for the environment, a single large above-ground explosion is likely to result in measurable global increases of a whole spectrum of health effects. India or Pakistan will deny culpability for these deaths, of course. The responsible nations, including my own, always do.
But the people who were affected by the blast itself will not be worrying about the fallout just yet.
A 1 megaton nuclear bomb creates a firestorm that can cover 100 square miles. A 20 megaton blast’s firestorm can cover nearly 2500 square miles. Hiroshima and Nagasaki were small cities, and by today’s standards the bombs dropped on them were small bombs.
The Allied firebombing of nearly 150 cities during World War Two in Germany and Japan seldom destroyed more than 25 square miles at a time, and each of those raids required upwards of 400 planes, and thousands of crewmembers going into harm’s way. It was not done lightly. And, they did not leave a lingering legacy of lethal radioactive contamination.
In the span of a lunch hour, one multi-warhead nuclear missile can destroy more cities than all the incendiary raids in history, and the only thing the combatant needs to do to carry off such a horror is to sit in air-conditioned comfort hundreds or even thousands of miles away, and push a button. He would barely have to interrupt his lunch. With automation, he wouldn’t even have to do that! The perpetrator of this crime against humanity may never have seen his adversary. He only needs to be good at following the simplest of orders. A robot could do it. One would think, that ONLY a robot WOULD do it.
Nuclear war is never anything less than genocide.
The developing firestorm is what the survivors of the initial blast will be worrying about — if they can think straight at all. Many will have become instantly “shell-shocked” — incapacitated and unable to proceed. Many will simply go mad. Perhaps they are among the “lucky” ones, as well.
The firestorm produces hurricane-force winds in a matter of minutes. The fire burns so hot that the asphalt in the streets begins to melt and then burn, even as people are trying to run across it, literally melting into the pavement themselves as they run. Victims, on fire, jump into rivers, only to catch fire again when they surface for air. Yet it is hard to see even these pitiable souls as the least lucky ones in a nuclear attack.
For the survivors of the initial blast who do not then die in the firestorm that follows, many will die painfully over the next few weeks, often after a brief, hopeful period where they appear to be getting better. It might begin as a tingling sensation on the skin, or an itching, which starts shortly after the blast. These symptoms are signs that the body is starting to break down internally, at the molecular level. The insides of those who get a severe dose of gamma radiation, but manage to survive the other traumas, whose organs had once been well defined as lungs, liver, heart, intestines, etc., begin to resemble an undefined mass of bloody pulp. Within days, or perhaps weeks, the victim, usually bleeding painfully from every hole and pore in their body, at last dies and receives their final mercy.
But this too will probably not be how most victims of a nuclear attack will die.
A significant percentage, probably most, of the people who die from a nuclear attack will die much later, from the widespread release of radioactive material into the environment. These deaths will occur all over the world, for centuries to come. Scattered deaths, and pockets of higher mortality rates, will continue from cancer, leukemia, and other health effects, especially genetic damage to succeeding generations.
Nuclear weapons do not recognize the end of a war, or signed peace treaties, or even the deaths of all the combatants. They simply keep on killing a percentage of whoever happens to inhale or ingest their deadly byproducts.
Some deaths will occur hundreds and even thousands of miles away, because low levels of ionizing radiation are capable of causing the full spectrum of health effects, albeit at a lower rate within the population. Not to mention the radioactive runoff from the rivers and streams that flow through the blast area and the area under the radioactive mushroom cloud’s drift. It may carry its deadly cargo for thousands of miles, raining a fallout of death only on some cities, and not on others. It will land upon nations which had not been involved in any way in India’s dispute with Pakistan. These nations will be mighty hurt and mighty upset.
Nuclear weapons do not recognize international borders.
Finally, an atmospheric blast of a nuclear “device” creates an EMP (Electro-Magnetic Pulse) which can be as large as Pakistan or even India — perhaps even larger than India and Pakistan together. The higher the altitude of the blast, the bigger the circle of damage will be from the EMP. This is a very serious concern for those of us in the high-tech industries, such as myself.
The Electro-Magnetic Pulse will electrify all sorts of metallic structures that are not normally electrified except by the occasional short circuit or lightening strike. This will be a lot like the whole country getting struck by lightening all at the same time.
As computer chips make better and better use of “real estate”, using more and more delicate electronic circuits, the more tightly-packed transistors, capacitors, diodes and resistors become more and more vulnerable to the EMP which will be carried into the chips via the connecting wires. The Electro-Magnetic Pulse is one of the reasons above-ground testing was stopped. (The other reason was that it became impossible to deny that the radiation dispersed by the tests was killing people.)
Pacemakers, for example, may stop working because of the “hit” from the EMP. It will be quite something to see people in a thousand mile radius of the epicenter of the blast (or further) who are using pacemakers, suddenly drop dead, and all the computers permanently go down and all the lights go out, all at the same time. And commercial and private aircraft will drop out of the sky, since their sensitive electronics and fly-by-wire systems are not very well shielded from the EMP. These planes will then not be available for evacuation purposes, nor will they be available to air-drop food, water, morphine and cyanide, all of which will be in great demand throughout the area.
A year ago people were dancing in the streets over this in both India and Pakistan. Why?
Home plumbing systems and most other plumbing systems are good examples of large metallic structures that will suddenly become electrified, destroying the motors, gauges, electronics, etc. which are attached to the plumbing systems. More and more pumping equipment is computer controlled nowadays for efficiency. Imbedded controllers are becoming prevalent but as they do, the potential damage from the Electro-Magnetic Pulse increases dramatically.
Train tracks will also carry the charge, as well as telephone wiring. All these things will have a nearly simultaneous surge of energy sent through them, igniting gas containers such as fuel storage tanks, propane tanks, and so on. Whatever doesn’t blow up will at least stop working.
My country has lived under the Russian and Chinese threat of nuclear war for many decades now, and it is not a pleasant thought. This is nothing to dance about. There is no benefit to having, or using, nuclear weapons.
I think the world would be a better place if we all stopped and said, “I will not be a part of this. I do not need these weapons, for I would never commit this sin against my own children, nor against my neighbor’s children, nor against my enemy’s children, nor even against my enemy. I choose not to be a part of this madness.”
There is a greater battle mankind must fight than against each other. Humanity’s fight right now, is for humanity’s general survival despite depleted and poorly used resources, environmental degradation (there is none greater than that from a nuclear explosion), dwindling effectiveness of antibiotics and other wonder drugs, an uneven distribution of available food, knowledge and wealth, and against weapons of mass destruction.
America had three excuses for her previous use of nuclear weapons in war, which we plead every time it is mentioned. First, we claim that we did not understand back then (over 50 years ago) all the ways nuclear weapons damage the Earth and her living inhabitants. Second, we claim that there was a war going on, and that had we not used these weapons, perhaps a million soldiers would have died invading Japan instead. But this second excuse is weakened by the knowledge that Japan was at that time very near collapse anyway. She was without an air defense, a sea defense, she did not have advanced radar, she had lost all her good pilots, millions of soldiers were either dead, wounded, captured, or uselessly stuck on nameless islands in the middle of the Pacific, and towns in her homeland were being firebombed on almost a nightly basis.
Our third excuse was that both Japan (and definitely Germany) were building their own nuclear weapons, and DEFINITELY would have used them against us had they succeeded in developing “the bomb” before the war ended. The war could not go on forever. We were, indeed, running out of time.
Perhaps these excuses are insufficient, but India and Pakistan haven’t even got them. India can, and therefore should, along with Pakistan, renounce nuclear weapons and the nuclear option. Perhaps her populace does not understand the full nature of the threat of nuclear weapons, and thus they are dancing in the streets, but I hope that her leaders do. However, I strongly suspect most of them are unaware of the things I have written about in this newsletter. Perhaps you, dear reader, will help me to educate them in this matter.
Sources for more information about the effects of nuclear weapons:
For more information on the Electromagnetic Pulse (which can also be created with non-nuclear weapons) you might start with a visit to this URL (which is, actually, specifically about non-nuclear EMP devices):
Computers used in data processing systems, communications systems, displays, industrial control applications, including road and rail signalling, and those embedded in military equipment, such as signal processors, electronic flight controls and digital engine control systems, are all potentially vulnerable to the EMP effect.
Other electronic devices and electrical equipment may also be destroyed by the EMP effect. Telecommunications equipment can be highly vulnerable, due to the presence of lengthy copper cables between devices. Receivers of all varieties are particularly sensitive to EMP, as the highly sensitive miniature high frequency transistors and diodes in such equipment are easily destroyed by exposure to high voltage electrical transients. Therefore radar and electronic warfare equipment, satellite, microwave, UHF, VHF, HF and low band communications equipment and television equipment are all potentially vulnerable to the EMP effect.
It is significant that modern military platforms are densely packed with electronic equipment, and unless these platforms are well hardened, an EMP device can substantially reduce their function or render them unusable.
Infowar.Com & Interpact, Inc.
For a photo of the famous wooden-trestle electromagnetic pulse (EMP) simulator at Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico (with a B-52 bomber sitting on top of it):
Visit the Federation of American Scientists’ web site for a more detailed discussion of the effect of nuclear weapons:
In 1962 the Department of the Air Force produced Air Force Pamphlet No. 136-1-3, by order of the Secretary of the Air Force Curtis E. LeMay. Titled The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, it was published by the United States Atomic Energy Commission in April of that year and was a revision of the 1957 edition of the same title. In the forward by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission Glenn T. Seaborg, we are told, “There is a need for widespread public understanding of the best information available on the effects of nuclear weapons. The purpose of this book is to present as accurately as possible, within the limits of national security, a comprehensive summary of this information.”
In other words, fiction wherever they thought it necessary.
However, there are several interesting statements to readers:
—– FROM “THE EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS” —-
From Paragraph 11.197:
“…in the great majority of cases, mutations have deleterious effects of some kind.”
“Hemorrhage is a common phenomenon after radiation exposure because the megakaryocytes, from which the blood platelets necessary for clotting are formed, are destroyed and the platelets are not replenished. If hemorrhage occurs in vital centers, death can result. Often the hemorrhages are so widespread that severe anemia and death are the consequences.”
“The loss of the epithelial coverings of tissues, together with the loss of white cells and antibodies, lowers the resistance of the body to bacterial and viral invasion. if death does not take place in the first few days after a large dose of radiation, bacterial invasion of the blood stream usually occurs and the patient dies of infection. Often such infections are caused by bacteria which, under normal circumstances, are harmless.”
U. S. Government photos:
Cover of The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, 1962, U.S. Gov’t Printing Office
First Thermonuclear Explosion, November 1st, 1952, Eniwetok Proving Grounds (color photograph)
Title Page from The Effects of Nuclear Weapons
Page 49: Figure 2.49: Late stage of the condensation cloud in an air burst over water
Page 105: Figure 3.06: Variation of pressure with time at a fixed location and effect of a blast wave passing over a structure. (Note position of dog in each frame.)
Page 568: Figure 11.51: The patient’s skin is burned in a pattern corresponding to the dark portions of a kimono worn at the time of the explosion.
Page 591: Table 11.111: Summary of clinical effects of acute ionizing radiation. (NOTE: this page misrepresents the dangers!)
Page 630: Figure 12.08: Idealized ranges for effects of air burst with the heights of burst optimized to give the maximum range for each individual effect.
This essay was originally published in the STOP CASSINI newsletter #123
REGIONAL INFORMATION (color coded)
By State: AL AK AR AZ CA CO CT DE DC FL GA HI IA
ID IL IN KS KY LA MA MD ME MI MN MO MS MT
NC ND NE NH NJ NM NV NY OH OK OR PA PR
SC SD TN TX UT VA VT WA WI WV WY
There are over 100 operating nuclear power plants in America and 16 non-operational power plants, and a large number of nuclear fuel and weapons facilities. The more you know about these places, the more frightened you’ll be — and should be!
How can we protect our nuclear power plants?
Don’t count on the plant security forces — they aren’t nearly strong enough. These plants are each vulnerable to air strikes, truck bombs, boat bombs, and of course, the well-equipped and well-armed single madman or small group of terrorists. All anyone needs to do is toss a grenade into a Spent Fuel Pool and hundreds of thousands or even MILLIONS could die.
When a power company decides to close its nuclear power plant permanently, the facility must be decommissioned by safely removing it from service and reducing residual radioactivity to a level that permits release of the property and termination of the operating license. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has strict rules governing nuclear power plant decommissioning, involving cleanup of radioactively contaminated plant systems and structures and removal of the radioactive fuel. These requirements protect workers and the public during the entire decommissioning process and the public after the license is terminated.
|Decommissioning Status for Shut Down NRC-Licensed Power Reactors
(As of April 2013)
|Big Rock Point
||ISFSI Only *
|Crystal River 3
||Crystal River, FL
||Monroe Co., MI
|Fort St. Vrain
||Alameda Co., CA
||Haddam Neck, CT
|Humboldt Bay 3
|Indian Point 1
||Sioux Falls, SD
|Peach Bottom 1
||York Co., PA
|San Onofre 1
||San Clemente, CA
||Suffolk Co., NY
|Three Mile Island 2
||Franklin Co., MA
|Zion 1 and 2
||An independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) is a stand-alone facility within the plant boundary constructed for the interim storage of spent nuclear fuel. ISFSI Only means the plant license has been reduced to include only the spent fuel storage facility.
||Rancho Seco has a low-level waste storage facility in addition to its ISFSI.
||Post-defueling monitored storage (PDMS).
Power Reactors in the Decommissioning Process
Current updates of all power reactor sites undergoing decommissioning are available at: http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/power-reactor/.
Crystal River – Unit 3
Crystal River 3, in Crystal River, Fla., entered an extended shutdown in 2009 when cracks were discovered in the wall of its containment dome. In February 2013, Duke Energy decided not to attempt costly repairs and certified to the NRC that the plant had permanently ceased operations and that the fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor.
Dresden – Unit 1
The plant, near Morris, Ill., shut down in October 1978 and is currently in SAFSTOR. The decommissioning plan (DP) was approved in September 1993. No significant dismantlement activities are underway. Isolation of Unit 1 from Units 2 and 3 is complete. All spent fuel from Unit 1 that was previously stored in the Unit 1 spent fuel pool (SFP), the Unit 1 fuel transfer pool, and the Unit 2 SFP has now been transferred to the on-site independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI). Currently, 108 spent fuel assemblies and one fuel rod basket from Unit 1 are stored in the Dresden Unit 3 SFP. The licensee plans to have decontamination and dismantlement of Unit 1 take place from 2029 through 2031 when Units 2 and 3 are nearing the end of their life. Following decontamination and dismantlement of Units 2 and 3, site restoration will be conducted in 2035 and 2036, with final site surveys to be performed in late 2036.
Fermi – Unit 1
The plant, in Monroe County, Mich., was shut down in September 1972 and is currently in SAFSTOR. The spent fuel, reactor vessel, piping, bulk sodium and liquid waste tanks have been removed from the site. The licensee is performing occupational safety enhancement activities, concentrating in non-radioactive areas, such as asbestos removal. The PSDAR public meeting was held on April 22, 1998.
GE- VBWR (Vallecitos Boiling Water Reactor)
The plant, in Alameda County, Calif., was shut down in December 1963 and issued a possession-only license in 1965. The plant is in SAFSTOR and plans to remain in SAFSTOR until ongoing nuclear activities at the site are terminated and the entire site can be decommissioned. All nuclear fuel has been removed from the site.
Humboldt Bay – Unit 3
The plant, near Eureka, Calif., was shut down in July 1976. A Decommissioning Plan (DP) was approved in July 1988 – currently called a Defueled Safety Analysis Report, it is updated every two years. A post-shutdown activities report (PSDAR) was issued by the licensee in February 1998. The transfer of spent fuel from the fuel storage pool to the ISFSI was completed in December 2008 and limited decontamination and dismantlement of HBPP Unit 3 decommissioning commenced. In 2010, the construction of a new fossil-fueled generation station on site was completed. The licensee has completed demolition of the non-nuclear Unit 1 and Unit 2. A license termination plan was submitted in May 2013.
Indian Point – Unit 1
The plant, in Buchanan, N.Y., was shut down in October 1974. Currently, there is no significant dismantlement underway. The owner plans to decommission Unit 1 concurrently with Unit 2, which remains in operation. The PSDAR public meeting was held on Jan. 20, 1999.
The plant, in La Crosse, Wis., was shut down on April 30, 1987. The SAFSTOR DP was approved Aug. 7, 1991. The DP is considered the PSDAR. The PSDAR public meeting was held on May 13, 1998. The licensee has been conducting limited dismantlement and decommissioning activities and completed transferring spent fuel to an ISFSI in September 2012.
Millstone – Unit 1
Unit 1, near Waterford, Conn., was shut down Nov. 4, 1995, and transfer of the spent fuel to the SFP was completed Nov. 19, 1995. On July 21, 1998, the licensee certified to the NRC that, as of July 17, 1998, Millstone Unit 1 had permanently ceased operations and that fuel had been permanently removed from the reactor vessel. The owner’s current plan is to leave the plant in SAFSTOR until the Unit 2 license expires, which is currently scheduled for July 31, 2015. The owner submitted its required PSDAR on June 14, 1999, and has chosen a combination of the DECON and SAFSTOR options.
Safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) remaining at Millstone Unit 1 are associated with the SFP “island” where the Millstone Unit 1 spent fuel is stored. Other than non-essential systems supporting the balance of plant facilities, the remaining plant equipment has been disabled and abandoned in place or removed from the unit and can no longer be used for power generation.
The ship was removed from service in 1970 and its fuel removed in October 1971. The reactor is currently in SAFSTOR. The Nuclear Ship (NS) Savannah was removed from the Maritime Administration Reserve Fleet in the James River, Va. In May 2008, the NS Savannah was relocated from the Hampton Roads area of Virginia to Baltimore, Md. The Department of Transportation plans to complete decommissioning and terminate the license by 2031.
Peach Bottom – Unit 1
The plant, in York County, Pa., was shut down in October 1974 and is in SAFSTOR with no significant dismantlement underway. Active decommissioning of Unit 1 is not expected until 2034, when Units 2 and 3 are scheduled to shut down. The PSDAR public meeting was held on June 29, 1998. The spent fuel has been removed from the site and is stored at the Idaho National Laboratory.
San Onofre – Unit 1
Southern California Edison (SCE) shut down the reactor, located near San Clemente, in November 1992 and placed it in SAFSTOR until the planned shutdown of Units 2 and 3 in 2022. In 1998, following a change in NRC decommissioning regulations, SCE submitted a PSDAR for San Onofre Unit 1 to commence DECON in 2000. Since that time, the fuel has been placed in an ISFSI. SCE has removed all structures down to the -8’ building level. In late 2008, the licensee completed Phase 2 of the planned ISFSI expansion by locating it on the former containment building site. In 2010, NRC approved SCE’s request for a partial site release of the off-shore cooling pipes. The Part 50 license remaining is for the reactor pressure vessel in storage and the ISFSI.
Three Mile Island – Unit 2
The operating accident at this reactor, near Middletown, Pa., occurred in March 1979. Plant de-fueling was completed in April 1990. Post de-fueling monitored storage was approved in 1993. There is no significant dismantlement underway. The plant shares equipment with the other operating unit, which was sold to Amergen (now Exelon) in 1999. GPU Nuclear, which is owned by FirstEnergy, retains the license for Three Mile Island Unit 2 and contracts to Exelon for maintenance and surveillance activities. Both units are currently expected to be decommissioned together when Unit 1 ceases operation. The U.S. Department of Energy has taken title and possession of the spent fuel (except for some debris in the primary systems), which is currently in storage at the Idaho National Laboratory.
Zion – Units 1 And 2
Zion Units 1 and 2, near Zion, Ill., were permanently shut down on Feb.13, 1998. The fuel was transferred to the spent fuel pool, and the owner submitted the certification of fuel transfer on March 9, 1998. The licensee is maintaining the turbine-generators as synchronous condensers to support grid stability and has isolated the spent fuel pool within a fuel building “nuclear island.” The owner submitted the PSDAR, site-specific cost estimate, and fuel management plan on Feb. 14, 2000. On Sept. 1, 2010, the facility license was transferred from Exelon to ZionSolutions for the express purpose of expediting decommissioning. ZionSolutions intends to use a “rip and ship” process that will reduce the labor-intensive separation of contaminated materials and transport the materials in bulk to the EnergySolutions disposal site in Utah. Completion of the spent fuel transfer to the ISFSI is scheduled for 2014. Submittal of the LTP is scheduled for 2015 and license termination in 2020.
More on power Nuclear Power Plants:
The Fort Calhoun Nuclear Generating Station is a nuclear power plant located on 660 acres (270 ha) between Fort Calhoun, and Blair, Nebraska adjacent to the Missouri River between mile markers 645.6 and 646.0. The utility has an easement for another 580 acres (230 ha) which is maintained in a natural state. The power plant is owned by the Omaha Public Power District of Omaha, Nebraska and operated by Exelon Nuclear Partners. When operational, the plant accounts for 25 percent of OPPD’s net generation capabilities, but has been shut down since April 2011 because regulators have found several problems.
This plant has one Combustion Engineering pressurized water reactor generating 484 megawatts of electricity. This is currently the smallest rated capacity among all operating commercial power reactors in North America, and as a single-unit plant, this also qualifies it as the smallest rated capacity nuclear power plant. OPPD’s two Nebraska City coal-fired plants at 682 (opened 2009) and 649 (opened 1979) MW are both significantly larger.
Fort Calhoun houses spent fuel rods in a 40 foot deep spent fuel pool next to the reactor, and when the pool had nearly reached capacity in 2006, OPPD began to store spent fuel rods above ground in dry cask storage as well. In total, the Ft. Calhoun reactor has 600,000 to 800,000 pounds of high level nuclear waste. The storage was not designed to house spent fuel permanently, but when plans for Yucca Mountain nuclear waste repository were terminated, OPPD stated that they are “prepared to safely store material on-site as long as necessary”
To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2014 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
- Full Title
An original bill to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2014 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes.
- No summaries available.
Last updated Jun 20, 2013.
DHS Compliance Assistance and Outreach
DHS has developed a variety of tools to facilitate compliance with CFATS: The CSAT Help Desk provides timely support to chemical facility owners and operators as well as a CFATS tip-line for anonymous chemical facility security reporting. It can be reached at 1-866-323-2957, or at firstname.lastname@example.org
The CFATS Knowledge Center is an online repository of Frequently Asked Questions, articles, and documents relating to CFATS and Ammonium Nitrate Programs. It can be found by visiting http://csat-help.dhs.gov/.
Chemical Security Inspectors and other DHS subject matter experts are available to provide guidance to facilities through outreach meetings, calls, and other engagements.
For more information visit: http://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure
To ask a Department representative to speak on the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) regulatory program, please contact
For more information, see www.dhs.gov/chemical
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